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Two studies were conducted examining the effects of power, distribution norms, and the scope of future interaction on small group negotiation. Subjects participated in a three‐person negotiation exercise in which they had to reach agreements between two or three players to receive resources. In study one the effects of power position (high, medium, low), dominant distribution norm (contribution, need), and the expectation of future interaction (expected, not expected) on the distribution of resources were examined. Power interacted with both dominant distribution norm and the expectation of future interaction. The ability of high power, less needy players to achieve resources was reduced under a dominant need‐based distribution norm, and when future interaction was expected. In addition, groups expecting future interaction were more likely to form exclusive coalitions than those not anticipating future interaction. In study two the effects of power position (high, medium, low), type of need (pure‐need need + future potential), and the scope of future interaction (full group, coalition‐only) on the distribution of resources were examined. Power interacted with both the type of need and the scope of future interaction. Low power, more needy players achieved greater resources when need was linked to future potential and when future interaction with the entire group was anticipated. In addition, groups anticipating future interaction with only those included in the final agreement were more likely to form exclusive coalitions than those anticipating future interaction with all group members.

Subjects participated in a three‐person negotiation exercise, in which they had to form two‐ or three‐way coalitions to receive resources. The effects of power position (high, medium, low), distribution norms (contribution, need), and task meeting structure (caucus, joint) on the distribution of resources were examined. Most coalition theories assume that the power position of the players calls into play different levels of entitlement which will determine the allocation of resources. There has, however, been little attempt to manipulate entitlement, in the form of distribution norms, separately from power structure. In the research reported here, three‐person groups contained a high, medium, and low power player. The dominant group distribution norm was manipulated as either contribution‐based or need‐based. Task meeting structure was manipulated by beginning each group meeting with either a three‐way meeting between all players (joint) or a series of one‐on‐one meetings (caucus). As predicted, groups that began by caucusing had a higher incidence of two‐way agreements than groups that began with joint meetings. The task meeting structure interacted with power position such that caucusing increased the high power player's outcome, while the joint meeting structure increased the low power player's outcome. In addition, the distribution norm interacted with power position such that the contribution‐based norm increased the outcomes of high power players, while the need‐based norm increased the outcomes of the low power players.

We created the Research on Managing Groups and Teams conference in 1997 with the first edited volume appearing in 1998. This is the 15th volume in the series, and its publication is truly bittersweet, as it will be our final volume as editors. Each year we explored a different theme, with a young scholar selected to be the thematic editor for the conference and volume. Our intention was to create a venue for junior scholars to develop and showcase their work. Over the years, this small conference of approximately 50 participants (who varied depending on the theme) has become a research incubator for junior faculty members. Their contributions to the field of management have been extensive, covering topics such as technology, time, social identity, status, and diversity – to name just a few.