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The purpose of this article is to examine whether officer uniform color influences impressions the public forms about the character of police officers.

A survey using digitally manipulated photographic prompts was used to examine how various levels of officer race, posture, and uniform color as well as a number of other experiential, attitudinal and demographic variables influenced subjects' impressions of officers' character on factor scores constructed from a set of semantic differential scales.

Officer uniform color influences impression formation, but not in the expected manner. Black uniforms elicited more positive impressions of officers than did lighter uniforms.

Convenience sample was drawn from university undergraduates.

Darker uniforms for police may enhance favorable character impressions formed by some sectors of the public.

The research instrument improves measurement validity over prior methods while maintaining a precise experimental control. Findings contradict the conclusions of prior research on public perceptions of darker vs lighter police uniforms.

Some police research has used quantitative methods of typology construction in attitudinal data to explore the spatial structure of occupational culture, suggesting distinctions among officer‐types may be empirically useful. The purpose of this paper is to suggest scale construction as a complimentary approach, using original data collected from a multi‐national sample. Cultural structure is examined here in terms of the spatial relationship among variables rather than respondents. Cultural homogeneity is understood principally as the relative congruence of attitudinal constructs across national groups. Where common constructive dimensions are evident, meaningful analysis of attitudinal valence is then possible.

Data‐measuring attitudes in several facets of occupational outlook were collected from police in Canada, India, and Japan. Factor analysis was used to identify latent structures among question items in 11 inventories in the aggregate set and then again in each national sample. Factor solutions were then compared for congruence across the three nations and against the aggregate result. Scores from congruent factors were analyzed using ANCOVA.

The findings suggest an appreciable universality to factor structures in the inventories and samples examined here. Congruence across attitudinal constructs appears to break down in those aspects of occupational outlook that are most personal and most impersonal to the officer.

The paper offers a complimentary approach to existing quantitative methods in probing sameness and difference in police culture by focusing upon the constructive meanings of attitudinal measurements as expressive of the conceptual dimensionality of attitudinal space.

This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

IN spite of the advantages of the sleeve valve engine the poppet valve engine is still produced in large numbers, and this position seems likely to be maintained for some time. Consequently a critical discussion of poppet‐valve problems and considerations from the metallurgical aspect will not be considered untimely, especially as the discussion is based on a fairly extensive first‐hand experience of high output engines.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of financial development on the Doing Business and capital flight contagion. And further, this study determines the threshold beyond which financial development reduces capital flight.

A two-step system generalized methods of moment empirical model with linear interaction between Doing Business and financial development was estimated. This study used data on 26 countries over 12 years (2004–2015).

The main results indicated that, although Doing Business had a significant positive effect on capital flight, the interactive term had a significant adverse effect on capital flight. This outcome suggests that to reduce capital flight, a well-reformed and efficient business environment should be embedded with an efficient, stable and well-developed financial sector. In addition, the authors found only South Africa has a robust financial framework beyond the threshold of 0.383, whereas Congo, Rep., Rwanda, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Congo, Dem. Rep. had the weakest financial system and sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This study recommends that policymakers should initiate policies that would enhance financial development.

This study’s main contributions are that the authors estimated the threshold beyond which financial development helps the business environment reduce the rate of capital flight. Further, the authors have shown that financial development is a catalyst to propel the deterioration powers of the business environment against capital flight. Also, the authors have estimated the long-run effect of the variables of interest on capital flight.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

The purpose of this paper is to examine stock price and trading volume reactions to name changes of the Toronto Stock Exchange listed companies. Previous studies present conflicting evidence on reactions to corporate name changes in US and other capital markets.

This study uses the event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns and trading volume around the announcement, approval, and effective dates of corporate name changes. It also contrasts abnormal returns between major and minor name changes, signaling focused and diversified strategies, accompanied with a ticker symbol change and without a ticker change, structural and pure name changes, as well as brand adoption and radical name changes.

Companies tend to experience a significant run-up in stock price in the period preceding the announcement of a name change. The stocks also show a significant positive abnormal return around the effective date. In addition, corporate name changes are associated with significant increases in trading volume for several days starting from the approval date. Most importantly, the type of a name change matters, as reflected in significance levels of abnormal return and trading volume reactions to various types of corporate name changes.

The limitation of this study comes from the difficulty to precisely identify the date when the market learns about a possible corporate name change.

This study is the first to examine market reactions to name changes of Toronto Stock Exchange listed companies. Most importantly, whereas previous studies focus on the announcement day, this paper also considers the approval and effective days. It also contrasts responses between name changes accompanied with a new ticker and name changes without a ticker change.

IT has recently been said by a member of a firm of justly‐famous wire makers (1) that there is probably no finer grade of wire than that designed for aero‐engine valve springs to Air Ministry Specification D.T.D.5A, and despite the fact that this article will deal principally with defects in that wire, the author, from an experience gained from the handling of some hundreds of miles of it, must state at the outset that he can endorse this opinion.

The significant impact of innovation in stimulating economic growth cannot be overemphasized, more importantly from policy perspective. For this reason, the relationship between innovation and economic growth in developing economies such as the ones in Africa has remained topical. Yet, innovation as a concept is multi-dimensional and cannot be measured by just one single variable. With hindsight of the traditional measures of innovation in literature, we augment it with the number of scientific journals published in the region to enrich this discourse.

We focus on an approach that explores innovation policy qualitatively from various policy documents of selected countries in the region from three policy perspectives (i.e. institutional framework, financing and diffusion and interaction). We further investigate whether innovation as perceived differently is important for economic growth in 25 economies in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1990–2016. Instrumental variable estimation of a threshold regression is used to capture the contributions of innovation as a multi-dimensional concept on economic growth, while dealing with endogeneity between the regressors and error term.

The results from both traditional panel regressions and IV panel threshold regressions show a positive relationship between innovation and economic growth, although the impact seems negligible. Institutional quality dampens innovation among low-regime economies, and the relation is persistent regardless of when the focus is on aggregate or decomposed institutional factors. The impact of innovation on economic growth in most regressions is robust to different dimensions of innovation. Yet, the coefficients of the innovation variables in the two regimes are quite dissimilar. While most countries in the region have offered financial support in the form of budgetary allocations to strengthen institutions, barriers to the design and implementation of innovation policies may be responsible for the sluggish contribution of innovation to the growth pattern of the region.

Segregating economies of Africa into two distinct regimes based on a threshold of investment in education as a share of GDP in order to understand the relationship between innovation and economic growth is quite novel. This lends credence to the fact that innovation as a multifaceted concept does not take place by chance – it is carefully planned. We have enriched the discourse of innovation and thus helped in deepening understanding on this contentious subject.