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This paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.

This paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.

About one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.

The article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.

The purpose of this paper is to review the historical background for broad-based ownership in the USA, the development of forms of employee ownership and profit sharing in the USA, the research literature on employee ownership and profit sharing and related employee participation, the development of policy and options for new policies.

It is a literature review.

There are four reasons to be interested in employee stock ownership and profit sharing today: first, employee share ownership and profit sharing can increase worker pay and wealth and broaden the overall distribution of income and wealth, a key ingredient for a successful democracy. To be a tool for reducing inequality, employee stock ownership and profit sharing must be spread more widely and meaningfully than it is today. Second, employee share ownership and profit sharing provide incentives for more effort, cooperation, information sharing and innovation that can improve workplace performance and company productivity. Third, employee share ownership and profit sharing can save jobs by enhancing firm survival and employment stability, with wider economic benefits that come from decreasing unemployment. Fourth, employee share ownership and profit sharing can create more harmonious workplaces with greater corporate transparency and increased worker involvement in their work lives through access to information and participation in workplace decisions.

Growth has been extraordinarily sluggish in the recovery from the Great Recession and has weakened in advanced countries over a longer period, leading some analysts to believe that the authors have entered a new economic era of small to modest growth. This may turn out to be true, which will increase the importance of growth-enhancing policies. The evidence that firms with employee stock ownership and/or profit-sharing perform better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership would boost the country’s lagging growth rate. The evidence that employee share ownership firms preserve jobs and survive recessions better than others suggests that policies that extend ownership could help stabilize the economy when the next recession comes down the pike.

Because there may be informational or institutional barriers about the benefits of ownership and sharing and the ways firms can introduce such programs that government can help overcome. Government has often played a role in promoting performance-enhancing work practices to enhance overall economy-wide outcomes from higher productivity and innovation, such as the long history of agricultural extension services (since 1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer education on safety practices conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Because of the “externalities” – effects that extend beyond the firm and its members – that greater ownership/profit sharing can bring us. If employee ownership and profit sharing lead to fewer layoffs and firm closures, this can reduce recession-created drops in consumer purchasing power and aggregate demand; government expenditures on unemployment compensation and other forms of support; decreased tax base for supporting schools and infrastructure; and potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital breakups and alcohol abuse. Apart from unemployment, more broadly shared prosperity and lower inequality may also have wider benefits for macroeconomic growth, stability and societal outcomes, as described by a number of social scientists. To the extent the ownership and profit sharing is a public good, a nudge in policy to consider the idea makes sense.

Because it is hard to find policy options that are as bipartisan as the shares policy. In The Citizens’ Share, and in other articles and venues, the authors lay out the areas in which there is evidence or logic for in-depth development of, and experimentation with, several broad policy directions, with the details to be worked out by members of Congress based on their deliberations.

The creation of an employee ownership plan is viewed as the catalyst enabling a sociotechnical change process. Identifies several key factors as mediating links between employee ownership plans and organizational effectiveness: the initiator’s purpose of the employee ownership plan; perceptions of ownership; level of participative decision‐making systems; and organizational culture. These elements are affected by the introduction of employee ownership arrangements and can be specific areas in which organizational development consultants can focus effort to facilitate change generated by the initiation of an employee stock plan.

Employee ownership has a rich tradition throughout the world in the form of co‐operative enterprises, however, the concept has received a new boost in the form of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). In order to understand why the stock model of ownership has received so much attention worldwide, one must examine the known and potential benefits of this model. As the United States provides the most widespread example of employee stock ownership, we shall begin our discussion there. The next section addresses in depth the corporate performance benefits of employee ownership and outlines additional benefits of interest throughout the world. The final section offers a brief look at employee ownership worldwide.

This study aims to disclose how the nature of corporate ownership, stock efficiency and wage level affect the optimal proportion of employee stock.

This paper studies three duopoly markets: two private enterprises, two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and a private enterprise and an SOE. The competitions between the two parties are taken as a two-stage dynamic sequential game and studied through back-induction.

The results reveal that the enterprise ownership has a directly bearing on the optimal proportion of employee stock and determines whether to implement the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the specific level of the plan. The optimal proportion of employee stock is positively correlated with its contribution to enterprise efficiency. There are many influencing factors on the effect of wage level on the optimal proportion of employee stock, namely, the ownership nature of ESOP implementer and efficiency difference of different nature stocks.

The results of this study provide policy recommendations for companies preparing to implement ESOP.

The research findings provide policy implications for enterprises to prepare a suitable ESOP and the reform of national equities, especially the mixed-ownership reform in China.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

One way that firms attempt to innovate is through investment in R&D activity. However, there is much heterogeneity in innovations among firms making comparable R&D investments. This article explores employee ownershipʼs moderating effect on the relationship between R&D intensity and innovative output. The basis for the moderation is that ownership increases motivation and commitment to the innovation agenda of the company, and retains employeesʼ entrepreneurial efforts for internal opportunities. Using hierarchical regression, the data support the hypothesis that employee stock ownership positively moderates the relationship between R&D intensity and innovative output. Implications for future research and practice are addressed.

The objective of this research is to present a causal model of the influence of stock options on psychological contract and employee attitudes, and report results of an initial empirical examination of this model.

To test the model, data were collected using a survey methodology from 98 employees in a large financial services firm. Multiple‐regression equations were used to derive the path coefficients.

The psychological contract variable of met expectations mediated the relationships between stock options and tenure intent and organizational commitment thus providing support for the intrinsic value model. Equity perceptions mediated the relationship between stocks exercised and met expectations. Equity perceptions, however, did not mediate the relationship between stock options and employee attitudes. Similarly, stock earnings also had a direct effect on external career intent indicating that employees who had exercised their stock options were looking for outside career opportunities contrary to our hypothesis.

Future studies should attempt to reconcile the intrinsic versus extrinsic value stock options may have on employee attitudes. These results should be considered tentative and interpreted with caution due to the cross‐sectional nature of data. The support for the intrinsic model suggests that organizations that use stock options may expect positive attitudes from their employees.

This is believed to be the first study that attempts to develop and test a causal model.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the additive and differential effects of short-term-oriented group incentives (STOGIs) and long-term-oriented group incentives (LTOGIs) on psychological ownership and organizational commitment.

This study analyzed data from 17,255 US employees in the 2005 data set of the National Bureau of Economic Research Shared Capitalism Research.

Both additive indices of group incentives have direct positive relationships with psychological ownership and organizational commitment, as well as indirect positive relationships with organizational commitment through psychological ownership. STOGIs have a stronger relationship with organizational commitment and LTOGIs have a stronger relationship with psychological ownership.

The value of this research lies in exploring the differential effects of short-and long-term group incentives, which provides new insight into the theory of group incentives and practical implications for their effective utilization.

Employee ownership has attracted much attention across the globe. Whether affected by the global financial crisis (GFC), or not, this paper seeks to canvass what is known about employee ownership in neo‐liberal political economies.

This paper is a literature review, cross cultural analysis and critique.

The findings indicate future research directions.

The paper suggests a reconsideration of organizational configurations for possible greater application in the future.

The paper hightlights the re‐regulation of neo‐liberal markets.

The paper focuses on employee share ownership schemes.