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This paper investigates the debate as to whether employee share options (ESOs) should be expensed in an entity’s financial statements as required by the IASB’s IFRS 2 – Share‐based payment (2004). The paper presents arguments for and against expensing ESOs, demonstrating that compensation of employees via ESOs is a bona fide expense in terms of the recognition and measurement criteria of the IASB Framework. It concludes that, the substance of an ESO transaction is that the entity pays an employee for his services, albeit with a different financial instrument. Consequently, the accounting treatment of such compensation should be the same as for any other payment of services of an employee.

This article investigates the most appropriate accounting treatment for expensing the fair value of employee share options (ESOs) in financial statements. The debate centres around whether the grant date or the exercise date is the most appropriate date for determining the value at which the ESOs are eventually accrued within the financial statements. After examining accounting models for each of the above measurement dates, the article concludes that exercise date accounting best reflects the economic substance of the ESO transaction. Therefore, the IASB should consider revising its definition of equity to encompass only existing shareholders, leaving all other financial obligations to be classified as liabilities.

The purpose of this paper is to address the concern about the impact of accounting regulatory change pertaining to employee share options (ESOs) on earnings management. Following Australia's adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005, companies are required to recognise the fair value of ESOs as expenses. Due to inherent imprecision in the estimate of ESO's fair value, the regulatory change from disclosure to recognition was widely claimed to potentially give rise to an alternative mechanism to manage earnings. This study provides empirical evidence on whether the regulatory change leads to earnings management problems.

This study uses the regulatory change in accounting for ESOs to provide a direct test of earnings management between disclosed versus recognised regimes for the same sample of firms. The sample consists of Australian firms from S&P/ASX300 for the period from 2003 to 2006.

The results show that, although the accounting regulatory change from disclosure to recognition may provide an alternative earnings management vehicle, there is no evidence of this occurring. There could be several reasons for this finding. First, the statistical tests lack power. Second, there are stricter audit tests on recognised amounts than on disclosed amounts. Third, given the concern of excessive pay and the close scrutiny of compensation, managers may have already understated ESO values in the disclosure regime. Finally, managers have limited time and resources and the effort involved in the adoption of IFRS in 2005 could have restricted the time available to manage earnings via the ESO reporting channel.

This study adds to the limited research on whether a change in accounting regulation for employee share options from disclosure to recognition gives rise to greater scope for earnings management. One reason for the lack of empirical evidence in the research is due to the problem of designing a test. Bernard and Schipper suggest that within‐firm studies have limitations for comparing the effects of recognition versus disclosure when the change is driven by an estimate becoming more reliable. A cross‐sectional study is also problematic due to self‐selection bias if firms can choose between disclosure versus recognition. This study circumvents potential design problems raised by Bernard and Schipper by setting a test using regulatory change which allows the test to be compared directly using the same company.

Following Marx and Engels' identification of the “essential condition of capital”, the purpose of this paper is to begin an initial critical exploration of the essential condition of intellectual capital, particularly the ownership rights of labour.

Adopting a critically modernist stance on unitarist HR and OB discourse, and contextualised within a background on the stock option phenomenon and recent accounting regulation, the paper argues that the fundamental nature of the capital‐labour relation continues resiliently into the IC labour (intellectual capital‐labour) relation.

There is strong evidence that broad‐based employee stock options (ESOPs) have become institutionalised in certain firms and sectors – but the future of such schemes is very uncertain (post 2005 accounting regulation). Overly unitarist HR/OB arguments are challenged here with empirical evidence on capital's more latently strategic purposes such as conserving cash, reducing reported accounting expense in order to boost reported earnings, deferring taxes, and attracting, retaining and exploiting key elements of labour.

Research supports the positive benefits of broad‐based employee stock ownership schemes. Further research on the benefits of such schemes and the reasons why they are or are not implemented is now required.

From the perspective of labour, nothing appears to have really changed (yet) in terms of the essential condition of intellectual capital.

This paper explicitly raises the issue of the ownership rights of labour to intellectual capital.

Employee ownership has attracted much attention across the globe. Whether affected by the global financial crisis (GFC), or not, this paper seeks to canvass what is known about employee ownership in neo‐liberal political economies.

This paper is a literature review, cross cultural analysis and critique.

The findings indicate future research directions.

The paper suggests a reconsideration of organizational configurations for possible greater application in the future.

The paper hightlights the re‐regulation of neo‐liberal markets.

The paper focuses on employee share ownership schemes.

Using a random sample of 49 UK engineering companies, the influence of profit sharing, share‐option schemes and the perceived degree of employee participation in decision making on inter‐firm labour absenteeism rates are investigated. After controlling for a number of firm‐specific factors, suggested as theoretically appropriate in the extant literature, the key empirical results indicated that firms which had adopted sharing schemes appeared to experience significantly lower absenteeism rates than their non‐sharing counterparts.

I point out also that there are 1,800,000 more owner‐occupiers since 1979 — a policy fought tooth and nail by the Labour Party; that there has been a dramatic extension of share ownership as with British Telecom and an increase in the number of employee share option schemes.

Research is currently being conducted at Cardiff Business School into the impact of wider share‐ownership/profit sharing and privatisation on various aspects of employee relations (see e.g. Poole and Jenkins, 1988; Wilson and Peel, 1989; Groves, Peel and Pendlebury, 1989; Peel, Pendlebury and Groves, 1989; Matthews, 1988). The purpose of the current paper is to outline a specific aspect of this research which is investigating the impact of share‐ownership/privatisation on the ‘financial awareness’ of employees; and to outline some preliminary evidence based on detailed questionnaire returns from leading UK quoted companies.

This study aims to investigate the post-implementation impact of expensing share-based payment transactions on basic earnings per share. In recent years, IFRS 2 was one of the most opposed and controversial standards issued by the IASB.

The sample relates to the period immediately after implementation (2006-2009) and consists of the 531 firm-year observations where share-based payments were present among Johannesburg Stock Exchange listed companies. The effect of share-based payments on basic earnings per share is assessed.

The findings of this study show a statistically significant impact on basic earnings per share, but the results are more modest than suggested by prior studies. The number of companies reporting a share-based payment expense increased over the five-year period 2005-2009.

The introduction of IFRS 2 caused small but not necessarily immaterial changes to the income profile of companies. This is important for analysts and general users of financial information who need to be aware of these changes. The results also suggest that IFRS 2 did not merely cause accounting policy changes, but has impacted on the way share-based payment transactions are used by companies.

Offering share “match” incentives and flexible payment choices enabled Enterprise Inns to gain employee buy‐in for its Share Incentive Plan, explains Julia Memery, relationship manager at Halifax Employee Share Services.