Search results

The legislation on shared parental leave that came into force on 1st of December 2014 is aimed at giving working mothers the opportunity to return to work early if they so choose after childbirth to continue with their career and also to give fathers the opportunity to be involved in the lives of their new-born. However, past research has demonstrated a very low uptake on shared parental leave. This paper aims to argue that working parents’ awareness on the existence of the legislation is key to its effectiveness.

A qualitative study approach was adopted to assess the importance of awareness. A sample of 40 eligible working parents were informally interviewed for 10 min to ascertain whether they know about shared parental leave. Participants were recruited at a primary school fair. The 40 parents were workers in different sectors which included care, hospitality, security, education, finance, retail and construction.

The findings indicated that awareness may be one key factor as to why the uptake of shared parental leave was low. It was also evident from the results that employers do not inform eligible employees of the existence of shared parental leave or support and encourage them to take shared parental leave. This paper concludes that to assess the effectiveness of shared parental leave, awareness is key.

The findings of this article are obtained from a limited time interview data. This paper is a basis for a bigger research project particularly on the reasons why mothers may or may not want to share their maternity leave.

Existing research has surveyed some employers and their employees and concluded uptake statistics based on their data. This study demonstrates that more awareness is required which has not been done yet. This research is part of an ongoing project investigating the reasons why mothers may or may not want to share their maternity leave, given that the legislation made mothers “gatekeepers” to the effectiveness of shared parental leave.

The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK.

The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration.

The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives’ position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated.

The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists.

This paper aims to examine the Salomon principle of separate legal personality and its impact on the regulation of directors’ remuneration in the UK. The aim of the paper is to explore the Salomon principle to determine whether it serves as a driving factor for directors’ remuneration levels. The paper will also examine the restrictive approach of the courts to move away from the principle and their reluctance to get involved in directors’ remuneration issues of a company. The paper explains the Salomon principle, describes the nature of the problem on directors’ remuneration and provides an analysis on how the Salomon principle impacts on the directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on the directors’ remuneration and the concept of separate legal entity. The paper critically reviews the impact of the concept of separate entity on directors’ remuneration.

The paper finds that the courts are reluctant to come away from the concept of separate legal personality as well as reluctant to get involved with directors’ remuneration. This reluctance of the court makes the concept of separate legal personality to act as one of the drivers of directors’ remuneration.

The paper offers a different explanation into why directors’ remuneration continuous to be an issue in the UK. It points out that the concept of separate legal personality is a potential driver of directors’ remuneration in the UK.

This paper aim to examine the implication of section 172(1)(b) on employment rights, particularly on workers on precarious employment contracts. The aim of the paper is to analyse whether company directors have any liability for potential abuse of worker on precarious employment contracts. The paper examine the advantage of companies recruiting staff on precarious employment contracts and the effect of such contract on the worker.

The paper reviews case law, statutory provisions and academic opinions on precarious employment contracts and its advantages and disadvantages to the company and the worker. The paper critically reviews the impact of Section 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act 2006 on precarious employment contract workers.

The paper argues that companies benefit more from precarious employment contracts than workers do. The Companies Act 2006 is silent on whether directors should factor the interest of precarious employment worker when making company decision, thereby leaving these workers in a vulnerable position and at the mercy of the employers.

The paper offers a different argument about why the use of precarious employment contracts is on the rise in the UK. It highlights the silence of the Companies Act 2006 as a driver for the increase in the use of precarious employment contracts in the UK.

This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the two approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of directors’ remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and the challenges it face in regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges faced.

The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.

The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors’ remuneration can be effective in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of advice that the remuneration consultants offer to the companies on executive pay. It explores how the advice offered affects the level of executive remuneration. Furthermore, it investigates whether the nature of advice offered forms part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay.

This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA.

This paper demonstrates that remuneration consultants’ advice on executive remuneration is not always objective. The nature of advice depends on whether the consultants have a balance of portfolio of companies (self-interest) or whether they have the courage to stand up to confrontations from the executives (fear of executives). This study shows that the purpose of using remuneration consultants in advising on executive remuneration is defeated. Also, the practice pushes up pay levels.

The research focused on large consultancy firm operating in the UK and/or the USA. Access to the participants was very difficult due to their busy schedules.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels.

This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels. This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting. Lastly, it informs policymakers on the grey areas of practice that requires best practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that remuneration consultants consider when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. It explores how the different factors influence the level of pay and whether the factors encourage pay-for-performance. Furthermore, it investigates whether the factors used form part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay.

This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA.

This paper demonstrates that there is no uniformity in the factors used by remuneration consultants when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. The paper shows that company performance is not a major factor considered justifying why executive pay is not linked to company performance. The paper further demonstrates that the factors that remuneration consultants consider in selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking justify high pay and affirm that remuneration consultants are associated with high pay.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels and the weak link between pay and performance. This paper will inform companies on what to demand from remuneration consultants when hiring their services. Second, it will provide the shareholders with vital information that they need to vote on remuneration reports in the annual general meeting. Finally, it informs policy makers on the grey areas of practice that require best practice.

The paper examines two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The aim is to explore the approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges toward the regulation of directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, their recommendations on directors’ remuneration, their effectiveness and the challenges of regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006.

The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006, because it targets the pay-setting process. However, the existence of gray areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge to its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately, because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.

The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and considers which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges.