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The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of information asymmetry in the equity selling mechanisms chosen by the firms from an important emerging market, India. Specifically, the authors look into the choice between the two most popular mechanisms of equity issues – rights issue and private placement of equity.

This study introduces three analyst specific variables as proxies of information asymmetry as the conventional proxies are fraught with several disadvantages. First, the paper tests the choice between rights issue and private placement using a binary logistic model. In the second approach the authors use rights issue and segregate the private placements into preferential allotments and qualified institutional placements and test the impact of information asymmetry using a multinomial logistic regression.

The outcome of this empirical exercise shows that only those firms facing lesser information problems choose rights issue of equity. Private placements are chosen by firms facing higher information problems to circumvent information costs. The results remain invariant even after segregating the qualified institutional placements from private equity placement as the firms with information disadvantage choose to place equity privately.

In contrast to the conventional studies that focus on the debt-equity framework, the authors argue that the impact of information asymmetry is applicable even at disaggregated levels of equity selling mechanism.

Since the initiation of the share split reform by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2005, the private placement has become the major source of raising equity after IPO. The purpose of this paper is to investigate why listed firms in China prefer private placements compared to other options of raising capital.

The ordinary least squares regression, the piecewise regression and the cross‐sectional regression analysis were undertaken to investigate the determinants and characteristics of the seasoned‐equity offerings announcement effects. Probit regression analysis was taken to estimate the probability of a firm choosing private placements.

The authors find positive significant announcement abnormal returns for private placement. The findings also indicate that operating performance deteriorates immediately after announcement and poor operating performance is more likely to be contributed by large size portfolios, which suggests size effect.

The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of the wider implication of the share split reform undertaken by the CSRC.

The paper provides insights for policy makers in China and around the world who have and wish to adopt similar practices within their jurisdictions. Similar research can be conducted in other emerging markets to enable better understanding and implications of seasoned equity offerings on firm financial performance.

The paper is novel in regard to the data and the wider research paradigm used.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test information asymmetry and agency conflicts hypotheses, as to firm's choices in selling preferred stock in public and private markets.

Using firm‐level preferred stock issue data, the author uses a multivariate logistic model to see a firm's different preferred stock selling decisions among public market, rule 144A market, and non rule 144A market. The paper examines the impact of the firm's idiosyncratic risk and cash flow volatility.

It is found that private placement (non rule 144A) firms have higher information asymmetry than public offering firms. In addition, private placement (rule 144A) firms have higher operating risk than public offering firms. The non Rule 144A market and rule 144A market for preferred stocks are significantly different.

This topic can be further studied with more detailed, preferred stock issue data.

The paper extends our understanding of the preferred stock market selling mechanism.

This study presents evidence concerning the effects of affective and cognitive rhetoric on the underpricing of firms at the time of their initial public offering. It is suggested that firms that use less affective, and more cognitively oriented discourse in their IPO prospectus will experience better underpricing outcomes. We examine these assertions using a sample of young high-tech IPO firms where investors rely on prospectuses as accurate and informative firm communications. Results from a robust five-year time span observe initial support for the hypothesized effects. Moreover, the signaling of a higher degree of entrepreneurial orientation in the firm prospectus is found to worsen the negative effects of affective discourse

The purpose of this paper is to test whether underpricing can serve as a signal of quality in a financing-investment environment and to compare it under the two institutions for financing offers that are commonly observed in corporate financial markets: take-it-or-leave-it offer (TLO) and the competitive bidding offer (CBO).

The research paper uses experimental economics methodology and laboratory experiments to investigate the research question.

The results suggest that underpricing can serve as a signal of quality but not sustainable as a repeat strategy. Over time, the high-quality firms converge to a pooling strategy rather than bearing the cost of signaling. Additionally, underpricing is lower under CBO than under TLO institution due to competitive bidding. Signaling under CBO institution may be less salient due to possible mimicking by the low-quality firms.

This paper presents a first experimental investigation of the underpricing-signaling hypothesis in a financing-investment environment under asymmetric information. The choice of institution in a financing environment produces qualitatively and strategically different behavior among firms and investors.

This paper seeks to examine the potential for regulation to reduce information asymmetries between firm insiders and outside investors.

Extensive prior research has established that there are substantial effects of information asymmetry in seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The paper tests for a mitigating effect of regulation on such information asymmetries by examining differences in long‐run operating performance, changes in that performance, and announcement‐period stock returns between unregulated industrial firms and regulated utilities that issue seasoned equity. The authors also segment the samples by firm size, since smaller firms are likely to have greater asymmetries.

Consistent with regulated utility firms having lower levels of information asymmetry, they have superior changes in abnormal operating performance than industrial firms pre‐ to post‐issue and their announcement period returns are significantly less negative. These findings are most pronounced for the smallest firms, firms likely to have the greatest information asymmetries and where regulation could have its greatest effect.

The paper does not examine costs of regulation. Thus, future research could seek to measure the cost/benefit trade‐off of regulation in reducing information asymmetry. Also, future research could examine cross‐sectional differences between different industries and regulated utilities.

Regulation reduces information asymmetry. Thus, regulation or mandated disclosure may be appropriate in industries/markets where information asymmetry is severe.

This paper is the first to compare the operating performance of regulated and unregulated SEO firms.

This is the first REIT paper to seek to empirically examine potential influencing factors on the discounts and underwriting fees of Australian REIT rights issues.

Using a methodology similar to Owen and Suchard, and Armitage, a sample of 62 A‐REIT rights issues during 2001‐2009 is analyzed. A variety of potential factors influencing discounts and underwriting fees are explored.

Over A$20 billion was raised by A‐REIT rights issues during 2001‐2009 (this around three times that raised through A‐REIT initial public offerings during the same period). The mean offer price was discounted around 9.5 percent from the current market price and underwriting fees averaged 2.9 percent of gross proceeds raised – both substantially less than for industrial rights issues. The standard deviation of daily returns for the past year appears to influence the percentage discount offered to subscribers. This volatility was particularly noticeable in 2008 and 2009, during the global financial crisis, where new issues were discounted substantially so as to raise equity to repay debt. This historical risk variable appears paramount in determining the discounts to subscribers and fees to underwriters.

A‐REITs seeking to minimize the discounts offered to subscribers and to minimize their underwriting costs with rights issue equity capital raisings must first minimize their share price volatility.

This paper adds to the international costs of capital raising literature of REITs by examining such costs with A‐REIT rights issues and is the first paper to examine factors influencing these costs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Japanese private placement issuers manipulate their earnings around the time of issuance and the relationship between earnings management and the post‐issue stock underperformance.

Cross‐sectional modified Jones model is used to measure earnings management proxy – discretionary accruals. Control firms are developed to mitigate the impact of other factors on the measurement of earnings management. Different set of control firms is also developed to calculate abnormal stock returns.

It is found that managers of Japanese private placement issuers tend to engage in income‐increasing earnings management around the time of the issuance. It is further speculated that earnings management serves as a likely source of investor overoptimism at the time of private placements. To support this speculation, evidence is found suggesting that the income‐increasing accounting accruals made at the time of private placements predict the post‐issue long‐term stock underperformance.

The study contributes to the large body of literature on earnings manipulation around the time of securities issuance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate short‐selling around private investment in public equity (PIPE) issuances, for evidence of manipulative short‐selling by hedge funds.

The authors use the Regulation SHO short‐selling data in combination with information about hedge fund participation in traditional stock PIPE offerings from Sagient Research, and share price and trading volume data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to examine the relations among hedge fund participation, short‐selling levels and stock returns surrounding such offerings.

It is found that significantly less pre‐deal short‐selling occurs when hedge funds are included in the PIPE investor group, and adjusted returns for firms with hedge funds as investors are positive in the pre‐deal period and negative in the post‐deal period. Both of these findings are opposite of the patterns expected given manipulative short‐selling by hedge funds. Pre‐deal and post‐deal adjusted returns and PIPE discount are unrelated to pre‐deal short‐selling by hedge funds, findings inconsistent with manipulative short‐selling by these investors. The evidence suggests that most hedge funds that invest in traditional stock PIPEs do not engage in manipulative short‐selling around these deals.

This paper is the first, to the authors' knowledge, to examine hedge fund participation and daily short‐selling around traditional stock PIPE issuances. Previous studies focus on structured PIPE deals, which do not represent the majority of the PIPE market at present. The daily short selling data used in this study allow for detailed investigation of market behavior not afforded by monthly short interest data used in previous studies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of ownership characteristics in a firm’s choice of alternative seasoned equity offering (SEO) methods, offer price discounts, and market reactions to such announcements within the UK setting.

The study examines 697 SEO events of firms traded in the UK during the period 1998 to 2012 using multivariate and binomial logistic regression models. Ordinary least square models are also used to examine how ownership variables affect offer price discounts and stock market performance during the announcement of such corporate events.

The authors show that placings and open offers (OOs) are the preferred methods for issuing equity by firms with higher managerial ownership. Thus, the evidence strongly supports the prediction of the entrenched management hypothesis. Moreover, the probability of choosing a combination of placings and OOs is also found to be significantly related to issue size, offer discount, leverage, and previous stock performance. The results show that pre-issue market conditions have a significant effect on the choice of issue method with rights offers (ROs) and the combination of placings and OOs primarily utilised by firms for issuing equity during hot market periods.

Unlike prior SEOs’ studies in the UK that predominantly concentrate on the use of ROs and placings, this study examines, for the first time, the link between OOs and the combination of placings and OOs with ownership concentration. The authors also investigate how offer price discounts are related to the firms’ ownership structure, various company micro-characteristics and the wider market conditions.