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This paper aims to examine the 10th national election held on 5 January 2014, and the violent incidents took place during, before and after the election in Bangladesh. Violence-free competitive, fair and credible national election is a prioritized issue in the politics and governance discourse in Bangladesh now. In this paper, relevant literature has been reviewed first for conceptual understanding, Then, the paper investigates to explore the causes and outcomes of violence took place centering the 10th parliamentary election in Bangladesh. Finally, it prescribes possible ways forward to overcome this crisis.

The paper is descriptive and qualitative in nature and based on secondary sources of materials. As it focused on a particular country and issue relating to the electoral violence of a particular national election in Bangladesh, it is a case study too. Most of the information and data have been used from published documents like journal articles, books and newspaper reports. Relevant information collected also from online sources.

The electoral violence may happen for various causes, yet the significant cause is the motive of the incumbent for picking up power over and again. Similarly, lack of cooperation of political parties, negligence and domination of ruling parties over opposition are also responsible for electoral and political violence before, during and after the election. In addition, violation of human rights, rule of law and, finally, the poor governance of Bangladesh are because of the lack of meaningful democratic government, strong political will and consensus among all political parties.

The main limitation of this research is the lack of financial supports to collect empirical data from concerned stakeholders through field visit.

The paper deals with an urgent issue of Bangladesh which is essential for a free, fair and credible election. To make the EC an independent institute, a law should be enacted for recruitment of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and other commissioners of EC as per Article 118(1) of Bangladesh Constitution. To find out neutral and impartial CEC and other members of EC, a search committee is very essential, and for constituting a search committee, a law also should be enacted by the Parliament. Therefore, it would be very helpful for electoral and legal reform to overcome the problem of electoral violence in Bangladesh.

The findings of this paper will be accepted by the readers, scholars and policymakers. A radical change will come to the politics and governance of Bangladesh. Thus, the paper would be beneficial for the society and community people as well as citizens of Bangladesh.

The paper would be helpful for policymakers to revamp the existing drawback of electoral policies and practice in Bangladesh. For a meaningful and effective Parliament, it would be necessary. The paper would be essential for the future scholars and researchers of this area to use as reference. Finally, the academicians and readers will find their food in the field of politics, administration and governance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the new Budget Act (2015) and the new budget cycle influence and were influenced by the contextual environment of the Tanzanian parliament and how this changed parliamentarians’ (MPs) budgetary oversight roles.

The paper employed analytical concepts explained in the contextual framework proposed by Alsharari et al. (2015) to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms. Interviews, video clips and document review were employed in the data collection. Data were analyzed using the thematic approach.

The values of the new Budget Act and the new budget cycle were in conflict with the prevailing institutions, political and power aspects. The MPs modified a few provisions in the new Budget Act and in the new budget cycle. Legitimating budgetary oversight roles as a result of institutional pressure emerged but stopped. Although there was a change in MPs formal powers and MPs involvement in budgetary oversight, there was stability as the change was ineffective.

The paper only extracted relevant aspects of the contextual framework, which were sufficient to achieve the objective of the paper. Moreover, the study was conducted only a few years after the implementation of the reforms. Therefore, it might be too early to reach conclusions. Yet, the paper serves as the basis for further studies investigating changes in budgetary oversight roles after the implementation of the reforms.

In order for the parliament to hold the government accountable to the electorate, there is a need for reforming the nature of the government system, improving MPs capacity, harmonizing Budget Act with prevailing constitution and demonstrating the political will to use MPs’ formal powers. The findings suggest that effective change in budgetary oversight by focusing on formal institutions only is unlikely.

This paper provides a more robust explanation on how the integration of institutional, political and power aspects shape budgetary oversight roles in parliaments. It is the first paper to explore accounting change using the contextual theoretical framework in an organization of a parliamentary nature. The paper responds to Kim’s (2018) call for conducting case studies to explore changes in budgetary oversight roles by investigating potential attributes of institutions when operating in practice.

This study aims to examine the participation of the Parliament of Tanzania in the fight against corruption in the country.

A desk-based research approach based on the review of documents and legal instruments was used.

The results of this study show that the Parliament of Tanzania has a chequered performance in fighting corruption. While it has passed several anti-corruption-related laws and in some respects succeeded to hold a few government officials accountable for the abuse of public office, there is little evidence to demonstrate its contribution at fighting this conundrum. Factors contributing to this deficiency include irresponsiveness to corruption allegations involving Members of Parliament, parliament’s remote oversight of the anti-corruption agency and shrinking democratic space in the parliament.

Tanzania has relatively high corruption levels. The country’s Development Vision 2025 envisages a nation free of corruption. Hence, efforts are needed from public and private sectors to overcome this conundrum. The parliament holds a special place in that fight. Through its representation, legislative and oversight roles and powers, parliament has a wider opportunity to strengthen anti-corruption in the country. This study shows that the Parliament of Tanzania has not been very effective in that regard. It offers suggestions to strengthen the parliament’s position and engagement to fight corruption.

There is scanty literature on the role of the Parliament of Tanzania in fighting corruption. This study is seminal, as it investigates the Tanzanian anti-corruption arsenal from a crucial organ that is vested with constitutional powers to make laws and oversee the executive and its agencies.

To examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government.

The sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs.

Results indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker.

If actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone.

Results of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation.

Such findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.

Supreme audit institutions, such as the auditors‐general, are considered a crucial link in the accountability chain between parliament and the executive arm of government. The purpose of this study is to examine the enabling legislation of the supreme audit institutions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries from a public sector accountability and independence perspective. Following on from INTOSAI (1998), English and Guthrie (2000) and De Martinis and Clark (2001), this study uses an accountability and independence framework to identify and compare the current legislation applicable to the supreme audit institutions of the ASEAN member countries with regard to independence, autonomy, mandate, funding issues, and related parliamentary powers. This study finds that while on average each jurisdiction has addressed slightly less than half the total number of issues under examination, there is considerable diversity with regard to the particular issues addressed. The study suggests policy implications to further strengthen the provisions for accountability and independence of supreme audit institutions through amendments to the enabling legislation of the various jurisdictions.

My title is intended to cover two related matters which have excited much public interest over the last few months—official secrets and freedom of information. The Official Secrets Acts and particularly the notorious section 2 of the Act of 1911 have of course been matters of public concern for many years. The Act of 1911 was passed through Parliament with scarcely any discussion during a spy scare, but as the Franks Committee has long since pointed out, its all‐embracing character was not the product of inadvertent haste, but the culmination of twenty years of effort in Whitehall to get Parliament to take the problem of protecting official information seriously. The security of the realm was, and remains, the most effective argument for extending a blanket of secrecy over all official information, however trivial. The difficulty for those who want to remove part of the blanket has been to convince the doubtful sympathizer that the blanket is divisible, or that some of it can be turned back without revealing all. The alternative, very satisfactory to Whitehall, ministers and senior civil servants alike, is that the release of official information should be entirely at their discretion. It is of course necessary for government that a great deal of official information be published as a matter of routine. The problem with the discretionary system is that some information needed for effective parliamentary scrutiny and public debate is not made available until after its publication could have affected government decisions, or indeed, at all. And the government, in deciding whether or not to publish, is apt to confuse its own political position with the national interest.

This monograph identifies five essential elements for an effective policy to promote consumer interests viz. protection, information, advice, education and representation. The author explores each in considerable depth to assess the extent to which this year's Fair Trading Act will contribute to them. Her verdict is that although not as much as might be hoped will be achieved, by and large the Act is a useful measure. It should bring a higher standard to trade practices particularly in the field of selling and promotion. But it can do little to provide consumer education or representation and these the author considers to be major omissions from the present consumer scene.