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The nature and extent of our knowledge of stock market efficiency are examined. The development of “efficiency”, as a way of thinking about stock markets, is traced from Roberts (1959) and Fama (1965) onward. The early work successfully introduced competitive economic theory to the study of stock markets and paved the way for a flood of empirical research on the relation between information and stock prices. This literature irreversibly altered our views on stock market behavior. The theory and evidence of seemingly‐rational use of information lay in sharp contrast to prior beliefs. It was associated with a widespread increase in respect for stock markets, financial markets, and markets in general, at the time. Researchers began developing and using a variety of formal models of security prices. Nevertheless, “efficiency” has its limitations, both theoretically (as a way of characterizing markets) and empirically (by stretching the quality of the data, the estimation techniques used, and our knowledge of price behavior in competitive markets). Extensive evidence of anomalies suggests either that the market systematically misprices securities or that the theoretical or empirical limitations are binding, or both. The less interesting research question now is whether markets are efficient, and the more interesting question is how we can learn more about price and transactions behavior in competitive stock markets. The concept of an “efficient stock market” has stimulated both insight and controversy since Fama (1965) introduced it to the financial economics literature. As a construct, “efficiency” models the stock market in terms of the reaction of prices to the flow of information. Like all theory choices, modelling the market in this fashion involved tradeoffs. The benefits included opening the literature to an abundance of high‐quality researchable data, covering a variety of information, and the resulting insights obtained on the role of information in setting prices. The opportunity costs included temporarily closing the literature to alternative ways of viewing stock markets, for example by modelling public information as a homogenous good and thus ignoring factors such as differences in beliefs among investors, differences in information processing costs, and the “animal spirits” that might drive group behavior. The costs also included reliance on particular asset‐pricing models of how an “efficient” market would set prices. Not surprisingly, the ensuing deluge of research has produced some startling evidence, for and against the proposition that financial markets are “efficient”. Strongly‐conflicting views and puzzling anomalies remain. The early evidence seemed unexpectedly consistent with the theory. The theory, and its implications, also seemed clear at the time. After a period that seems short in retrospect, the growing body of evidence in favor of the efficient market hypothesis emerged as one of the most influential empirical areas of economics. Fama's (1970) review described a flourishing, coherent and confident literature. This research had an irreversible effect on our knowledge of and attitude toward stock markets, and financial markets generally. It coincided with an emergence of interest in, and respect for, all markets among economists and politicians, and influenced the worldwide trend toward “liberalizing” financial and other markets. The research consistently appeared to show an unbiased reaction of stock prices to public information. The property of “unbiased reaction” to public information, which formed the basis of the early definitions of “efficiency”, was seen to be an implication of rational, maximizing investor behavior in competitive securities markets (Fama 1965, p.4). Reduced to a basic level, the reasoning was that any systematicallybiased reaction to public information is costlessly publicly observable, and thus provides pure profit opportunities to be competed away. Characterizing the market in terms of its reaction to information is only one of many feasible ways of modelling stock price behavior, but it introduced economic theoryto the empirical studyof stock prices, which had received little serious attention from economists prior to that point. Despite the subsequent spate of anomalies, the early efficiency literature not only adapted standard economic theoryto provide the first formal economic insights into how stock prices behave, but it helped pave the way for an outporing of theoretical and empirical work on stock markets and capital markets in general. Subsequent empirical research was not as consistent with the theory. Evidence of “anomalous” return behavior now is widespread and well‐known. It generallytakes the form of variables (for example, size, day‐of‐the‐week, P/E ratio, market/book value ratio, rank of scaled earnings change, dividend yield) that are significantly but inexplicablyrelated to subsequent abnormal stock returns. Much of this evidence has defied rational economic explanation to date and appears to have caused many researchers to strongly qualify their views on market efficiency. Disagreement has not been not confined to the evidence. The literature has produced a variety of research designs, ranging from the “market model” of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR, 1969) to Shiller's (1981a,b) variance‐bounds tests. The very term “efficiency” has engendered controversy: there is a modest literature on precisely what efficiency means, on the role of transaction costs, and on whether efficient markets are logically feasible. Making sense of this literature requires careful definition of “efficiency” in this context and careful analysis of the type of evidence that has been offered in relation to it. This involves an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both the theory of efficient markets, as a way of characterizing stock markets, and of the data and research designs used in testing it. Not surprisingly, a mixed conclusion emerges. While the concept of efficient markets was an audacious departure from the comparative ignorance and suspicion among economists of stock markets that preceded it, and provides valuable insights into their behavior, the concept has its limitations, in terms of both its internal logical coherence and its fit with the data. Section 1 ofthis survey sketches the development of the efficient market theory, reviewing the principal contributions in terms of their usefulness in guiding and evaluating empirical research. Section 2 addresses the limitations inherent in what is knowable about stock market efficiency, given the present state of theory about how security prices might behave in an “efficient” market. It argues that there are binding limitations in the theoryof asset pricing, some of which are known and others of which are unknown or even unknowable. These limitations must be borne in mind when choosing whether to interpret the data as evidence of: (1) market efficiency, under the maintained hypothesis that a specific research design, including a specific model of asset pricing used to benchmark price behavior, correctly describes pricing in an efficient market; or (2) the ability of our models and research designs to encapsulate how prices behave in an efficient market, under the maintained hypothesis of efficiency. Against this background, section 3 then provides an assessment of the accomplishments of the theory of stock market efficiency, including an interpretation of the evidence. It focuses on the nature and influence of the evidence and does not attempt to provide a comprehensive literature taxonomy. The final section offers conclusions. The principal conclusion is that the theory of efficient markets has irreversibly enhanced our knowledge of and respect for stock markets (and perhaps for all financial market or even for markets in general) but that, like all theories, it is fundamentally flawed.

The goal of this paper is to analyze the views of Frank Knight and Ludwig von Mises on the topic of uncertainty and how it influences the theory of individual decision-making and to trace out the implications of the same for the theories of entrepreneurship, equilibrium, and the firm. The paper adopts a historical approach in its analysis of the theory of uncertainty, with an extended discussion of the primary writings of Knight and Mises on this topic. It then uses the insights gleaned from this discussion in order to address issues and topics that have found a prominent place in the modern literature on entrepreneurship, equilibrium, and the firm that draws its inspiration from the Austrian School. The paper offers three main findings: in the realm of entrepreneurship it argues that there can be no theory of the entrepreneur without the concept of uncertainty provided by Knight and Mises, whereas with regard to the theory of equilibrium it focuses on highlighting the concept of an equilibrium with error prevalent in the Austrian tradition and on the implications that an explicit introduction of uncertainty has for the existence of a process of equilibration that pushes the economy toward a state of general equilibrium in real time. As regards the theory of the firm we find that a proper understanding of uncertainty ultimately reverses the direction of any causal explanation of economic organization, making the firm an outcome of dealing with uncertainty rather than a means to do so.

Even though housing prices in Germany are low by international standards, housing in urban areas has become less affordable. Since 2018, certain families aspiring to become homeowners may apply for a capital subsidy (Baukindergeld) that contributes to their down-payment. This paper analyzes whether this subsidy is an appropriate policy instrument to achieve the desired goals.

The paper presents an equilibrium model with two types of households (low- and high-income) and two types of houses (low- and high-quality) to examine equilibrium prices before and after the introduction of a subsidy.

This subsidy not only makes owning less affordable for the lower-income household but also increases the prices of more expensive houses that are not within reach of lower-income households.

Because this policy has just come into effect in 2018 and no data are available yet, the implications of the model are yet to be tested.

The implications of the subsidy run counter to its intentions as house prices will rise even further. Other policies or fewer regulations for new construction may be more effective.

An instrument aiming to relieve financially weaker families, this subsidy will increase prices for all house types, assuming continuing supply shortages observed in the German urban housing markets.

This is the first paper on Germany’s new homeownership subsidy. The model is general enough to be used with any explicit demand and supply functions and is thus applicable to other markets with low supply elasticities.

The aim of this study is to examine whether China’s exchange rate follows an equilibrium process and consequently to answer the question of whether or not China’s international competitiveness fluctuates in consistency with equilibrium.

The theoretical background of the paper relies on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis, while the econometric methodology is mainly based on a nonlinear two-regime Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) unit root test.

The main finding is that China’s price competitiveness was not constantly following a disequilibrium process. The two-regime threshold model shows that PPP equilibrium was confirmed in periods of relatively high – compared to the estimated threshold – rate of real yuan appreciation. Moreover, it is implied that the fixed exchange rate regime cannot ensure external balance since it can neither establish equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, nor confirm that China’s international competitiveness adjustment follows an equilibrium process.

The results do not imply that China acts as a currency manipulator. However, a main policy implication of the paper is that China should continue appreciating the yuan to establish external balance.

This paper is the first which accounts for a nonlinear two-regime process toward a threshold, which is defined to be the rate of change in China’s international competitiveness. Consequently, the paper draws attention to the role of China’s international competiveness in accepting the PPP hypothesis.

Traditionally, the Laffer effect has been discussed in the context of endogenous growth models or in the case of the labor market with respect to willingness to supply more labor given a tax incentive on wages. The paper adopts an inductive approach to discuss it in the context of a product's market, say automobile industry in Turkey.

The author revisits the ad valorem tax model on a product and investigates how the elasticities of demand and supply and the tax rate are related to the Laffer effect. The author considers a special case where demand curve is non-linear and the supply curve is completely elastic. This specific model fits the practical case where the Turkish government expected the auto sellers to pass fully the temporary partial tax concession onto the consumers during the global crisis in 2009.

The author showed that the demand elasticitiy must be calculated neither at the intersection of the initial equilibrium nor that of the final equilibrium points, but somewhere else. The author defined a pass-through coefficient which was different from the classical burden of tax concept, calculating the degree of pass-through of a tax decrease from firms to consumers. Moreover, the author found a one-way relationship between the overall tax revenues of the government and a single sector.

The case of tax revenues where both the demand and supply curves are non-linear and non-extreme must be solved.

The author showed that the government's dual expectation of both boosting the economy, increasing employment and raising its tax revenues can sometimes be consistent given a usual upward sloping supply curve. In the case of a perfectly elastic supply curve, the tax revenues can even be higher with a higher level of equilibrium quantity.

The Turkish government aiming to support the production and employment in this leading export industry, may have expected this temporary tax decrease to be passed completely onto the consumers by the producers. However, this did not happen as producers’ prices to the consumers did not decrease as much as the amount of tax. This paper shows that the after tax elasticities and the current level of tax rate must have been compared.

The author pointed out to the importance of being clear in explicitly indicating at which points the elasticities derived from some function (tax revenue function) of equilibria variables (price and quantity) must be interpreted. In this paper, doing many numerical calculations allowed us to notice the proper point of calculation of the demand elasticity, which is the after-tax price along the “no tax demand curve”. Moreover, a pass-through coefficient is defined which is different from the classical burden of tax concept.

This paper aims to investigate the role of certification in providing information and reducing market inefficiencies when the “certification process is imperfect”. In the setting, eco-labels imperfectly signal environmental product quality to consumers where the error in the process of certification could be either Type 1 or Type 2 error. The paper examines firms' incentive to get certified, equilibrium quantities and profits. The authors use perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept for the analysis. They then examine conditions for separating and pooling equilibrium to exist and welfare implications of certification process.

The paper uses a vertical product differentiated model where firms are competing in quantities. Consumers are unable to observe the environmental quality of the product. To signal the product quality to consumers, firms may adopt certification by a third party. Using a framework where certification process is imperfect, the paper derives conditions for Perfect Bayesian separating and pooling equilibrium to exist.

The paper shows that the existence of separating and pooling equilibrium depends on the certification fee. A separating equilibrium, where one firm seeks certification and other firm does not seek certification exists for an intermediate value of certification fee. A pooling equilibrium, where both firms seek certification, exists only when the certification fee is sufficiently small. The paper shows conditions for the certification fee for which welfare will be higher under separating equilibrium as compared to pooling equilibrium and analyses welfare implications for subsidy policy for the certification fee.

The paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of labelling under imperfect certification.

Crime games cannot be simply read with mixed strategies. These strategies are inconclusive of how the players act rationally. This is undeniably true for the crime of tax evasion, where dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, when considering the risk of non-compliance. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that in the presence of a small “private disturbance” of the players’ payoff, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies provides us with the necessary information on equilibria in pure strategies that will be played.

In tax-evasion games, an equilibrium must necessarily be interpreted in pure strategies, and the only way to do this is to insert some private information into the game and reinterpret it in a Bayesian scheme. We show that taxpayers’ private,subjective considerations on the effective implementation of the penalty and the revenue agency’s private information on the cost of monitoring and conviction can lead to Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies. The present paper takes issue with this Bayesian equilibrium and the implications for comparative-statics results.

In this context, tougher sentencing deters crime, although, as the Italian experience teaches, the necessary condition required is the certainty of punishment and the ability of the government to enforce it. The equilibrium strategies with incomplete information reveal whether it is convenient for the two agents to maintain their “private disturbance” as private information or, on the contrary, it is convenient to expect it to be “common knowledge.”

A distinct set of studies has adopted a game theoretic approach and shows that the standard economic approach to crime deterrence inspired by Gary Beker’s seminal paper might be flawed. See, among others, Saha and Poole (2000), Tsebelis (1989) and Andreozzi (2010). This paper shows that a greater severity of the penalty and a higher certainty of punishment (a lower possibility of appealing against sanctions and no discounts on due penalties) necessarily lead to a unique Bayesian equilibrium without evasion.

This paper aims to extend social entrepreneurship theory by investigating the darker sides of innovation and enterprise. Entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship theories regarding shifting equilibriums are considered alongside other traditions. This research presents how individuals see enterprises as dark and light and discusses how such perceptions are important to building emerging theories of light and dark social entrepreneurship.

The study uses a survey of public perceptions (n = 631) regarding the social and economic impact of a total of 15 different enterprises to create a map of the darker variations of enterprises. An 11-point scale was used to evaluate perceived impact.

The mapping of each enterprise on a coordinate plane resulted in four thematic areas: traditional enterprises (light social, light economic), taboo enterprises (dark social, light economic), dark enterprises (dark social, dark economic) and alternative enterprises (light social, dark economic). Some enterprises crossed between the thematic areas.

This study opens up new directions for research on dark social entrepreneurship and research on enterprises that influence social equilibriums.

This study provides guidance for practitioners and policymakers to better understand phenomena such as dark, taboo and alternative enterprises and their nuances.

This study allows for a broader look at social entrepreneurship, innovation and enterprise to better understand dark and light nuances. Similarities between the lighter and darker forms of enterprises are noted.

This study builds on dark entrepreneurship and dark social entrepreneurship theories and concepts using empirical methods.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of utility and production externalities on the equilibrium efficiency, and to devise tax policies capable of correcting the distortions caused by the external effects.

The paper analyzes a Ramsey‐type model with utility and production externalities. It compares the decentralized equilibrium in the market economy with the optimal growth path attainable by a central planner.

The paper shows the effects of utility and production externalities on competitive long‐run equilibrium values. It devises optimal tax policies capable of decentralizing the optimal growth path, and shows how the leisure specification affects the optimal tax policy.

The paper adds to the literature on optimal taxation, and provides theoretical results that may help policy makers to set the tax policy.

The paper analyzes the equilibrium efficiency in a rather general model with utility externalities, associated with both consumption and leisure, and production externalities. Equilibrium efficiency is studied under the two typical leisure specifications proposed in the literature: home production and raw time. This allows one to analyze the effect that the leisure specification has on the optimal tax policy.

This paper studies how multichannel retailers choose the product quality level and decide which attribute to make prominent in their physical store in a competitive environment.

This paper develops a game theoretic model, in which multichannel retailers' decisions are made in three stages. Using prominent experiential attributes (e.g. functionality) in their offline store and product quality decisions, multichannel retailers are capable of transferring the sales between different channels.

This analysis shows that making different attributes prominent in their physical store may be an equilibrium, and each multichannel retailer chooses the highest quality level for the prominent attribute. However, the prominent attribute of the highest quality level is not always optimal. Under certain conditions, multichannel retailers may make the experiential attribute prominent in their respective physical stores, which can result in equilibrium.

The results indicate that multichannel retailers should avoid blindly highlighting high-quality attributes in a competitive environment, or falling into price completion.

From the perspective of prominent attributes, this study designs the optimal product line based on channel characteristics. The results of the research can provide practical implications for multichannel retailers to increase sales.