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Some police research has used quantitative methods of typology construction in attitudinal data to explore the spatial structure of occupational culture, suggesting distinctions among officer‐types may be empirically useful. The purpose of this paper is to suggest scale construction as a complimentary approach, using original data collected from a multi‐national sample. Cultural structure is examined here in terms of the spatial relationship among variables rather than respondents. Cultural homogeneity is understood principally as the relative congruence of attitudinal constructs across national groups. Where common constructive dimensions are evident, meaningful analysis of attitudinal valence is then possible.

Data‐measuring attitudes in several facets of occupational outlook were collected from police in Canada, India, and Japan. Factor analysis was used to identify latent structures among question items in 11 inventories in the aggregate set and then again in each national sample. Factor solutions were then compared for congruence across the three nations and against the aggregate result. Scores from congruent factors were analyzed using ANCOVA.

The findings suggest an appreciable universality to factor structures in the inventories and samples examined here. Congruence across attitudinal constructs appears to break down in those aspects of occupational outlook that are most personal and most impersonal to the officer.

The paper offers a complimentary approach to existing quantitative methods in probing sameness and difference in police culture by focusing upon the constructive meanings of attitudinal measurements as expressive of the conceptual dimensionality of attitudinal space.

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which chief executive officers (CEOs) deserve the pay they receive both in terms of over and underpayment.

Rather than using the traditional normal distribution view in which CEO performance clusters around the mean with relatively little variance, the authors adopt a novel power law approach. They studied 22 industries and N = 4,158 CEO-firm combinations for analyses based on Tobin’s Q and N = 5,091 for analyses based on return on assets. Regarding compensation, they measured the CEO distribution based on total compensation and three components of CEO total pay: salary, bonus, and value of options exercised.

In total, 86 percent of CEO performance and 91 percent of CEO pay distributions fit a power law better than a normal distribution, indicating that a minority of CEOs are producing top value for their firms (i.e. CEO performance) and a minority of CEOs are appropriating top value for themselves (i.e. CEO pay). But, the authors also found little overlap between CEOs who are the top performers and CEOs who are the top earners.

The findings shed new light on CEO pay deservingness by using a novel conceptual and methodological lens that highlights systematic over and underpayment. Results suggest a violation of distributive justice and offer little support for agency theory’s efficient contracting hypothesis, which have important implications for agency theory, equity theory, justice theory, and agent risk sharing and agent risk bearing theories.

Results highlight erroneous practices when trying to benchmark CEO pay based on average levels of performance in an industry because the typical approach to CEO compensation based on averages significantly underpays stars and overpays average performers.

Results offer new insights on the extent of over and underpayment. The findings uncover an extremely large non-overlap between the top earning and top performing CEOs and to an extent far greater in magnitude than previously suggested.

Objetivo – El objetivo de nuestro estudio fue examinar si los directores ejecutivos (CEOs) merecen la remuneración monetaria que reciben.

Metodología – En lugar de utilizar el enfoque tradicional que asume que la distribución del rendimiento de CEOs sigue la curva normal (con la mayoría de CEOs agrupados en torno a la media y relativamente poca variación), adoptamos un enfoque diferente basado en la ley de potencia. Incluimos 22 industrias y N = 4.158 combinaciones de CEO-firma para análisis basados en Tobin’s Q y N = 5.091 para análisis basado en la rentabilidad de los activos. En cuanto a la remuneracion, medimos distribuciones basadas en la remuneración total y tres componentes del pago completo a los CEOs: salario, bonos, y el valor de las opciones ejercitadas.

Resultados – 86% de las distribuciones de rendimiento de CEOs y el 91% de las distribuciones de pago de los CEO se aproximan mejor a una distribución de ley de potencia que a una distribución normal. Esto indica que una minoría de los CEOs produce un valor muy superior para sus empresas (es decir, el rendimiento CEO) y una minoría de los CEOs apropia valor superior para sí mismos (es decir, pago de los CEO). Sin embargo, encontramos muy poco solapamiento entre aquellos CEOs que se desempeñan mejor y los CEOs que ganan más.

Implicaciones – Nuestros hallazgos usando una conceptualización y metodología novedosas ponen en relieve que a muchos CEOs se les paga demasiado y que a muchos no se les paga suficiente (en comparación con su desempeño). Los resultados sugieren una violación de los principios de justicia distributiva y no apoyan la hipótesis de “contratación eficiente,” y tienen implicaciones para para la teoría de la agencia, de la equidad, de la justicia, y de la distribución de riesgos.

Implicaciones prácticas – Los resultados destacan las prácticas erróneas con respecto a la distribución de compensación a CEOs que se basan en los niveles medios de rendimiento en una industria. Estas prácticas llevan a no pagar suficiente a los directivos “estrella” y pagar demasiado a los directivos con desempeño medio.

Originalidad/valor – Los resultados ofrecen nuevas perspectivas sobre la relación entre desempeño y compensación de CEOs y que los que se desempeñan mejor no son los que reciben más pago, y viceversa. Estas diferencias son mucho más grandes de que lo que se creía anteriormente.

Objetivo – O objetivo do nosso estudo foi examinar se os CEOs merecem a compensação monetária que recebem.

Metodologia – Em vez de utilizar a abordagem tradicional que assume que a distribuição do desempenho do CEO segue a curva normal (com a maioria dos CEOs agrupados em torno da média e relativamente pouca variação), adotamos uma abordagem diferente com base num enfoque inovador da lei de potência. Incluímos 22 indústrias e N = 4.158 combinações de CEO-empresa para análise baseada no Q de Tobin e N = 5091 para análise baseado na rentabilidade dos ativos. Em relação à compensação, medimos as distribuições de CEO com base no total de compensação e três componentes do pagamento total dos CEOs: salário, bônus e o valor das opções exercidas.

Resultados – 86% do desempenho do CEO e 91% das distribuições de pagamento do CEO correspondem a uma lei de potência melhor do que uma distribuição normal, indicando que uma minoria de CEOs está produzindo valor superior para suas empresas (ou seja, desempenho do CEO) e uma minoria de CEOs se apropriando do valor superior para si próprios (isto é, o salário do CEO). Mas, também encontramos pouca sobreposição entre CEOs que tem os melhores desempenhos e os CEOs que tem as maiores ganancias.

Implicações – Nossas descobertas lançam nova luz sobre o merecimento do pagamento do CEO, usando uma nova lente conceitual e metodológica que destaca o excessivo e o baixo pagamento sistemático. Os resultados sugerem uma violação da justiça distributiva e não apoiam a hipótese da contratação eficiente, e tem implicações para a teoria da agência, teoria da igualdade, teoria da justiça e distribuição de riscos.

Implicações práticas – Os resultados destacam práticas errôneas quando se tenta benchmark de remuneração do CEO baseado em níveis médios de desempenho em uma indústria, porque essas práticas levam a não pagar o suficiente aos CEOs “estrela” e pagar em excesso CEOs com desempenho médio.

Originalidade/valor – Os resultados oferecem novas perspectivas sobre a relação entre desempenho e retribuição dos CEOs e que os que desempenham melhor não são os que recebem um pagamento maior, e vice-versa. Estas diferenças são muito maiores do que se pensava anteriormente.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of financial development on the Doing Business and capital flight contagion. And further, this study determines the threshold beyond which financial development reduces capital flight.

A two-step system generalized methods of moment empirical model with linear interaction between Doing Business and financial development was estimated. This study used data on 26 countries over 12 years (2004–2015).

The main results indicated that, although Doing Business had a significant positive effect on capital flight, the interactive term had a significant adverse effect on capital flight. This outcome suggests that to reduce capital flight, a well-reformed and efficient business environment should be embedded with an efficient, stable and well-developed financial sector. In addition, the authors found only South Africa has a robust financial framework beyond the threshold of 0.383, whereas Congo, Rep., Rwanda, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Congo, Dem. Rep. had the weakest financial system and sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This study recommends that policymakers should initiate policies that would enhance financial development.

This study’s main contributions are that the authors estimated the threshold beyond which financial development helps the business environment reduce the rate of capital flight. Further, the authors have shown that financial development is a catalyst to propel the deterioration powers of the business environment against capital flight. Also, the authors have estimated the long-run effect of the variables of interest on capital flight.

Aarhus Kommunes Biblioteker (Teknisk Bibliotek), Ingerslevs Plads 7, Aarhus, Denmark. Representative: V. NEDERGAARD PEDERSEN (Librarian).

The purpose of this paper is to examine stock price and trading volume reactions to name changes of the Toronto Stock Exchange listed companies. Previous studies present conflicting evidence on reactions to corporate name changes in US and other capital markets.

This study uses the event study methodology to calculate abnormal returns and trading volume around the announcement, approval, and effective dates of corporate name changes. It also contrasts abnormal returns between major and minor name changes, signaling focused and diversified strategies, accompanied with a ticker symbol change and without a ticker change, structural and pure name changes, as well as brand adoption and radical name changes.

Companies tend to experience a significant run-up in stock price in the period preceding the announcement of a name change. The stocks also show a significant positive abnormal return around the effective date. In addition, corporate name changes are associated with significant increases in trading volume for several days starting from the approval date. Most importantly, the type of a name change matters, as reflected in significance levels of abnormal return and trading volume reactions to various types of corporate name changes.

The limitation of this study comes from the difficulty to precisely identify the date when the market learns about a possible corporate name change.

This study is the first to examine market reactions to name changes of Toronto Stock Exchange listed companies. Most importantly, whereas previous studies focus on the announcement day, this paper also considers the approval and effective days. It also contrasts responses between name changes accompanied with a new ticker and name changes without a ticker change.

The Conference season will shortly be upon us. No sooner have librarians returned from their holidays than they will be packing their bags again, either for Edinburgh, London, Hastings or Denmark. If they are Scotland‐bound, it will be the I.F.L.A. Conference that will be attracting them. Those coming to London will be concerned with the F.I.D. Conference to be held from 6 to 16 of September. This is rapidly followed by the Library Association's own conference at Hastings in the third week of September, and then some librarians will be on their way to Denmark for the Anglo‐Scandinavian meetings. Truly a gaggle of conferences all of a piece, but this happens to be an exceptional year. Not always do we have the pleasure of welcoming the I.F.L.A. and F.I.D. Conferences to this country, but we are delighted to have them and wish all delegates a happy and successful time. As for the Anglo‐Scandinavian Conference, that only takes place every four or five years, and this year it is the turn of Denmark to be the host country. We can be sure that our Danish colleagues will be excellent hosts, both during the meetings and for the library study tour that follows them.

This is a short commentary on Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment.”

Using insights from prior studies on executive compensation, the author’s commentary presents a critical evaluation of “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […].” In addition, the author offers potential avenues for further research.

The paper “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” is well executed and makes several significant contributions to the management and executive compensation literature. Particularly, noteworthy are the use of advanced quantitative methods, the use of power law distributions to explain chief executive officer (CEO) pay outcomes, the focus on pay-for-performance and the role of justice in CEO outcomes. The author’s commentary in the present paper discusses the measurement of CEO pay and performance, poses alternative estimation methods to explore the pay-for-performance link and offers thoughts on justice theory in the context of CEO pay.

The authors’ findings may be briefly stated as CEO pay is better described by a power law distribution than a normal distribution, CEO pay is not linked to firm performance and the patterns of CEO pay does not conform to patterns of distributive justice. Overall, the authors provide an important way to evaluate CEO pay outcomes. Thy set the stage for new avenues of research.

CEO pay is a highly controversial subject in the domain of corporate governance. This paper offers boards of directors and policymakers a method to better understand the success or failure of boardroom pay policies.

CEO pay is an important social measure.

The authors’ paper is original by offering a method for determining over and underpayment of CEOs. The author in the present paper makes suggestions on how one might extend the research.

Objetivo – Este es un comentario sobre el trabajo de Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle y Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – Utilizando las ideas de la literatura previa sobre retribución de ejecutivos, mi comentario presenta una evaluación crítica del artículo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: […]”. Además, esbozo algunas ideas para la investigación futura.

Resultados – El artículo “Dos lados de la injusticia de la retribución de los CEO” está bien desarrollado y realiza varias contribuciones significativas a las literaturas de gestión y retribución de ejecutivos. En particular, son de señalar: a) el uso de métodos cuantitativos avanzados, b) el uso de la distribución de ley de poder para explicar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO, c) el foco en el pago por resultados, d) el papel de la justicia en el rendimiento del CEO. Mi comentario a) discute las medidas de retribución y rendimiento del CEO, b) propone métodos de estimación alternativos para la relación entre retribución y rendimiento y c) ofrece ideas en torno a la teoría de la justicia en el contexto de la retribución del CEO.

Implicaciones – Los resultados de los autores pueden resumirse así: a) La retribución de los CEO se describe mejor como una distribución de ley de poder que como una distribución normal, b) la retribución del CEO y el rendimiento empresarial no están conectados, c) los patrones de retribución del CEO no concuerdan con los patrones de justicia distributiva. En general, los autores proporcionan un importante método para evaluar los resultados de la retribución de los CEO y fomentar la investigación futura.

Implicaciones prácticas – La retribución del CEO es un tema muy controvertido en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo. Este artículo proporciona a los consejos de administración y a los decisores públicos un método para entender mejor el éxito o fracaso de las prácticas retributivas en los consejos de administración.

Originalidad/valor – El trabajo de los autores es original al ofrecer un método para determinar la sobre o la infra retribución de los CEO. Yo apunto algunas sugerencias sobre cómo puede extenderse esta investigación.

Objetivo – Este é um breve comentário a Herman Aguinis, Geoffrey Martin, Luis Gomez-Mejia, Ernest Boyle and Harry Joo (2017): “Two sides of CEO pay injustice: A power law conceptualization of CEO over and underpayment”.

Metodologia – Usando conhecimentos de estudos anteriores em compensação executiva, o meu comentário apresenta uma avaliação crítica de “Two sides of CEO pay injustice:….”. Adicionalmente, ofereço potenciais avenidas para investigação futura.

Resultados – O artigo “Two sides of CEO pay injustice” está bem feito e apresenta diversas contribuições importantes à literature sobre compensação executiva e de gestores. Em particular, são de salientar: a) o uso de métodos quantitativos avançados b) o uso de distribuições da lei de potência para explicar os resultados do pagamento a CEOs c) O enfoque no pagamento pela performance d) o papel da justiça nos resultados para o CEO. O meu comentário a) discute a medida de pagamento ao CEO e do desempenho b) Propõe métodos alternativos de estimação para explorar a ligação pagamento ao desempenho e c) Apresenta argumentos da teoria da justiça no contexto da compensação do CEO.

Implicações – Os resultados dos autores podem resumir-se como: a) Compensação do CEO é mais bem descrita por uma distribuição da lei de potência que por uma distribuição normal b) Compensação do CEO não está ligada à performance da empresa c) Os padrões da compensação do CEO não se conformam com justiça distributiva. Em geral, os autores fornecem uma forma importante de avaliar a compensação do CEO. Apresentam por isso novas vias para investigação futura.

Implicações práticas – Compensação do CEO é um tópico controverso do domínio da governança corporativa. Este artigo oferece aos Conselhos de Administração e decisores politicos um método para melhor perceber o sucesso ou insucesso das políticas de pagamento aos membros das Administrações.

Originalidade/valor – O artigo é original e oferece um método para determinar sobre ou sub compensação do CEO. Faço sugestões de como se pode estender a investigação.

It has often been said that a great part of the strength of Aslib lies in the fact that it brings together those whose experience has been gained in many widely differing fields but who have a common interest in the means by which information may be collected and disseminated to the greatest advantage. Lists of its members have, therefore, a more than ordinary value since they present, in miniature, a cross‐section of institutions and individuals who share this special interest.

IT has recently been said by a member of a firm of justly‐famous wire makers (1) that there is probably no finer grade of wire than that designed for aero‐engine valve springs to Air Ministry Specification D.T.D.5A, and despite the fact that this article will deal principally with defects in that wire, the author, from an experience gained from the handling of some hundreds of miles of it, must state at the outset that he can endorse this opinion.

We cannot immediately recall who it was that wrote of the pessimist, one of whose main regrets was that there was “nothing to eat but food ”, but it seems more than possible that there are still a number of people who feel this way when they are sitting down to their meals, because they are so acutely obsessed with the fear that what they are about to eat, or are tempted to eat, will do things to their weight, or to their figure. Every week our less responsible dailies, and the many monthly and weekly journals that cater for the housewife, and for the wants and interests of the feminine world in general, feature articles on the art of slimming, giving advice on how so to regulate diet and habits as to enable Venus‐like figures and lissome bodies to be acquired and preserved for all‐agers. And indeed, there is nothing wrong with the idea, but we fear that, like so many things that may be essentially good and proper, it has become more or less of a racket, gathering momentum from time to time from the stupid demands of the arbiters of feminine fashion, and fed by the nutritional ignorance of the would‐be slim, as well as sometimes, we fear, by the glib but imperfect knowledge of those who would guide and advise.