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Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

Examines the attitudes of Thai police regarding drug enforcement in the following areas: drug laws, prosecutors and judges. Assesses the accuracy of officers’ knowledge of drug laws. Explores the effects of 16 independent variables, derived from personal background, institutional support and drug offense information, on officers’ attitudes and knowledge. Using data collected from a survey of 672 Thai police officers, employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the aggregate effect of independent variables on officers’ attitudes about drug enforcement and to identify the most significant independent variables. Finds that the officers have positive attitudes regarding drug enforcement but are not knowledgeable about the drug laws, and that several institutional variables have a positive significant influence on these attitudes.

This paper aims to present a comparative analysis of noncompliance with planning laws in advanced-economy countries. Most research to date has focused on the widespread phenomenon of “informal” construction in developing countries. However, advanced-economy countries also encounter illegal development, though at different scales and attributes. Because planning law is at the foundation of land-use and urban policies, it is time that the “orphan” issue of noncompliance be adopted by more researchers to enable cross-national learning. The two OECD countries selected for in-depth analysis – Portugal and Israel – probably fall mid-way in the extent of noncompliance compared with the range among advanced-economy countries. Like most OECD countries, the selected countries have generally viable planning-law systems. Their experiences can thus offer lessons for many more countries. Recognizing the limitations of enforcement mechanisms as prevention, the paper focuses on how each of these countries responds to illegal development.

The method relies on two main sources: analysis of official documents – laws, policies and court decisions in both countries – and field interviews about practice. In both Portugal and Israel, the authors held face-to-face open interviews with lawyers and other professional staff at various government levels. The interviews focused on four issues: the effectiveness of the existing enforcement instruments, the urban consequences of illegal development, the law and policy regarding legalization and the existence of additional deterrent measures.

In both countries, there is a significant phenomenon of illegal development though it is somewhat less in Israel than in Portugal. In both countries, efforts to reduce the phenomenon have been partially effective even though in both, extensive demolition is not exercised. Neither country has adopted a general amnesty policy for existing noncompliance, so both resort to reliance on ex-post revision of statutory plans of granting of variances as a way of legalization. The shared tension between local authorities and national bodies indicates that not enough thought has gone into designing the compliance and enforcement systems. In Israel, a recent legislative amendment enables planning authorities, for the first time, to set their own priorities for enforcement and to distinguish between minor and major infringements. This approach is preferable to the Portuguese law, where there is still no distinction between minor and major infringements. By contrast, Portuguese law and policy are more effective in adopting financial or real-estate based deterrence measures which restrict sale or mortgaging of illegal properties.

There is very little research on noncompliance with planning controls in advanced-economy countries. There is even less research on the legal and institutional responses to this phenomenon. This paper pioneers in creating a framework for looking at alternative types of government responses to illegal construction. The paper is, to the authors’ best knowledge, the first to present a systematic cross-national comparative analysis and critique of such responses. The authors thus hope to expand the view of the possible legal and policy response strategies available to planning authorities in other advanced-economy countries. The comparative perspective will hopefully encourage, expansion of the research to more countries and contribute to the exchange of experiences between jurisdictions.

This study aims to investigate the impact of the enforcement of the international anti-bribery legal framework in developing countries.

It uses the PetroTiger case to examine the effects of foreign bribery prosecutions in Colombia, from a bribe-receivers perspective. PetroTiger is a USA-based company that was prosecuted for bribing public officials in Colombia. As a result, the public officials involved were also prosecuted in Colombia for receiving bribes. This case serves to illustrate how international anti-bribery law operates in practice and how it impacts Colombian law enforcement institutions and their capacity to prosecute bribe-receivers. The Colombian response to the international anti-corruption framework is examined in this study through the review of legislative efforts taken to address the problems of bribery and corruption in public procurement.

This study finds that enforcement of foreign bribery laws raise awareness of the situation of corruption in developing countries, generate parallel prosecutions of individuals at the receiving end of bribes and helps developing countries to develop technical expertise to fight corruption.

In practice, due to the transnational nature of foreign bribery, without international agreements, this type of corruption in international business would seldom lead to prosecution. Although the effectiveness of the enforcement of international anti-corruption law is debated, in reality, prosecutions of foreign bribery by developed countries have more positive than negative implications for developing countries.

Assist to continue efforts to deter corruption.

No many studies have looked at the effectiveness of anti-corruption international law in developing countries. As indicated by Mr. Moulette Patrick head of Anti-Corruption Division at organisation for economic co-operation and development more research on the effectiveness of the UN enacted Convention against Corruption, which is what this paper does.

The purpose of the study is to examine gun violence prevention practices among urban police in the USA, assessing their scope, effectiveness, limitations, and impacts.

A national survey was conducted with police agencies serving cities of 100,000 or more people.

Strategies used most frequently and rated as most effective include targeted efforts focussed on high‐risk places and groups, as well as multi‐agency problem‐solving efforts, particularly those involving federal authorities. However, most agencies make limited use of proactive strategies to reduce gun crime, and there are substantial gaps in the enforcement of many gun laws. Results also suggest that gun crime is lower in places where police engage in more intensive gun‐related enforcement and prevention efforts.

The survey focussed only on large US cities. Implementation of the strategies could not be examined in detail, and assessments of the effectiveness of strategies reflect the views of practitioners. There is a need for more in‐depth research on gun‐related enforcement and prevention practices, their effectiveness, and the organizational and environmental factors that facilitate or hinder them.

The study highlights strategies that should be given priority consideration in policy decisions. The findings also suggest that police efforts to address gun crime can be enhanced considerably – and that doing so may produce demonstrable reductions in gun crime. Further examination of policy changes necessary to facilitate these efforts is warranted.

This study represents the first national survey of gun violence reduction efforts by police in the USA.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the compliance of foreign investment projects with local environmental standards in Ethiopia. It examines the cause and impact of the environmental problems created by such projects as well as the necessary policy response, especially by examining the role of the applicable bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in enforcing local standards.

The research approach is fundamentally an empirical study with some doctrinal analysis. The empirical data (qualitative) was collected through interviews, focus group discussions and observation tools.

The investment projects selected for the case studies were not complying with the local environmental standards, which resulted in several environmental problems. The major cause for the overall environmental problems was not a legal gap in the local standards, but the failure of enforcing such standards by the government bodies and foreign investors. The applicable BITs also played no role in environmental protection as they do not impose environmental obligations along with enforcement mechanisms. Non-compliance with local standards can be mitigated if the applicable BITs impose environmental obligations along with workable enforcement mechanisms – as a treaty obligation has more binding force. The author argues that, in general, foreign investments are not environmental-friendly unless otherwise strictly regulated by combining local environmental standards and a BIT that imposes environmental obligations (along with enforcement mechanisms) on the foreign investors, host state and home state.

The existing literature does not deal with the environmental problems, the enforcement constraints and the role of the applicable BITs together in a single publication. They separately address these issues, which do not give a comprehensive understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship. This paper fills this gap by presenting comprehensive findings that combine the environmental problems and the associated enforcement constraints as well as the role of the applicable BITs in this regard. It also contributes to the ongoing debate concerning whether foreign direct investment is good or bad for the environment by producing empirical evidence from Ethiopia, the African continent.