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The paper aims to study the impact of cultural differences on the ownership structure of international joint ventures in China. It is reasoned that foreign investors, when faced with larger culture‐related investment uncertainties, may have the incentive to acquire more control rights to contain the risks by acquiring more equity shares in the joint ventures.

Data on international joint ventures in China were used to test the theory. The data contain 941 observations from Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Tianjing, covering a 13‐year time span. Pooled ordinary least square is used in the model estimation.

Cultural distance between China and foreign countries was found to increase the foreign equity share in the joint ventures, a finding contrary to traditional view. In addition, it was found that cultural distance in different dimensions does not play an equal role in affecting foreign equity shares. Last, there is significant evidence that the allocation of ownership between foreign and domestic investors in the joint ventures is influenced by the investor's relative importance in supplying different types of resources.

The paper introduces a new perspective into the study of culture and international joint venture. Foreign investors may be able to reduce investment risk by increasing equity shares, which gives them more internal control, in international joint ventures. In contrast, the traditional view is that larger cultural distance tends to discourage foreign equity ownership.

Strategic alliances have a variety of governance structures that can be broadly classified as joint ventures, minority equity alliances, and contractual alliances. This paper seeks to empirically examine the roles of four key determinants of governance structure choice, namely, joint R&D and joint marketing objectives, alliance management experience, and international partners.

Several hypotheses are developed regarding governance structure choice and are tested with data from 765 alliances. A multinomial logistic regression (logit) model is used for statistical analysis, with five control variables.

All hypotheses are supported, so that the roles of alliance objectives, alliance management experience, and international partners are demonstrated as being significant as determinants of governance structure choice in alliances.

Limitations stem from the data being from a single source, one that also relies on press announcements that may be biased toward larger alliances.

Briefly, alliance managers should find it useful to assess the relative presence of the four determinants of structural choice studied in this investigation in order to make an informed selection of the appropriate governance structure.

The study contributes to the knowledge of the key determinants of governance structure choice in strategic alliances by examining empirically, with a large sample of alliances from various industries, the significant roles of four factors, namely, joint R&D and joint marketing objectives, alliance management experience, and international partners.

Since joint venture experience obtained from inward FDI may create a positive or negative impact on ownership mode choice, it is difficult to predict its direct impact. The purpose of this paper is to combine the organizational learning and agency perspectives to find whether CEO power can moderate the effect of inward joint venture experience.

Using a sample of 337 foreign entries conducted by 77 Chinese firms during 1998-2008, this study has tested some interaction effects of inward joint venture experience and CEO power measures.

The author finds that inward joint venture experience interacts with CEO ownership and CEO duality, respectively, to have a negative impact on the selection of high-equity mode.

This study contributes to entry mode literature by finding that inward (but not merely outward) FDI experience can influence entry mode choices and by combining agency theory and the organizational learning perspective to solve the theoretical conflicts created by the two opposite effects of a FDI experience.

The alliance governance – whether equity or non-equity based – through which an alliance is governed serves as a mechanism to protect a firm from partner's opportunistic behavior, manage resource dependence and facilitate knowledge sharing. Alliance governance structure also reflects the risk, reward and control that partners perceive in a relationship. In light of the conflicts and instabilities reported in strategic alliances, the purpose of this paper is to examine the interorganizational domain that affects the endurance and continuity of collaboration and explain how the alliance interface contexts determines the structuring of alliance governance.

An empirical examination of 179 strategic alliances, using survey and archival data conducted to test the hypothesized relationship between the choice of governance structure and the complexity of alliance task, balance of power and competitive scope between partners.

A multinomial logistic regression of the hypothesized variables revealed that the complexity of alliance task, balance of power, and competitive scope between partners are significantly related to the mode of alliance governance – whether non-equity, minority-equity, or joint venture.

This study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the relationships between the contextual factors such as the alliance task, power dynamics, and competitive scope that shape the collaboration and structuring of appropriate alliance governance mode. Results of the study provide strong evidence for the hypotheses that the greater the task complexity, and greater the balance of power and scope of competition between partners, the alliance governance tends to be equity or joint venture based. Consistent with recommendations of several organizational scholars that the theory of alliance governance and performance must shift from individual partner firm to interaction domain and interface contexts (Luo, 2002; Gray and Wood, 1991; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), this study integrally examined the dyadic issues such as balance of power, task complexity, and the competitive scope and the dynamic role they play in decisions pertaining to alliance governance. While many extant studies on the choice of alliance governance structure have employed secondary data sources, the study employed data from survey measures (Gulati, 1995; Teng and Das, 2008; Oxley and Sampson, 2004) enhancing the validity of the results.

This paper delves into the mechanism of the contingency framework for foreign entry mode decisions and identifies two essential tasks that jointly determine the outcome of the entry mode decision. It then recognizes a critical weakness in previous research pertaining to the comparison of entry modes along a key decision criterion, the degree of control. Existing studies generally treat equity involvement as the only source of entrant control, while largely ignoring non‐equity sources of control (i.e., bargaining power and trust). Non‐equity sources of control, when underutilized, amount to missed opportunities, increased resource commitments, and heightened risk exposures in foreign markets. Drawing from a pluralism perspective in transaction and relationship governance, the author presents a more integrative method for the ranking of entry modes along the degree of control. The central message is that companies entering foreign markets should make an earnest effort to identify trust and bargaining power situations and fully utilize their control potential in making entry mode decisions.

The article reviews existing literature on equity joint ventures (EJVs), outlines the research methodology and analyses the results of the study of EJVs in China.

This paper analyses the investment patterns of Sino‐British joint ventures in China. The research is based on the data of 551 Sino‐British joint ventures formed over the period of 1983 to 1996. It aims to provide an overview of Sino‐British joint ventures' investment in China and to explain the investment conditions. The article analyses the investment patterns from the dimensions of investment value, geographical location, industry sector and equity ownership. To explain the formation of the patterns, it further explores the host country factors of investment based on the policy framework, economic determinants and business facilitation. It reveals the investment trend, the uneven spatial distribution, the sectoral characteristics and the ownership structure of joint ventures. Suggests that government economic strategy and policies towards FDI are imperative in shaping the investment patterns. Locational advantages, economic growth, industrial structures and reform process are major economic factors influencing the investment decisions. Decentralisation of decision making and local governments' facilitation efforts also play a complementary role in attracting foreign investment.

This study examines the factors influencing the number of partners forming an international joint venture (IJV) and the resultant outcome on performance. Various theoretical paradigms (such as strategic behavior, organizational learning, eclectic theory, socio‐cultural distance, and role theory) are drawn upon from the literature to develop a set of testable hypotheses which may assist in understanding the factors influencing the number of partners forming an IJV. Size (overall equity investment), control, socio‐cultural distance, industrial characteristics (technology and capital intensity) and location are used to differentiate the number of partners in an IJV. Additionally, an outcome orientation was taken to determine the impact of the number of partners on performance. Empirical findings, based upon Sino‐foreign IJVs, indicate that the number of partners involved with the cooperative agreement were positively associated with the size of the IJV, and differed across control and location of the IJV. Further, performance tended to increase as more partners were included within the IJV.

To date, there has been little research about the degree of correspondence between partner equity ownership and partner representation on boards of joint ventures (JVs). It is generally assumed that partners’ share equals board representation in percentage. This paper aims to explore various instances of deviation from the above norm.

Using a unique database of 259 JV contracts extracted from the US Securities and Exchange Commission, and by drawing from resource dependency and transaction cost theories, this manuscript explores the factors that increase or decrease the deviation between equity share and board representation.

The results show that international JVs (IJVs) tend to deviate more, while JVs with a deadlock clause, a large board and based in a stable country deviate less from the degree of correspondence between equity share and board representation.

This study contributes to the alliance and governance literatures by identifying factors that influence the degree of correspondence between partner investment (equity share) and control through board of director representation.

Strategic alliances are a growing trend. What makes some succeed where others fail? A key is how the joint ventures are designed at the outset.