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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether managerial ownership affects the association between shareholder rights and the cost of equity capital.

Prior literature has shown that strong shareholder rights are associated with a lower level of cost of equity capital. This paper empirically tests the interaction between managerial ownership and shareholder rights on affecting the cost of equity capital, using Gompers et al.'s governance score and Ohlson and Juettner‐Nauroth's estimate of cost of equity capital. To mitigate the endogeneity arising from other governance variables affecting both shareholder rights and the cost of equity capital, the paper adopts both OLS and two‐stage regression.

The results indicate that managerial ownership aligns managers' interests with those of shareholders, leading to a lesser degree of agency problems and lower cost of equity capital. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that managerial ownership could substitute for shareholder rights in affecting the cost of equity capital, making strong shareholder rights less important in a high managerial ownership setting.

Findings in this paper suggest that firms need to consider the interaction between managerial ownership and shareholder rights in designing their governance structure to minimize their cost of equity capital.

This paper reveals the interaction between two major governance variables in affecting firm valuation.

This paper investigates the foreign ownership structure of service equity joint ventures (EJVs) in China. In less than 20 years, China has emerged from a closed economy to become the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. Now that China is a member of the World Trade Organisation, liberalisation of FDI is expected to accelerate even further. Despite the fact that an increasing proportion of FDI in China is in the form of equity joint ventures in the service sector, little is known of the ownership structure of service EJVs. Using a database of 6,430 foreign EJVs, in China from 1984 to 1996, this paper shows that foreign equity ownership differs significantly between service and manufacturing EJVs with foreign ownership generally being higher in service EJVs. The overall results also suggest that the gradual liberalisation of FDI in the service sector by Chinese authorities has had a positive effect on foreign equity ownership.

The Growth of Institutional Shareholdings 1966–1980. Institutional investors, particularly insurance companies and pension funds, are consistent purchasers of company and overseas securities. Of particular interest is the ownership of U.K. quoted equities, rather than ownership of debentures, preference shares and overseas securities. Ownership of the ordinary share capital is of particular interest because the votes attached to equities give the holders legal powers to influence management through general meetings. The impact of the growth of institutional shareholdings on corporate management and the London Stock Exchange will be discussed in later articles. This article demonstrates the growth of institutional ownership of British industry, comments on the concentration of institutional holdings in large companies, illustrates the avoidance of new issues by financial institutions, and comments on the future pattern of U.K. share ownership.

This paper aims to investigate whether audit committee ownership (consisting of both equity holdings and option holdings) is associated with the cost of equity capital.

This paper uses regression analysis to examine the association between audit committee ownership and the cost of equity capital. The data set consists of 2,825 firm-year observations for companies listed on the ASX between 2001 and 2015. This paper also conducts tests to explore the mediating effects of financial reporting quality, firm performance and the risk of reporting problems, on the relation between audit committee ownership and cost of equity capital.

The analyses reveal that audit committee ownership reduces the firm’s cost of equity and, thereby, support the incentive alignment view. However, the association is driven primarily by audit committee equity ownership, with option holdings having an insignificant effect. This paper also finds that firm performance mediates the association between audit committee ownership and the cost of equity capital.

Findings of the existing corporate governance research relating to the cost of equity capital and audit committee ownership remain sparse in the context of “comply-or-explain” types of regulatory environment, like that of Australia. The findings indicate that principle-based discretionary governance arrangements, e.g. compensating audit committee members with company equity, may bring benefits to firms in terms of cheaper financing. Regulators, scholars and practitioners are invited to consider further the comprehensive implications of the structure and transparency of audit committee incentives on the effective functioning of security markets.

The effects of audit committee ownership on the cost of equity capital are an issue of direct economic consequence for equity investors. The main finding of this study, namely, that a firm with higher audit committee share ownership is likely to benefit from a lower cost of equity capital, therefore adds value to the limited extant literature.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the influence of country risk (CR) and cultural distance (CD) on transnational equity investments. It also tries to find out the international equity investment patterns of enterprises from developing countries like China.

From the perspectives of internalization theory, transaction cost theory, etc. this paper tries to explain the relationships between country‐level factors and transnational investment. Based on the data collected from overseas listed companies, it also empirically analyses the impacts of CR and CD on Chinese enterprises' ownership pattern in transnational equity investment.

The empirical results of this paper indicate that both the risk of host country and CD between host country and home country have significant and negative impacts on the level of ownership equity, but insignificant impacts on ownership status.

As there are still some doubts about the existence of country culture, especially when dealing with a huge country like China, the use of Hofstede's instrument may be one of the limitations of this paper. Also, by focusing on Chinese enterprises, the research results may lack generalisability. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to test the proposed propositions when they study enterprises from other developing countries.

The paper sheds light on international investment activities of Chinese enterprises, and also provides insights for the decision making on equity arrangement in transnational investment.

This paper is one of the first to analyse the international equity investment activities of Chinese enterprises and it provides new evidence on how the country‐level factors influence transnational equity investment decisions.

This paper aims to examine the effect of different modes of equity ownership structure in unconditional conservatism of financial reporting for non-financial listed companies in Egypt.

Using a large sample of Egyptian non-financial listed companies for the period from 2011–2018, this paper used the ordinary least square regression model to test the impact of equity ownership equity on accounting conservatism based on an accrual-based measure developed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007).

The paper finds that, on average, Egyptian listed companies tend to demonstrate lower levels of unconditional conservatism during the period from 2011–2018. Regarding the different patterns of equity shareholding, a negative association between unconditional conservatism and managerial ownership is found. Briefly, the mild equity shareholding of managers in Egyptian listed companies is accompanied by higher demand for conservative reporting. Besides, a negative association is also reported for the relationship between concentrated ownership and unconditional conservatism in which the concentration of shareholding by a few numbers of individual investors lessen the demand for conservatism. By contrast, a non-significance relationship is reported neither for institutional shareholders nor for governmental ownership in their relationship with unconditional conservatism.

The paper does not take into account the modifications conducted on the Egyptian accounting standards according to decree number 69 for the year of 2019 because they were not valid until the publishing of this paper. It considers only non-conditional conservatism.

First, the paper provides clear empirical evidence that Egyptian listed companies are adopting less-conservative accounting policies in their financial reporting during a high-tension period that witnessed several radical political and economic events. This evidence should stimulate regulators and policymakers to revisit the reporting standards to improve the quality of financial information and should also guide investors’ decisions because it helps in clarifying their interpretation of figures and trends reported in financial statements. Second, the paper would direct the attention of the Egyptian government to the importance of increasing their investment in the stock market to enhance its regulatory role. Third, it gives some implications to investors and policymakers toward the shape of the relationship between accounting conservatism and each pattern of equity shareholding in Egypt.

This paper visualizes an image toward the current state of equity ownership structure for listed companies in Egypt within a period that witnessed critical vulnerabilities and irregularities. In addition, it addresses how the accounting conservatism would be shaped according to the different types of equity shareholdings in Egypt.

This paper brings in relevant entrepreneurial behavior theory to understand the ownership decisions founders make during the nascent stage of new venture creation, and how such decisions impact the viability of the firm.

The authors examine the behavior and decision making of 137 lead founders during the nascent stage of new venture creation. Psychological ownership and environmental uncertainty are measured of lead founders when dividing up firm ownership among the founding team. Using a longitudinal approach, these nascent-stage decisions are then analyzed to understand the impact on the new venture one year later.

Counter to prior research suggesting teams are better off with identical wages and ownership, the authors find such harmony (i.e. “kumbaya”) pursuit to be a detriment to new venture emergence. Specifically, this study finds that nascent ventures are better off with an unequal ownership split among the founding team members. These findings suggest that nascent firms with an unequal split are more likely to move beyond the nascent stage and launch a functional business.

Although the results of this study offer a valuable contribution to lead founders and new businesses, the study looked at each startup independent of another and is therefore not able to draw any conclusions related to competitiveness.

Lead founders and founding teams frequently divide ownership evenly among the founders. This paper shows that, while convenient, the decision to divide ownership equally can hamper a nascent firm as it moves toward the launch phase of the startup process. These results should motivate founders to think deeply regarding the ownership structure decision and, at the very least, consider the possible negative costs associated with the pursuit of founding team unity.

While scholars have brought attention to the nascent stage, few have identified and analyzed the decisions that take place during this critical time of the new venture development process. Furthermore, even is less is known of the impact nascent decisions have on startup launch. This study sheds light on these areas.

The mainstream framework for corporate governance is that all corporate activity should be directed towards shareholder wealth maximization. This article posits that public policy should move away from shareholder primacy and instead recognize employees as key contributors to corporate value-creation. One way to implement this approach is to require the creation of Employee Equity Funds (EEFs) at large corporations, which would pay employees dividends alongside external shareholders and establish a collective employee voice in corporate governance. EEFs may reduce economic inequality while improving firm performance and macroeconomic stability. This article provides an original estimate of average employee dividends, illustrating the potential of employee equity funds.

Analysis of employee dividends for Employee Equity Funds at large U.S. corporations, using publicly available corporate finance data.

Based on historic dividend payments and employee counts in public 10-K filings, I find that, if EEFs held 20% of outstanding equity, the average employee dividend across this sample would be $2,622 per year, while the median is $1,760. This indicates that employee dividends can be a small but meaningful form of redressing wealth inequality for the low-wage workforce, though it should emphatically not be seen as a replacement for fair wages.

Original data analysis of a proposed policy reform to increase the benefits of employee equity in the United States.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.

This paper uses a linear regression model to examine the association between institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation at US banks.

Institutional investors influence executive compensation at banks with the impact being most pronounced for the CEO. Ownership by the top five investors is associated with greater total compensation. Active investors have the strongest impact on executive compensation as evidenced by a positive association between active ownership and both equity compensation and total compensation. As well, active ownership is negatively associated with bonus compensation. The paper also finds that passive and grey investors influence compensation but to a less significant extent than active investors.

The results suggest that the monitoring role of active and passive institutional investors is different in the banking industry. As well, institutional investors were likely a driving factor in shaping the compensation packages of the top executive team during the financial crisis period.

Stakeholders at banks should be aware that not all types of institutional investors act as effective monitors over issues such as controlling the amount of executive compensation paid to the highest paid executive, the CEO. Prospective investors should consider the type of institutional investor that owns large blocks of equity when making an investment decision. Namely, the interests of existing institutional investors may differ from their own interests.

This paper provides a new perspective on the monitoring roles played by different types of institutional investors. Furthermore, it provides a more comprehensive analysis by investigating the role of institutional investors in shaping the compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives including chief financial officers (CFOs) who play a vital role in risk management at banks.

A comprehensive review of UK share ownership during the 1966–1980 period, with particular reference to the work of Revell and Moyle at the Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge.