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1 – 10 of over 2000In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an…
Abstract
Purpose
In construction projects, engineering variations are very common and create breeding grounds for opportunistic claims. This study investigates the complementary effect between an inspection mechanism and a reputation system in deterring opportunistic claims, considering an employer with limited inspection accuracy and a contractor, which can be either reputation-concerned or opportunistic.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper applies a signaling game to investigate the complementary effect between the employer's inspection and a reputation system in deterring the contractor's possible opportunistic claim, considering the information-flow influence of claiming prices.
Findings
This study finds that in the exogenous-inspection-accuracy case, the employer does not always inspect the claim. A more stringent reputation system complements a less accurate inspection only when the inspection cost is lower than a threshold, but may decline the employer's surplus or social welfare. In the optimal-inspection-accuracy case, the employer always inspects the claim. However, only a sufficiently stringent reputation system can guarantee the effectiveness of an optimal inspection in curbing opportunistic claims. A more stringent reputation system has a value-stepping effect on the employer's surplus but may unexpectedly impair social welfare, whereas a higher inspection cost efficiency always reduces social welfare.
Originality/value
This article contributes to the project management literature by combing the signaling game theory with the reputation theory and thus embeds the problem of inspection mechanism design into a broader socio-economic framework.
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Xiaogang Cao, Hui Wen and Bowei Cao
In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the…
Abstract
Purpose
In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the remanufacturing of components requires patent licensing from the supplier.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors consider three different models with government subsidy for remanufacturing: (1) no government subsidies; (2) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the supplier and (3) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the remanufacturer and use the Stackelberg game model to solve and analyze the equilibrium wholesale prices of components and the equilibrium outputs of new and remanufactured products under three subsidy modes.
Findings
The results show that the equilibrium wholesale prices of two kinds of components decrease with the unit patent licensing fee and the unit government subsidy, and the equilibrium quantity of the remanufactured products under the three modes is obviously higher than that of the new products.
Originality/value
Finally through numerical simulation, it is found that the equilibrium profits of the supplier, the manufacturer and the supply chain increase monotonously in relation to the unit government subsidy, while the optimal profit of the assembler in relation to the unit government subsidy tends to decrease first and then increase.
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Leilei Shi, Xinshuai Guo, Andrea Fenu and Bing-Hong Wang
This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market equilibrium price, in which traders' momentum, reversal and interactive behaviors play roles.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors select intraday cumulative trading volume distribution over price as revealed preferences. An equilibrium price is a price at which the corresponding cumulative trading volume achieves the maximum value. Based on the existence of the equilibrium in social finance, the authors propose a testable interacting traders' preference hypothesis without imposing the invariance criterion of rational choices. Interactively coherent preferences signify the choices subject to interactive invariance over price.
Findings
The authors find that interactive trading choices generate a constant frequency over price and intraday dynamic market equilibrium in a tug-of-war between momentum and reversal traders. The authors explain the market equilibrium through interactive, momentum and reversal traders. The intelligent interactive trading preferences are coherent and account for local dynamic market equilibrium, holistic dynamic market disequilibrium and the nonlinear and non-monotone V-shaped probability of selling over profit (BH curves).
Research limitations/implications
The authors will understand investors' behaviors and dynamic markets through more empirical execution in the future, suggesting a unified theory available in social finance.
Practical implications
The authors can apply the subjects' intelligent behaviors to artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning and financial technology.
Social implications
Understanding the behavior of interacting individuals or units will help social risk management beyond the frontiers of the financial market, such as governance in an organization, social violence in a country and COVID-19 pandemics worldwide.
Originality/value
It uncovers subjects' intelligent interactively trading behaviors.
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Quanli Deng, Chunhua Wang, Yazheng Wu and Hairong Lin
The purpose of this paper is to construct a multiwing chaotic system that has hidden attractors with multiple stable equilibrium points. Because the multiwing hidden attractors…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to construct a multiwing chaotic system that has hidden attractors with multiple stable equilibrium points. Because the multiwing hidden attractors chaotic systems are safer and have more dynamic behaviors, it is necessary to construct such a system to meet the needs of developing engineering.
Design/methodology/approach
By introducing a multilevel pulse function into a three-dimensional chaotic system with two stable node–foci equilibrium points, a hidden multiwing attractor with multiple stable equilibrium points can be generated. The switching behavior of a hidden four-wing attractor is studied by phase portraits and time series. The dynamical properties of the multiwing attractor are analyzed via the Poincaré map, Lyapunov exponent spectrum and bifurcation diagram. Furthermore, the hardware experiment of the proposed four-wing hidden attractors was carried out.
Findings
Not only unstable equilibrium points can produce multiwing attractors but stable node–foci equilibrium points can also produce multiwing attractors. And this system can obtain 2N + 2-wing attractors as the stage pulse of the multilevel pulse function is N. Moreover, the hardware experiment matches the simulation results well.
Originality/value
This paper constructs a new multiwing chaotic system by enlarging the number of stable node–foci equilibrium points. In addition, it is a nonautonomous system that is more suitable for practical projects. And the hardware experiment is also given in this article which has not been seen before. So, this paper promotes the development of hidden multiwing chaotic attractors in nonautonomous systems and makes sense for applications.
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Agnieszka Lipieta and Artur Lipieta
A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake…
Abstract
Purpose
A serious problem in the pandemic days is that in this period many firms face difficulties with remaining on the market. It causes that the entrepreneurs do not undertake activities which could result in introducing innovations. In this context, the authors examine new mechanisms which lead competitive economy to the long-run equilibrium under the assumption that producers are change-averse.
Design/methodology/approach
The results have the form of theorems with rigorous proofs and provide the ideas on the way of developing the economic policy in respect of firms in the pandemic days.
Findings
As a result, the authors justify that in some cases it is worth leading an economic sector or a whole economy to the long-run equilibrium state.
Originality/value
The authors show that there exists a mechanism in the sense of Hurwicz which transforms the economy into an economic system being in the long-run equilibrium as well as the authors determine optimal mechanisms, under the criterion of distance minimization, in some subsets of the mechanisms designed.
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Tsuyoshi Shinozaki, Makoto Tawada and Mitsuyoshi Yanagihara
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.
Abstract
Purpose
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.
Design/methodology/approach
The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.
Findings
If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.
Originality/value
In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.
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