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The phenomenon of “women in combat” is not such a novel one; it however has shattered the dominant perception of women as peaceful and nonviolent people. Indeed, it resulted in critical questions being raised as to why women are involved in patterns of extreme violent behavior, such as suicide bombers. In the wake of insurgent activities by an Islamist group in Nigeria (Boko Haram (BH)) in recent times, the feminization of terror that has come to characterise the activities of this group has generated much concern. Although there may not be easy answers as to why women are involved in terrorism in Nigeria, the threat that such a scenario poses to security is real, deserving a credible and scientific explanation. To investigate this phenomenon, data was gathered by the survey method, which conforms more to a qualitative research design. The data sources were determined through purposeful sampling technique and instruments such as interviews, focused group discussions (FGDs), and non-participant personal observation. Applying the feminist theory of international relations (IR) as the tool for analysis, the author seeks to unravel the hidden propositions about gender. Among the findings was evidence that the shift by BH to include women in its operations was in response to increased pressure on its male operatives. Since deception is key to the tactics employed by BH, the eradication of terror in Nigeria could be brought about by the identification and prevention of possible deceptive moves by the insurgents.

The threat of terrorism is not just limited to a particular nation, rather it has affected the economies of several developed and developing nations. In this study, we have tried to analyze how terrorism has been sought to be tackled and how it can be tackled. In this context, we present the extent to which the method adopted by the USA after the 9/11 attacks, which is popularly called the Global War on Terror (GWOT), has been successful in eliminating terrorism from the world. Only qualitative methodology has been used in this chapter, and most of it has been derived from secondary sources. Through this study, we seek to show that the successes of GWOT have been limited in nature, in spite of tall claims. In fact, what the US has achieved by GWOT in the name of success is the killing of the leaders of some terrorist organizations, successful disruption of their sanctuaries, passing several legislations in order to launch counterterrorism operations, and the freezing the finances of these terrorist organizations by banning some of their charity-based organizations. This chapter lists the gains obtained as a result of GWOT and also highlights what may be called the failures of this global endeavor. Such a proposition aims at showing why GWOT is not only but possibly the best solution to eradicate terrorism. The unexpected outcomes, however, have been many, not only for terrorism but also for international politics, thereby impacting international organizations and also the third-world nations.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 created a crisis of legitimacy for the U.S. nation state. To overcome a catastrophic event that threatened national identity, the Bush administration evoked fear as the spiritual root of patriotism and the basis of a renewed security state. The modern rhetoric of crisis management was combined with a nostalgic rhetoric of national community. In the new civil defense, all citizens were enlisted to relentlessly examine their fears so that bodies, minds, neighborhoods, and ultimately the nation state could be free of terror. These conditions led to authoritarian efforts to reach deep into citizens’ private lives and purge the body politic of ill-defined invaders, damaging democratic community.

Post-9/11 a first order terrorism narrative has been widely asserted. In this chapter, I explore the development of second order terrorism narrative or ideal-type.

The chapter begins by providing a brief synopsis of three highly mediated Australian counter-terrorism operations and of shortcomings in incident counting. It also relies on some U.S. research on counter-terrorism prosecutions in support.

In first order terrorism, crime appears as a spectacular irruption or original sin on a tabula rasa of innocence and there is a clean division between us and them, non-state and state, victim and offender. In the second order terrorism narrative there is a contrasting claim that 9/11 is blowback, in kind, for U.S.-led interventions and does not offer a clean division between how we and they behave, blurs non-state and state culpability in big crimes, and sees victims and offenders trading places over time. As we adjust our perspective from the presumptive first order to second order event-acts, terrorism and counter-terrorism, event-act and interdiction, is merged as one.

The concept may be useful in accounting for assumptions pertaining to this category of crime, including its relation with precaution and security.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.

The 2006 General Assembly adoption of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism strategy marked the first time all member states ratified a collective counter-terrorism (CT) agenda. Building on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the strategy incorporated Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to development. This promised human-oriented and holistic methods for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in contrast to the post-2001 ‘hard security’ context of the United States–led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although the first pillar of the strategy emphasised human rights and social progress over isolated economic growth, poverty, violence and retrogression in conflict zones since 2006 have led to the deaths of millions. Combined with resource scarcity and environmental devastation, insurgency-related conflicts have resulted in 70 million people displaced worldwide in 2019, while the politically violent phenomena of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-jihadism remain prevalent. Reflecting on the social and economic outcomes of the GWOT, this chapter evaluates development-related discourses and activity in UN-led initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, it accounts for the impacts of UN CT measures on contemporary patterns ‘in phenomena described in policy arenas as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, including ‘neo-jihadism’ and right-wing extremism, in Global North and Global South contexts.

Today's terrorism has been considered one of the main global threats the Western civilisation faces, even a great challenge posed for the next years. After 9/11, theorists of tourism triplicated the number of publications that took tourism security and terrorism as main objects of study. In spite of the proliferation of these studies, terrorism targeted the main European cities such as London, Madrid, Paris and Brussels (only to name a few). Over years, scholars believed that the industry of tourism was particularly sensitive to terrorism; at least the decline of tourist destinations in the Middle East seems to testify this assumption. In this complex context, two significant families of theories surface: the socio-cultural theory and the economic-based theory. Though debated in the chapter, we opt for a third alternative model which expands the current understanding of terrorism. The chapter not only explores the historical intersection between tourism and terrorism but also deciphers the moral dilemmas of extortion which remains as the touchstone of Western capitalism.