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If equal pay for equal work were already the rule, it would be difficult to adduce reasoned arguments for paying different remuneration for people doing the same work alongside one another, once family responsibilities had been covered by social security legislation. In the Civil Service and among employers and owners of businesses and professional practices it is the rule, but for employees a different system applies. It is over eighty years since the TUC first demanded equal pay for equal work and now that the Equal Pay Act of 1970 is on the statute book, it might be thought that the battle is won. But the Act will slumber until the end of 1975 unless information reaching him can spur the Minister to invoke his powers under the Act and require earlier but partial implementation. The subject, like the poor, continues to be with us; many women will find that when the Act does become fully operative they will gain nothing, for equal pay as a concept is based on comparability within an organisation (or associated ones) and at least 700 000 are estimated to be unaffected by it. Also, one reason why other women who could do similar work to that of more highly paid male colleagues may be unable to claim equal pay is because they lack the necessary training; so they will continue to be under‐used as far as their potentialities are concerned. The poor record of training of women is a severe indictment of the multi‐million pound ITB system and of the costly (and equally paid) Department of Employment which purports to supervise it.

Among some commentators abroad, Australia enjoys a reputation as a country in which the “three cornered suspension” afforded by conciliation and arbitration machinery has assisted both sense and sensibility in wage fixation. (Though Australians may sometimes feel that the arbitration system is not without honour save in its own country.) In the light of international interest in Australian wage determination, it may therefore be useful to examine Australian progress towards equal pay for women.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse an example of non-decision making in the Nordic tripartite policy process, namely, the reform of the Finnish gender equality legislation and the law for equal pay comparisons.

The paper uses non-decision making as a conceptual framework for qualitative analysis of the documentation of the working group that drafted the law for equal pay comparisons. The analysis focuses on the strategic responses used by the participants in order to defend the status quo and resist change in legislation.

The key findings are that the suggested law for conducting equal pay comparisons as part of gender equality planning in Finnish organisations changed dramatically in the tripartite policy process. Employer organisations successfully prevented the most relevant features from being implemented in the reformed law.

The findings of this research indicate that there is a need for more research on the tripartite policy process and its implication on developing policy.

This paper shows what kind of power employer and employee organisations use in Finnish policy making. As a result, the reformed gender equality legislation is a compromise reflecting the vested interests of different stakeholders. The findings highlight the challenges of developing policy in tripartite policy process.

The tripartite policy process and its implications have rarely been studied. The value of this paper lies in both originality of the topic and approach, and the societal importance of the findings.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

In the final article of their series dealing with the aspects of wage payments and employment in retail distribution, the authors examine the implications of the 1970 Equal Pay Act on retail distribution and, in particular, how the Government's counter‐inflation policy has affected the situation. They warn that when the full terms of the Act are implemented retail employers may find an unanticipated burden added to their wage bills. This research has been funded by the Social Science Research Council.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the impact on the new federal wage fixing system on gender pay equity in Australia.

The article is divided into four parts. The first section briefly examines the policy approach to the issue of gender pay equity in other Anglophone counties and the history of pay (in)equity under the Australian tribunal based industrial relations system. The second section overviews the recent developments at the State level in Australia focused on gender pay equity. The third section discusses recent cases in State wage fixing systems in Australia designed to remedy the gender based undervaluation of children's services employees. The fourth and final section discusses the implications of the new “national” workplace relations laws in the context of gender pay equity in Australia.

The capacity of State tribunals to continue to apply gender free wage determinations is under threat because of the federal government's 2006 “reforms” to the Australian industrial relations and wage fixation systems.

The commissioned case studies and inquiries demonstrate that governments – and State Labor governments in particular – have placed the issue of the gender earnings gap on the policy agenda.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which implementation of the Equal Pay Act 1970 in retail distribution has been influenced by the wages regulation orders of the industry's Wages Councils. In concentrating on machinery for determining statutory minimum levels of remuneration (SMR) it is recognised that there are obvious dangers in ignoring the role played by collective bargaining, and of drawing conclusions about pay which are unrelated to total earnings. In particular branches of retailing, notably in co‐operative societies and amongst multiple organisations, pay and other conditions of employment are negotiated almost entirely by the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW). The general image of retail employment nevertheless remains one of low pay. Negotiated pay structures provide minimum rates which are low in comparison with those in most other industries, and the coverage of trade union recognition and negotiation has not achieved a level sufficient to question the need for statutory minimum wages regulation in the industry as a whole. It will be shown that retail Wages Councils place severe restrictions in the way of progress towards equal treatment of men and women by fixing SMRs bearing a minimal relationship to men's total earnings — an argument which may be applied with only slight modification to the functioning of the industry's main collective agreements, in which the lowest‐paid occupations are those held almost entirely by women.

There are many problems with the British equal value legislation, mostly the result of its complaint‐driven nature. Some Canadian provinces responded to a similar legal inadequacy with statutory pay equity – an employer‐driven approach. Most Canadian legislation covers the public sector; Ontario law also applies to the private sector. All provinces require pay equity bargaining in ununionised workplaces. Indications are that effective pay equity bargaining is separate and co‐operative, but equity maintenance may be undermined. However, the initial impact of the proactive schemes has been positive. For British women to benefit from this alternative approach, political will is crucial.

States that the narrowing pay gap between genders reached a plateau in the 1990s. Describes the scope of the disparity before discussing possible explanations such as working hours, preferences, experience and tenure. Suggests how an organisation can identify and avoid pay disparity. Cites some case law examples. Concludes with recommendations for resolution including strengthening the Equal Pay Act and creating family‐friendly policies.