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The mainstream framework for corporate governance is that all corporate activity should be directed towards shareholder wealth maximization. This article posits that public policy should move away from shareholder primacy and instead recognize employees as key contributors to corporate value-creation. One way to implement this approach is to require the creation of Employee Equity Funds (EEFs) at large corporations, which would pay employees dividends alongside external shareholders and establish a collective employee voice in corporate governance. EEFs may reduce economic inequality while improving firm performance and macroeconomic stability. This article provides an original estimate of average employee dividends, illustrating the potential of employee equity funds.

Analysis of employee dividends for Employee Equity Funds at large U.S. corporations, using publicly available corporate finance data.

Based on historic dividend payments and employee counts in public 10-K filings, I find that, if EEFs held 20% of outstanding equity, the average employee dividend across this sample would be $2,622 per year, while the median is $1,760. This indicates that employee dividends can be a small but meaningful form of redressing wealth inequality for the low-wage workforce, though it should emphatically not be seen as a replacement for fair wages.

Original data analysis of a proposed policy reform to increase the benefits of employee equity in the United States.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

Over the last two decades, Under Armour (UA) has emerged from being the “underdog” in the sports apparel and footwear industry to being a leader in the industry, with a fierce attention to performance and great skill at picking up-and-coming athletes who emerge as superstars. This case underscores its administrative heritage, competitive strategy, and growth potential as a global player in a highly competitive industry. It addresses the tension between being a performance brand while launching lines for women vs technology applications and conflicts between its growth strategy and macro-economic forces. It highlights areas in which it has succeeded against macro-economic forces and where it has not.

The research relies primarily on secondary sources and countless studies of UA and its major competitors. Primary research is based on databases, videos of UA’s Chief Executive Officer, Kevin Plank, and articles from Bloomberg to The Baltimore Sun (UA’s headquarters) on the history, growth and future of UA. It also includes observations and site visits to one of its signature brand house stores as well as intensive research and directed studies with students in the USA and China.

The case can be applied to undergraduate, graduate or executive business classes in: business policy and strategy; general management; (sports) marketing; leadership or organisational behaviour classes.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

The Changing Pattern of Share Ownership. As indicated elsewhere in these pages, one of the most important economic developments of recent years has been the changing pattern of share ownership in UK quoted companies. Ownership of equities gives the holder the legal right to vote at company annual general meetings on such matters as the appointment and removal of directors. When a group of investors owns enough shares to control the board of directors then that group can clearly exert a powerful influence over managerial decision‐making. This is now the case in the United Kingdom with respect to a major group of investors. The combined equity holdings of institutional investors — pension funds, insurance companies, investment trust companies and unit trusts — amounted to 51 per cent of all UK quoted equities at the end of 1980. These financial institutions thus controlled more than half the voting power in British industrial and commercial enterprises, and they continue to acquire a further two per cent of all UK quoted equities each year. This gives considerable power to institutional portfolio managers. It could be suggested that this power, particularly in the case of pension funds which form the largest and fastest growing sector, should be vested in those who contribute the savings which finance the growth of institutional equity holdings, that is employees or their elected representatives.

We examine the contribution and investment decisions made by members of a large UK‐based DC pension plan. We find that many employees appear to be relatively financially sophisticated and follow approaches consistent with economic and financial theory in terms of savings rates and investment strategies. However, there are also many less sophisticated employees who stick with plan default arrangements and/or follow simple rules of thumb in saving and investing. The challenge for corporate sponsors of pension plans is in designing arrangements and communication strategies that reduce the chances of these less sophisticated plan members making mistakes – in the sense of systematic deviations from optimal behaviour.

This monograph reports the growth in ownership of ordinary shares in UK registered and managed companies by institutional shareholders and assesses the implications for corporate management. Combined holdings of insurance companies, pension funds, investment trust companies, and unit trusts amounted to 45 per cent of quoted UK equities in 1974 and will approach 50 per cent by 1977. Despite exhortations from the Bank of England, the Press, academics and private shareholders, institutions have been reluctant to use their voting strength. French and German companies are familiar with managerial participation by financial institutions. In the United Kingdom the persistent increase in institutional shareholdings presents management with opportunities to mobilise institutional support for the board, particularly in takeover situations; to involve financial institutions in corporate planning and the development of industrial democracy; to use institutions as a source of funds; and to use the financial resources of institutions to maximise the market capitalisation of the firm.

Pension funds are rapidly acquiring voting control of UK quoted companies. Who, if anybody, should have the legal right to use the votes attached to pension fund shareholdings — pension fund managers, employees, employee representatives, members of the TUC, members of the Government, civil servants, or perhaps members of a stakeholders' council? This article sketches a few scenarios.

Several popular and academic pieces of late have expressed concerns regarding the sustainability of public defined benefit pension funds. Since the onset of the Great Recession, concern has increased. In this paper recent arguments are analyzed in the context of three related data sets: panel data on public sector pensions spanning 2001-2009, historic asset return data, and business cycle data. Findings generally indicate that while public sector plans have suffered a difficult decade, current anxieties may be somewhat overwrought. Several remedial policies are investigated. Remedial policies, such as improving plan administration, altering portfolio allocations, and increasing both employee and employer contributions, are observed to be more promising than either freezing or closing the funds.