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A daily diary study was used to examine the relationships between goal distance, goal velocity, affect, expectancies, and effort from the perspective of Carver and Scheier's (1998) control theory of self-regulation. Fifteen social workers completed a diary at the end of each working day for four weeks. Multi-level analysis found little support for the precice predictions of Carver and Scheier's theory, but did support the idea that discrepancy reduction plays a role in regulating behavior. Expectancies had a strong association with effort, and affect moderated this relationship. The interaction indicated that high expectancies suppress the signalling effects of affect, preventing the individual from being consumed by immediate reactions to situational events and enabling effort to be sustained.

This chapter addresses how emotional labor relates to effort; an important mediator in the relationship between emotional labor strategies and important outcomes. To better understand how effort functions in these relationships, a new way of understanding emotional labor strategies is considered. This new approach accounts for effort profiles associated with different types of emotional labor. Consequently, three distinct categories of emotional labor strategies emerge; cause-focused, symptom-focused, and avoidance actions. These new categories are contrasted with the current dichotomous understanding of emotional labor strategies; surface and deep acting. How these three distinct sets of emotional labor strategies are specifically related to effort – and thus to outcomes of interest – is discussed and propositions are made. The implications of, and avenues for future research afforded by this new categorization of emotional labor are discussed.

Labor process research has documented a shift in the nature of control – from techniques that aim to limit worker discretion to consent-oriented controls that are believed to generate greater effort by increasing intrinsic rewards or bonding employees to managers and/or the firm. Over the past several decades, however, growing pressure to increase profits has prompted firms to adopt cost-cutting strategies that have eroded job security, relationships with management and commitment to organizational goals. This study investigates how a changing labor process and rising job insecurity shape workers’ orientations toward work, managers and the firm, and in turn influence workplace behavior. Analyses of content-coded data on 212 work groups confirms that discretion-limiting controls (supervision, technology and rules) are associated with more negative orientations and/or reductions in effort (with variations across distinct forms of control), while investment in workers’ human capital (but not involvement of workers in decision-making) has the reverse effect – ­generating more positive orientations toward work, managers and the firm, and (in turn) promoting discretionary work effort and limiting covert effort restriction. Implications of insecurity are more complex. Both layoffs and temporary employment reduce commitment to the organization, but layoffs generate conflict with management without reducing effort, whereas temporary employment limits effort without producing conflict. We illuminate underlying processes with evidence from the qualitative case studies.

Purpose – The aim of this chapter is to analyze the measurement error due to partial observability of circumstances, given the current methodologies used to capture the inequality of opportunity.

Methodology – We limit our analysis to the case in which IOp is measured by using an inequality index and evaluated according to the ex ante and the ex post approaches proposed by Checchi and Peragine (2010). Both approaches rely on the use of two hypothetical distributions obtained by standardizing and smoothing processes so that in one of them all inequalities are due to effort and in the other they are all caused by individuals circumstances. The impact of a change in the observability of circumstances has been analyzed directly in the first case (ex ante approach) and indirectly in the second (ex post approach). Hence, in the latter results are obtained by using a decomposable inequality index, while in the first case the result holds for any Lorenz consistent inequality index.

Findings – We have shown that, in both cases, we can only identify a lower bound of opportunity inequality, and the results obtained when measuring IOp with the two approaches are biased in the same direction.

Originality – The idea that inequality of opportunity, as it is generally measured, is only a lower bound of the real inequality of opportunity has already been hinted in Peragine (2004a), Fleurbaey (2008, Chap. 9), and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). We attempt to bring this intuition to complete fruition in this chapter by providing clear and distinct demonstrations of this result for both the ex ante and the ex post approach for measuring IOp.

This study examines the effect of using a computerized decision aid on student cognitive effort and learning in the first tax course. Students at a mid-western university in the United States prepared a 1040 tax return using either paper or tax software from a given set of taxpayer information. Students using paper forms reported higher levels of cognitive effort than did students using the tax software, however, no association between self-efficacy and cognitive effort was found. A test for association between decision aid type and inferential (higher-level) learning (the third level of Bloom's taxonomy) found cognitive effort to be statistically significant. The study also found a significant interaction between cognitive effort and experience. These results suggest that paper forms, which require students to work through task processes, may be better instructional tools for helping students acquire a deeper understanding of subject matter. Although tax software provides potential benefits of increased accuracy and speed, practitioners should be aware of its limitations as a learning tool.

This chapter analyses efforts exerted and utilities obtained in a double lawsuit. This is a usual situation when insurance companies are involved in damage compensation. A victim files the first lawsuit against its insurance company for coverage. If the victim loses, there are no further lawsuits. If the victim wins, the insurance company files the second lawsuit against the perpetrator to recover its expenses.

The situation is described as a two-period game, which is solved with backward induction. The model is based on the Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) litigation success function that expresses influence of the counterparts’ efforts on the outcome of a lawsuit.

The chapter analyses the optimal resource allocations in each lawsuit as functions of effort unit costs, the value of each lawsuit and the contest intensities in the lawsuits. It is shown that a one-period game where the victim, the insurance company and the perpetrator choose their efforts simultaneously and independently gives the same solution as the two-period game.

In 2008 in the United States 15 million lawsuits were filed. Several of these were linked in the sense that subsequent lawsuits depend on the outcomes of earlier lawsuits.

Lawsuits are commonly analysed separately. The chapter analyses in a novel manner the implications of two linked lawsuits referred to as a double lawsuit.

A well-documented human tendency is to compare outcomes with others, trying to outperform them. These tendencies vary across cultures and among different individuals in a given society. To understand the implications of such diversity in status considerations on wages, contracts, sorting and output we use a standard principal agent framework in which firms consist of two workers and a principal. We find that, in equilibrium, firms mix workers with different status concerns to enhance ‘cultural trade’. Although workers may have the same productivity, equilibrium will generate a dispersion in (expected) wages, and workers with status concerns will have more high-powered incentives, work more and earn more than workers who do not care about status. Finally, we find that a more diverse workforce can increase the total output of the economy. This increase in output is a result of the higher effort exerted by the status minded workers that offsets the reduction in effort by those who do not care about status.

The managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?

Considering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.

In this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.

The study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

We examine how school districts in California help their high schools respond to state accountability requirements. We discovered two contrasting forms of district interventions: those aiming to increase schools’ internal coherence and those encouraging direct but narrower responses to state requirements. Drawing on interviews in six districts and eight high schools, we find that many district efforts focus on immediate responses to state requirements to raise test scores. Yet, our analysis suggests that without strong district efforts to increase internal coherence, interventions aimed at eliciting school responses will be less beneficial over time.