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Firms will, at times, replace employee holdings of out‐of‐the‐money stock options with new ones that have lower exercise prices. This paper seeks to examine how stockholders view such actions.

The stock price reaction to announcements of option exchange programs is used to establish how stockholders view option exchanges. Regression analysis is then used to get insight into firm and program characteristics that explain cross‐sectional differences in the stock price response.

A positive stock price response indicates that stockholders view such option exchanges as value enhancing. Regression analysis indicates that the price response increases with a firm's growth opportunities, the level of employee turnover, the extent to which employee option holdings are out‐of‐the‐money, and the quality of corporate governance. Deals where only non‐executive employees are allowed to participate are viewed more favourably.

This is the first paper to document that stockholders regard resetting the terms of employee option holdings in a positive vein, confirming implications emerging from theoretical papers on this subject. The paper also documents firm and program characteristics that impact the extent of possible value creation.

The objective of this research is to examine the effect of a broad‐based option program on voluntary employee turnover.

The paper examines the effect of a broad‐based stock option program in a Fortune 100 company during the 1990s and uses logistical analysis.

Employee turnover is an issue due to the costs involved in recruiting and training replacements. Voluntary turnover can be reduced if a cost can be imposed on the departing employee. This cost need not be an explicit cost, but can take the form of a benefit forgone when the employee departs. Along these lines, stock option grants to employees, if properly structured, have the ability to reduce voluntary employee turnover. The paper finds that voluntary turnover is lower during the periods in which the option cannot be exercised, i.e. the vesting period. This effect is strongest for employees approaching retirement, but also holds for employees leaving the company for other reasons.

The finding that unvested options reduce or delay voluntary turnover, which while intuitive, has not to the author's knowledge been shown previously, and is important for those involved in the compensation plan design process.

This paper aims to show that tax‐motivated early exercise of US employee stock options can be, in principle, rationalized for bullish executives. The paper aims to show empirical evidence consistent with private positive information guiding the timing of the exercises.

The paper uses conventional event study methodology to examine the long‐run relative stock price performance of firms in which executives early exercise and maintain the acquired shares. The long‐run analysis adopts the cumulative abnormal return as well as the buy‐and‐hold methodological approach.

Tax‐motivated early exercise may be justified on the grounds that future stock appreciation can be converted to long‐term capital gains if the shares are held for over one year while, should the stock decline, shares can be sold within a year to count for short‐term losses. The empirical results reveal that executives who early exercise and continue to hold a majority of the shares acquired do so before performance in their company stock is significantly better than a benchmark.

Information‐based early exercise is not a harbinger of poor firm performance, as prior research has suggested. This paper illustrates that private positive information can motivate tax‐based early exercise of employee stock options. Prior research has mostly suggested it cannot. Stock retention upon early exercise indicates the optimism of the exerciser.

The first modeling of an exploitable tax asymmetry upon exercise of US employee stock options. The explicit separation of exercises likely based on positive inside information from those likely based on negative information or other non‐informative reasons.

Following Marx and Engels' identification of the “essential condition of capital”, the purpose of this paper is to begin an initial critical exploration of the essential condition of intellectual capital, particularly the ownership rights of labour.

Adopting a critically modernist stance on unitarist HR and OB discourse, and contextualised within a background on the stock option phenomenon and recent accounting regulation, the paper argues that the fundamental nature of the capital‐labour relation continues resiliently into the IC labour (intellectual capital‐labour) relation.

There is strong evidence that broad‐based employee stock options (ESOPs) have become institutionalised in certain firms and sectors – but the future of such schemes is very uncertain (post 2005 accounting regulation). Overly unitarist HR/OB arguments are challenged here with empirical evidence on capital's more latently strategic purposes such as conserving cash, reducing reported accounting expense in order to boost reported earnings, deferring taxes, and attracting, retaining and exploiting key elements of labour.

Research supports the positive benefits of broad‐based employee stock ownership schemes. Further research on the benefits of such schemes and the reasons why they are or are not implemented is now required.

From the perspective of labour, nothing appears to have really changed (yet) in terms of the essential condition of intellectual capital.

This paper explicitly raises the issue of the ownership rights of labour to intellectual capital.

This paper seeks to evaluate the cost of repriceable options, and to investigate whether repriceable employee stock options (ESOs) cost more than standard ESOs in providing incentives to employees.

This paper develops an intensity‐based model, reflecting the special features of repriceable ESOs. The model is used to assess shareholder cost of repriceable ESOs, to explore their early exercise pattern and to compare their incentive effect with standard ESOs.

Two main conclusions arise. First, option holders of repriceable ESOs postpone their exercise before repricing. But, once the exercise price has been reset, option holders are more likely to exercise ESOs early. Second, option repricing is less cost‐effective than standard options in providing incentives.

This research finds that issuing new options proves more efficient than option repricing in providing incentives. In turn, this research offers a practical guideline to companies confronted with underwater options.

Constructing and applying a more accurate valuation model than those previously developed, this paper investigates several important questions about ESOs repricing. Chiefly, this research helps academics and practitioners better understand the cost of repriceable options, how repricing influences employees’ early exercise decisions, and whether option repricing is cost‐effective in providing incentives. These are important questions to ask, filling gaps in the existing literature.

This paper investigates the debate as to whether employee share options (ESOs) should be expensed in an entity’s financial statements as required by the IASB’s IFRS 2 – Share‐based payment (2004). The paper presents arguments for and against expensing ESOs, demonstrating that compensation of employees via ESOs is a bona fide expense in terms of the recognition and measurement criteria of the IASB Framework. It concludes that, the substance of an ESO transaction is that the entity pays an employee for his services, albeit with a different financial instrument. Consequently, the accounting treatment of such compensation should be the same as for any other payment of services of an employee.

Starting from 2003, Microsoft and many other companies have either gradually reduced or completely replaced stock options with restricted stocks in their compensation plans. This raises an interesting question: which form of compensation is better, stock or options? This chapter makes an economic comparison between the two compensation vehicles and concludes that stock is preferred to options. The backdrop of the study is dynamic asset allocation within a utility maximization framework whereby the company may go bankrupt. The incorporation of bankruptcy risk into the analysis is motivated by the recent downfalls of companies such as Enron and WorldCom.

We demonstrate that vesting requirements and bankruptcy risk can lead to significant value discounts. When the restricted stock and options have a vesting period of 5 years, and account for 50% of the total wealth, the total discount is more than 60%, out of which 20% is due to bankruptcy risk. More importantly, we find that stock is a better compensation tool than options. For a given dollar amount of grant, the higher the stock proportion, the higher the expected utility. In fact, replacing options by stock can lead to a substantial amount of cost savings for the firm, while maintaining the same level of utility for the employee. For example, when options account for 50% of the total wealth and are subsequently replaced by stock, the granting cost is reduced by about 60%. Our findings therefore provide a theoretical support for the move to stock-only style of performance compensations.

Many firms in many countries started to issue stock option schemes to their employees in the 1990s (Murphy, 1999).¹ In the course of time, the mushrooming of schemes has generated a heated public debate on the pros and cons of this compensation method. In one camp are those who argue that stock options are nothing more but a compensation mechanism by which managers transfer excessive fortunes to themselves without a real enhancement in firm performance. On the other hand, proponents underline that options provide managers and employees financial incentives to make better decisions, work harder, and share valuable information in a way that enhance firm performance. Thus, they see options – more or less– as a major innovation in managerial and personnel compensation (or more generally in human resource management). However, at the moment there is no theoretical or empirical consensus how stock options and managerial equity ownership affect firm performance in economic literature (Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2003).

Reviews previous research on the timing of employee stock option exercise decisions and share price performance before and after insider trading. Analyses the 1992‐1993 exercise behaviour of top executives at 65 large US firms using the Black‐Scholes (1973) value (less anticipated dividends) as a benchmark to compare with the intrinsic value (market price minus exercise price) at the date of exercise. Finds options are exercised when the two values are roughly equal, i.e. that executives’ decisions are not risk‐averse or biased by private information. Also shows a tendency for the subsequent change in share prices to be lower when the intrinsic value is less than the Black‐Scholes value at the time of exercise. Considers consistency with other research and the implications of the findings.

Accounting for stock options is a controversial issue. The FASB recognized that the “intrinsic value” method, which had been used for years, failed to adequately account for the costs involved. To rectify the problem they suggested the use of a “fair value” method. Their proposal met with strong objections from companies, which were concerned with the impact of the proposed standard on their reported profits. Consequently, the board relented and allowed the use of either method. Unfortunately, both the intrinsic value and fair value approaches have deficiencies, particularly in regard to how they measure compensation expense and gains and losses over time. This paper addresses these shortcomings by developing two alternative cost measurement approaches that apply an option‐pricing model on an iterative basis over the life of the option. Both approaches represent specific ways to implement exercise‐date measurement techniques for stock options. The paper argues that both approaches provide more relevant and reliable measures of an option’s cost than either intrinsic or fair value methods.