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We examine the empirical relationship between direct equity agency costs measures and corporate governance control mechanisms to control equity agency costs. We measure the three direct agency cost proxies commonly used in the literature: the operating expense; asset turnover; and selling, general, and administrative (SGA) ratios. Internal corporate governance control mechanisms examined are inside ownership (IO), outside ownership concentration (OC), the size of the board of directors (BODs), and the composition of the BODs (proportion of nonexecutive (NE) directors and separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair). The external corporate governance control mechanism examined is the size of bank debt (short-term debt). Univariate and multivariate tests reveal that the only statistically significant relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and direct equity agency cost measures is the negative relationship between the proportion of IO and direct agency costs. The asset utilization ratio (asset turnover) ratio is the best proxy for direct equity agency costs and can be useful for event studies of announcement period excess returns.

Based on an ensemble sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs), this study aims to explore the effect of the interactions between Chinese parent firms’ knowledge (including both technological and marketing knowledge), equity control and cultural distance on the business performance of their overseas branches under different subsidiary roles.

The study uses a data set compiled from 138 listed Chinese manufacturing enterprises and their 231 overseas subsidiaries to test the hypotheses regarding the interactive effects of transferred knowledge types and the subsidiary’s control mode.

The empirical results suggest that the moderating effects of equity control and cultural distance vary with the types of the parent firm’s knowledge and subsidiary roles. Specifically, equity control positively regulates the relationship between technological knowledge and subsidiary performance while negatively moderating the relationship between marketing knowledge and subsidiary performance. Cultural distance appears to negatively regulate the relationship between marketing knowledge and subsidiary performance. This binary relationship is shown to be more significant for the implementer subsidiaries.

Drawing on the literature on inter-firm governance and knowledge-induced innovation mechanisms, the authors develop a theoretical contingency framework to derive some managerial implications for inter-firm and infra-firm knowledge transfer in light of MNEs’ performance integrity.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the rights of shareholders, particularly those of minority shareholders in the management of firms in Ghana.

As a result of the largely unexplored nature of this issue in Ghana, a qualitative analysis was conducted to offer a painstaking understanding needed. The case study design is in particular relevant for exploring such phenomenon, as it evolves through the experiences of several key players.

Data indicate that minority shareholders’ influence is, in most cases, nil in every aspect of their firms. Whilst majority shareholders have an absolute right to appoint or influence the appointment of top officials of the firms, minority shareholders’ role in the selection is limited. In addition, in regards to control of corporate decision-making processes, unlike the majority shareholders, the minority shareholders do not have any influence on them. Further, in terms of relevant information, whilst the majority shareholders have absolute access to them anytime they desire, the minority shareholders only rely on annual general meetings to get hold of them, thus limiting their access to corporate information. The revelations unambiguously grant the majority shareholders of the firms absolute control rights whilst undermining the rights of the minority shareholders. This paper was concluded by itemizing the implications of our findings for management, regulators and governments.

It is believed that this is among the handful of studies that have been conducted using developing or emergent economy data to empirically analyse how minority shareholders wield their rights in emergent economies and to add to the mounting pool of scattered cross-country evidence.

Prior research has argued that family firms are reluctant to consider external equity as a source of financing because they fear a loss of control, which would limit their socioemotional wealth. However, prior empirical research has neglected potential contingencies that determine whether family firms’ need for control affects their equity financing decisions. The purpose of this paper is to provide first insight into this research void.

The paper builds on rational choice theory and a logit regression using secondary data.

The study shows that the effect of family firm owners’ need for control on their consideration of external equity depends on the extent to which owners expect investors to interfere with management and the extent to which decision making is affected by emotions. Hereby, the present study provides evidence that family firm owners’ decisions to use external equity are more complex than previously presumed.

This study has several limitations that provide fruitful avenues for further research. Overall, the authors list and detail seven different limitations in the paper, e.g. the narrow focus on equity financing, the use of a partial model, the fact that the authors did not conceptualize differences between different types of investors (such as high net worth individuals, private equity firms and venture capital firms) in the model and further more.

The study shows that investors need to understand the complex interplay among family firms’ need for control, expected investor interference and emotional decision making, to correctly assess their chances of success when approaching family firms for equity.

Prior empirical research has neglected potential contingencies that determine whether family firms’ need for control affects their equity financing decisions. The present paper provides first insight into this research void.

This paper delves into the mechanism of the contingency framework for foreign entry mode decisions and identifies two essential tasks that jointly determine the outcome of the entry mode decision. It then recognizes a critical weakness in previous research pertaining to the comparison of entry modes along a key decision criterion, the degree of control. Existing studies generally treat equity involvement as the only source of entrant control, while largely ignoring non‐equity sources of control (i.e., bargaining power and trust). Non‐equity sources of control, when underutilized, amount to missed opportunities, increased resource commitments, and heightened risk exposures in foreign markets. Drawing from a pluralism perspective in transaction and relationship governance, the author presents a more integrative method for the ranking of entry modes along the degree of control. The central message is that companies entering foreign markets should make an earnest effort to identify trust and bargaining power situations and fully utilize their control potential in making entry mode decisions.

The alliance governance – whether equity or non-equity based – through which an alliance is governed serves as a mechanism to protect a firm from partner's opportunistic behavior, manage resource dependence and facilitate knowledge sharing. Alliance governance structure also reflects the risk, reward and control that partners perceive in a relationship. In light of the conflicts and instabilities reported in strategic alliances, the purpose of this paper is to examine the interorganizational domain that affects the endurance and continuity of collaboration and explain how the alliance interface contexts determines the structuring of alliance governance.

An empirical examination of 179 strategic alliances, using survey and archival data conducted to test the hypothesized relationship between the choice of governance structure and the complexity of alliance task, balance of power and competitive scope between partners.

A multinomial logistic regression of the hypothesized variables revealed that the complexity of alliance task, balance of power, and competitive scope between partners are significantly related to the mode of alliance governance – whether non-equity, minority-equity, or joint venture.

This study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the relationships between the contextual factors such as the alliance task, power dynamics, and competitive scope that shape the collaboration and structuring of appropriate alliance governance mode. Results of the study provide strong evidence for the hypotheses that the greater the task complexity, and greater the balance of power and scope of competition between partners, the alliance governance tends to be equity or joint venture based. Consistent with recommendations of several organizational scholars that the theory of alliance governance and performance must shift from individual partner firm to interaction domain and interface contexts (Luo, 2002; Gray and Wood, 1991; Oxley and Sampson, 2004), this study integrally examined the dyadic issues such as balance of power, task complexity, and the competitive scope and the dynamic role they play in decisions pertaining to alliance governance. While many extant studies on the choice of alliance governance structure have employed secondary data sources, the study employed data from survey measures (Gulati, 1995; Teng and Das, 2008; Oxley and Sampson, 2004) enhancing the validity of the results.

The purpose of this study is to examine corporate governance practices in an emerging economy. It focusses on how ownership control and board control systems operate in corporate organisations in an emergent economy, assuming that these systems are essential for enhancing good corporate governance practices in emerging countries.

The paper builds on descriptive multiple-case study with multiple units of analysis to divulge how ownership control and board control systems function to ensuring effective corporate governance in publicly listed corporate organisations in Ghana. A criterion-based sampling technique is used to select the companies. Thereafter, three techniques of data collection are used to gather data from the companies: archival records, semi-structured interviews and observation.

By linking the gathered data to the paper’s theoretical propositions, the study highlights that all the companies are characterised by the presence of large shareholders, and, in consequence, they tend to exert extensive control over the activities of the companies through their involvement in the decision-making processes. However, whilst the presence of large shareholders has the tendency to solve the agency problem, it poses challenges in regards to minority shareholders’ interests in these corporate organisations. The study also reveals that boards of directors tend to exercise control over corporate organisations when majority shareholders stop interfering in their dealings. This implies that when major shareholders fully partake in corporate decision-making processes of companies, boards of directors seem to be sheer advisory bodies to management.

This is a paper to shed light on corporate governance practices in four large publicly listed corporate organisations on the Ghana Stock Exchange, so the observable facts do not apply to other emergent economies. In addition, the sample does not represent all corporate organisations in Ghana; thus, the empirical observations cannot be generalised to other organisations that have not been included in this study. However, the empirical results can be applied to other similar corporations in Ghana and other emergent economies in an analytical sense. With the application of inductive reasoning, the results can be applied to provide important appreciation in an effort to understand the structure of corporate governance practices in organisations in developing countries.

A comparative analysis of the empirical observations from this study and the recommended guidelines of corporate governance of Ghana has been carried out, and aspects in which organisations need to reform and improve to fully comply with the guidelines are highlighted: director independence, director evaluation, introduction of new directors and board education. This could possibly be the foundation upon which corporate governance structures in these organisations can be restructured and further enhanced.

The majority of the studies of corporate governance in emergent economies have used quantitative techniques to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. However, this study takes a different approach to examine corporate governance practice in an emergent economy by using a comprehensive and defensible qualitative analysis to examine relations between ownership structure and shareholder control, and board of directors and board control. In addition, it highlights how ownership and board control systems interact in corporate organisations in emergent economies.

According to the 2019 World Investment Report, recent events in deglobalization have made many countries, especially developed markets, resist inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as ceding control to foreign countries. At the same time, many emerging market firms (EMFs) have been increasing their acquisitions in developed markets. The authors elaborate three unconventional motives that justify such acquisitions, and test whether conditions in home countries related to these motives predict the pursuit of greater or lesser equity control. Understanding how home country conditions may spur seeking greater equity control can help policymakers and business firm decision-makers improve these dynamics.

Examining data covering the period 2006–2018, the authors test hypotheses using a sample of 4,130 acquisitions by EMFs into developed markets, and test hypotheses to investigate “How does the institutional and resource environment of an EMF's home country relate to the respective EMF acquisition behavior of seeking equity control?”

The authors found that higher institutional quality, poorer factor market development, and higher capital market quality in the home country are related to higher equity positions sought.

Acquiring and target firm managers, along with other stakeholders, can gain insights on how to respond to acquisition opportunities by recognizing how home country conditions influence emerging market internationalizing behaviors into developed markets.

The compilation of this data uniquely covers 48 different emerging markets and further concentrates on the relatively less understood pre-deal phase for EMNEs entering developed markets.

While it is widely acknowledged that host governments play some role in framing the governance structure that is available to multinational corporations, some argue that in recent years the influence of host governments on MNCs in terms of the level of ownership and control over their foreign ventures has diminished. The authors examine the degree of MNC’s control in foreign investment by presenting and testing a model of government influences on MNC’s control over its foreign market venture. Based on a survey of U.S. MNCs, the authors find that host government preference does influence MNC’s ownership control over its foreign market venture, which in turn influences its management control over the venture.

The purpose of this paper is to explain how family firm ownership and management control affect corporate capital structure strategy after controlling for other significant variables. The authors argue that, although family ownership has a positive effect on a firm’s leverage, family control through the CEO position and equity performance moderate its impact.

Using a stratified random sample of 200 US public firms in the S & P Small-Cap 600 index from 1999 to 2007, this study uses random effect panel regressions to test the impact of family ownership on market value and book value debt ratios and the moderating effects of family control and equity performance after controlling for firm, industry, and macroeconomic variables.

The initial panel regression suggests that family ownership is not related to debt ratios. However, further examination with controls for family CEO and equity performance shows that family ownership is positively related to market and book value debt ratios, but its effect is offset by family control through the CEO position and equity performance.

This study’s methodology can be extended to examine how family firm governance factors affect other firm behaviors such as investment, risk management, and CEO compensation.

Practitioners should consider family ownership and management control factors when establishing financing strategy. The Small Business Administration and other government agencies should make similar considerations when setting policies.

This paper separates ownership and management control factors to explain why family firms use more or less leverage. This study, thus, reconciles the mixed results of prior studies, which do not differentiate between these two governance factors.