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Since the late 1980s, learning organisations have been deemed to have a number of advantages over non‐learning ones. One organisation that has been identified as “a premiere learning organisation”, is Royal Dutch Shell (RDS). Despite this, in 1998 its results were the worst in its history. Seeks to explain how and why this happened. Considers the advantages claimed for learning organisations, the features of them that enhance an organisation’s competitive advantage and those that can obstruct their effectiveness. Analyses the performance of RDS over a period of time in the light of the changing conditions in the oil industry. In particular examines a variety of learning methods used by RDS in the critical period prior to and during the 1990s. From this, addresses differences between the characteristics of RDS in the 1990s, compared with previously, on the one hand, and with those identified as significant for ensuring that learning organisations create competitive advantage, on the other hand, in an effort to explain RDS’s poor performance at the end of the 1990s.

As a result of an increasingly competitive petrol retailing environment and the rise of convenience stores in the food retailing sector, oil companies in Britain in the 1980s began to diversity into food retailing and convert their petrol stations into forecourt convenience stores. Drawing on case study evidence of Shell Retail, the paper examines how the company attempted to build its organisation into a strong brand by rebranding its forecourt outlets and introducing business format franchising to manage them. Utilising franchising, branding and food retailing literatures, the work investigates not only why Shell Retail believed business format franchising was more appropriate than traditional franchising or in‐company management for its rebranded forecourts but also the factors that eventually caused the arrangement to fail. In particular, the paper analyses the problems relating to business format franchising that Shell Retail encountered in order to provide guidance for other retailers who may be considering using it as an instrument in the rebranding process.

Organizational networks have become increasingly common in business in recent years. These networks are managed by a “core organization”. However, little is known about the reasons for a firm becoming a core, and its role in the network′s value adding chain. Identifies three ways for an organization to become a core: by contracting work to potential network members, by spinning off essential and auxilliary activities from within the organization itself, and by becoming an umbrella and linking organization for network members. Looks at a variety of roles which the core may have in the network′s value‐adding chain, including: the user of member organizations′ goods and services, the provider of goods and services for the network members, or in some cases both, and the link between the providers and users in the chain. Discusses the advantages for the core and the other network members of these types of relationship, and also the notion that the role of the core may change over time. Concludes with a detailed definition of the role of the core in the network and its motivation for taking on this position.

In the 1970s estate agency in the UK was a highly fragmented industry. Small, locally based, independent businesses dominated the industry. This industry structure meant that estate agency was seen as a typical entrepreneurial activity. By the first half of the 1990s, however, most estate agencies were in the hands of large institutions in the financial services sector, although recently independent estate agents have begun to reappear on the high street. Nevertheless the dramatic change in the character and structure of estate agency in the UK between the end of the 1970s and the present day raises a number of questions about the nature of entrepreneurship and its impact on industry development. In this paper the development of estate agency in the UK over the past 20 years is analysed, in order to ascertain, first, the relationship between an industry’s fragmentation and the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities within it, and, secondly, the extent to which the radical change in the industry’s structure during that period was the result of the exploitation of an entrepreneurial opportunity.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how one firm – the British Shoe Corporation – eventually failed because, as a result of the strength of its predominant managerial mental model it fell into a number of exploitative learning capability traps.

The paper uses a contemporary historical case study approach. This allows for a longitudinal study of the phenomenon. It examines the core concepts involved before moving on to consider the task environment in which the company operated, the origins and nature of its predominant managerial mental model, its performance over its lifetime and how and why it fell into the various capability learning traps.

The study found that the firm's predominant managerial mental model had a significant impact on its capability learning. It argues that to prevent other firms falling into these sorts of traps they should adopt scenario planning and seek out internal asymmetries.

The study is limited in that it only considers one specific case. More studies of the same sort need to be carried out before the findings can be considered generalisable. Again much more research is needed into the process of seeking out internal asymmetries, a recently developed concept with very little written on it.

The paper provides advice on ways to prevent firms falling into the same sorts of learning traps as the British Shoe Corporation.

The paper is original in that it relates the problem of falling into capability learning traps to the predominant managerial mental model of the organisation. It provides a practical example of the phenomenon and discusses practical strategies that other firms can adopt to avoid suffering the same outcome.

When DAF BV collapsed in February 1993 the Continental operations were saved by the Belgian and Dutch governments. However, in Britain the receivers were called in to Leyland DAF. They, along with the former Leyland DAF head of manufacturing, decided to salvage as much as possible of the company through the creation of an organizational network. Two essential roles that need to be carried out to establish an organizational network successfully are that of the architect and that of the lead operator. Analyses the way in which these two roles were carried out in the creation of the Leyland DAF network which not only encompasses the major former Leyland DAF plant in Britain but also the newly established concern, DAF Trucks, on the Continent.

Examines how the British Shoe Corporation eventually failed because, as a result of the strength of its predominant managerial mental model, it fell into a number of exploitative learning‐capability traps.

Considers the core concepts involved before moving on to examine how and why it fell into the various capability‐learning traps.

Argues that the firm's predominant managerial mental model had a significant impact on its capability learning.

Provides advice on ways to prevent firms falling into the same sorts of learning traps as the British Shoe Corporation.

Discusses practical strategies that other firms can adopt to avoid suffering the same outcome.

Discusses the nature of business cultures between two European Union nations – Germany and the UK – and how these cultures affect their economic performance. Details the way takeover bids are conducted between the two countries and the ramifications for both management and employees of the respective companies involved. The charge that nationalism plays a big part in negotiations is made by some, and raises the question of the desirability of the increasing concentration of industrial ownership in the hands of one member of the community at another′s expense.

Collaboration is now an important part of public sector management. The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that have helped shape the relationships between public agencies involved in sports tourism.

Using critical case sampling 54 in‐depth interviews were conducted with public officials in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The authors have produced the “Theory of collaborative advantage in relation to sports tourism”. This model captures the dynamics of collaboration in the sports tourism policy arena. A total of 12 practitioner themes and four cross‐cutting themes were identified and although each theme and the issues and tensions identified within it can affect inter‐organizational relationships in a particular way, the model illustrates how each theme is interlinked and is part of a larger, more complex picture.

Like all empirical research, this paper has its limitations but if the issues that affect collaboration are not identified then they cannot be addressed. Although no two collaborative settings are the same, public sector managers need to be aware of the factors that affect, or may affect, inter‐organizational relationships so that they can pre‐empt problems and maximise the use of resources.

Hopefully this paper will, in some way, lead to better planning and management of sports tourism and encourage those involved in sports tourism policy to adapt a collaborative, rather than an isolated, approach.

This study has contributed to knowledge by providing a better understanding of the inter‐relationships in the sports tourism policy arena.

In light of the increasing acceptance of the concept of brand cocreation this paper aims to develop a model of the process in order to elucidate the roles of the various stakeholders, particularly the company and the brand consumers, in it and the implications of the concept for brand managers.

The process model of brand cocreation was derived from extant literature covering a wide range of topics related to brands, including: various types of marketing, consumer behaviour, psychology, new product development, and marketing communications.

A five‐stage process of brand cocreation is developed identifying the various stages in which the firm is in control and those which are controlled by the consumers.

The paper highlights the need to reconsider the role of brand managers in the brand cocreation process and identifies various gaps in the knowledge of brands and their management that have become apparent as a result of the development of the model.

The value of this paper lies in its holistic overview of the complete brand cocreation process and the issues relating to the nature of brand management that it highlights.