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The purpose of the study is to examine whether superiors (i.e. principals), who evaluate the performance of their subordinates (i.e. agents), take information asymmetry into account by assuming that subordinates shirk when the accounting system does not provide information on subordinates’ effort levels. A decision making experiment was conducted to examine the effect of information asymmetry on effort attribution and the effect of effort attribution on performance evaluation. The results show that the presence of an agency problem significantly affected managers’ beliefs regarding the level of effort they attributed to the subordinate, which affected their evaluation of the subordinate.

Understanding the effect of assortment composition on attentional levels is an essential topic for academic researchers and practitioners. This work has important implications when analyzing the influence of shopping frame time and search effort on the relationship between the reaction to assortment composition and visual attention to stock-keeping units (SKUs) pricing.

Two experimental studies through gauze behavior analysis technology (using eye-tracking equipment) analyze the variable's large assortment, visual attention to SKU pricing, search effort and shopping frame time.

The results suggest that, although it increases the search effort, a large assortment decreases the visual attention to SKU pricing. Further, our results indicate a moderating effect associated with mitigating the negative effect by medium-low levels of search effort and a moderating impact of time in this relation.

Marketing professionals can carefully optimize the in-store experience by managing the assortment and variety and by influencing consumers' visual attention to SKU pricing along the journey as part of the experience. Assortment and SKU pricing strategies need to be aligned with consumer journey design.

Our findings contribute to assortment theory and management by detailing the relationship between consumers' reactions to assortment perception and visual attention to SKU pricing in time flow. We reinforce the importance of considering assortment strategies from the consumer perspective and giving reliable information about in-store behavior.

The study aims to address a critical gap in existing healthcare payment schemes and care service pricing by recognizing the influential role of patients' decisions on self-management efforts. These decisions not only impact health outcomes but also shape the demand for care, subsequently influencing care costs. Despite the significance of this interplay, current payment schemes often overlook these dynamics. The research focuses on investigating the implications of a novel behavior-based payment scheme, designed to align incentives and establish a direct connection between patients' decisions and care costs. The primary objective is to comprehensively understand whether and how this innovative payment scheme structure influences key stakeholders, including patients, care providers, insurers and overall social welfare.

In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model to incorporate the performance of self-management with the demand for healthcare service, compare the patient's effort decision for self-management and provider's price decision for healthcare service under a behavior-based scheme with that under two implemented widely payment schemes, that is, co-payment scheme and co-insurance scheme.

Our findings confirm that the behavior-based scheme incentives patient self-management more than current schemes while reducing their possibility of seeking healthcare service, which indirectly induces the provider to lower the price of the service. The stakeholders' utility under various payment schemes is sensitive to the cost of treatment and the perceived health utility of patients. Especially, patient health awareness is not always benefited provider profit, as it motivates patient self-management while diminishing the demand for care.

We provide a novel framework for characterizing behavior-based payment schemes. Our results confirm the need for modification of the current payment scheme to incentivize patient self-management.

The purpose of this study is to provide an optimal joint strategy of multi-period pricing and sales effort for a retailer with a logit choice demand in an integrated channel.

Customer demand is characterized by a logit choice model, it varies over time and is influenced by price and sales effort. The multi-period decision model for the retailer is constructed using a discrete-time dynamic programming method to determine the optimal price and sales effort in each period.

When the inventory level does not exceed a certain threshold, decreasing price and increasing sales effort over time or as inventory level increases are the optimal strategies. However, once the inventory level exceeds the threshold, the optimal strategy is to maintain both price and sales effort constant as the inventory level changes or to increase price and decrease sales effort over time. Additionally, the greater the influence of sales effort on demand or the higher the arrival rate of customers, the higher the optimal price and the greater the optimal sales effort level.

This study contributes to the existing research on dynamic pricing and sales effort in integrated channels by incorporating a logit choice model. Furthermore, it provides valuable management insights for retailers operating in an integrated channel to make pricing and sales effort decisions based on inventory level and time period.

The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model of union reform that may help to revitalize the labor movement. Our model presents a path using democracy and militancy to overcome union oligarchy to build stronger unions and a stronger broader movement. We develop a new model of union revitalization by expanding the Voss and Sherman (2000) model from our own experiences and a review of past union revitalization efforts. Democratic and militant strategies are a key to successful reform efforts. Entrenched union leaders tend to oppose such efforts. Reformers must adequately overcome entrenched leader responses to succeed in reforming their unions. We have developed a new conceptual model of union revitalization. Our model should be tested further through in-depth case studies and analysis of reform efforts which have failed or succeeded. Our model presents strategies and tactics for labor activists to revitalize their unions and the labor movement. We present a new model of union revitalization that looks at both internal and external union revitalization. This chapter accumulates evidence across reform efforts throughout the modern history of unions. This comparative and contrasting analysis of the evidence from these efforts is a unique contribution to the field. Further, the resulting model from this review presents a unique focus on the strategies and tactics of reform efforts as well as the interaction between union reform efforts and entrenched leaders. This model provides a path for both future research and practical revitalization efforts.

Purpose – Recruiting sufficient participants who adequately represent the population of interest is an ongoing issue for accounting experimental researchers. This study investigates the impact of recruitment method on the number of participants, effort on the experimental task, and sample bias with respect to three individual difference variables (locus of control, social desirability response bias, and prosocial behavior). We employ five different recruitment methods: three forms of monetary compensation and two levels of an appeal for help with a research project.

Methodology – We recruit students in five sections of the same course taught by the same instructor (not one of the researchers), manipulating recruitment method across sections. Immediately following recruitment, participants completed a simple experimental task and scales for the individual difference variables.

Findings – We find that the method of recruiting resulted in different response rates, with appeal from a fellow student yielding the highest response rate, and appeal from a professor yielding the lowest response rate. Effort was greatest for the appeal from the professor and least for the draw. While the five subsamples that resulted from the five recruiting methods were not different with respect to the individual difference variables, the relationship of those variables to effort did vary.

Research Implications – Our findings suggest that researchers must carefully consider recruitment method not only in terms of how many participants can be attracted, but also in terms of the potential impact of the manner in which recruitment was conducted on the attitudes and behaviors of the participants during the experiment.

Classical definitions of motivation typically involve two main components: direction and activation. Motivated behavior is directed toward or away from particular stimuli (i.e., appetitive and aversive motivation). Furthermore, activational aspects of motivation refer to the observation that motivated behavior is characterized by substantial activity, vigor, persistence, and exertion of effort in both the initiation and maintenance of behavior. Although separate neural systems direct organisms toward distinct motivational stimuli (e.g., food, water, sex), there appears to be a common circuitry regulating behavioral activation and the exertion of effort. Mesolimbic dopamine is one of the brain systems mediating activational aspects of motivation and exertion of effort. This system integrates aspects of motivation and motor control functions involved in the instigation of action. Research on the neurobiology of effort has contributed to our understanding of the pathophysiology of neurological and psychiatric disorders that are characterized by motivational dysfunction.

We demonstrate in a laboratory experiment that the effectiveness of performance-contingent incentives is inversely related to risk-aversion levels. For about 16.5% of participants, performance fails to improve under performance-pay, and the probability of such failure increases with risk-aversion. This phenomenon works in part through the reduced effort level of more risk-averse individuals when effort level is positively correlated with risk exposure. It is also associated with higher self-reported levels of stress by more risk-averse people working under performance-contingent pay. We find no evidence of such stress causing decrements in the quality of effort affecting performance after controlling for effort level. However, controlling for effort, more risk-averse participants perform better under a fixed salary, leaving less room for improvement under performance-pay.

Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the private returns of (social) investors to the success of social programs. We investigate experimentally how SIBs perform in a first-best world, where investors are rational and able to obtain hard information on not-for-profits’ performance. Using a principal-agent multitasking framework, we compare SIBs to inputs-based contracts (IBs) and performance-based contracts (PBs). IBs are based on a piece-rate mechanism, PBs on a non-binding bonus mechanism, and SIBs on a mechanism that, due to the presence of an investor, offers full enforceability. Although SIBs can perfectly enforce good behaviour, they also require the principal (i.e., government) to relinquish control over the agent’s (i.e., not-for-profit’s) payoff to a self-regarding investor, which prevents the principal and agent from being reciprocal. In spite of these drawbacks, in our experiment SIBs outperformed IBs and PBs. We therefore conclude that, at least in our laboratory test-bed, SIBs can allay the underperformance of not-for-profits.

Using data from a retail chain of 193 bakery shops that underwent downsizing, we study the effects of two types of downsizing announcements – closure or sale to another operator – on sales in the affected shops, and how these effects are moderated by job security perceptions. On average, sales in the affected shops go down by 26% after a closure announcement and by 7% after a sale announcement. Sales decline more sharply in shops where employees had higher job security perceptions before the announcement. Our findings are consistent with psychological contract theory: a breach of an implicit contract promising job security in exchange for work effort results in a reciprocal effort withdrawal. We rule out several alternative explanations to our findings.