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Could an alternative system of income maintenance overcome the existing inequitable and inefficient situation, which effectively limits women′s options in the labour market in The Netherlands? This question is approached by describing an alternative system of income maintenance in the form of a negative income tax. Both prospects and limitations of a negative income tax system for Dutch society, from the point of view of this society in general and from an emancipatory point of view in particular, are explored.

By reducing the real value of nominally fixed tax band limits, deductions and tax credits, inflation can lead to higher real tax burdens (“fiscal drag”). The traditional view is that this reduces aggregate demand and thus acts as an automatic stabiliser. Yet, this familiar reasoning ignores the supply side and, in particular, possible effects of higher tax burdens on labour costs. Recent work on imperfect labour markets has shown that such effects can indeed arise as employees are able to bargain for higher wages that partly compensate for tax increases. In this case, the resulting upwards pressure on real labour costs can be inflationary. To illustrate this mechanism, this article analyses labour tax burdens in four European countries and how they are altered if tax systems are not adjusted for inflation. This is then combined with available results on the effects of tax changes on wages in imperfect labour markets. The results suggest that, in an unadjusted tax system, inflation can produce a moderate upward pressure on wages. It is argued, however, that more detailed empirical work on the role of taxes in the wage-setting process is needed as existing work ignores the substantial heterogeneity of workers and the tax rates they face.

In the last decade there has been considerable interest in the analysis of Trade Union behaviour, but surprisingly little discussion of the effect of tax changes on wage demands. Previous analyses have been limited by the use of simple tax structures. The discussion is extended by considering a multi‐rate tax system that can easily be applied to most countries. The effect on unions′ wage demands of eliminating the top marginal tax rate, while raising VAT, is examined in detail. It is shown that this policy can be expected to lead to an increase in the wage demands of all unions, producing a once‐and‐for‐all increase in nominal wages and unemployment.

The analysis presented in this chapter defines three different synthetic measurements of disincentives for formal work: two standard measurements, namely, the tax wedge and the marginal effective tax rate (METR); and a new, innovative measurement called formalization tax rate (FTR). The novelty of the latter is that it measures disincentives stemming not only from labor taxation but also from benefit withdrawal due to formalization. A descriptive analysis across a large number of OECD and Eastern European countries reveals that the disincentives for formal work – when measured through the FTR – are especially high for low-wage earners. This suggests that formal work might not pay in this segment of the labor market, in particular for the so-called mini-jobs and midi-jobs (low-paying part-time work).

Another novelty of the chapter is its empirical approach. Using EU-SILC 2008 data and OECD Tax and Benefit data for six Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia), we match disincentives for formal work to individual observations in a large data set. Applying a probit regression, the analysis finds a significant positive correlation between FTR or METR and the incidence of being informal. In other words, controlling for individual and job characteristics, the higher the FTR or the METR that individuals are facing is, the more likely they are to work informally. The tax wedge, on the other hand, yields a negative correlation. This indicates that the tax wedge is not sufficiently capturing disincentives for formal work. We also conclude that in cross-country analysis, it might be more useful to use the tax wedge that applies to low-wage earners as opposed to average wage earners.

A recent study found state bond bank participants continually realize considerable interest cost savings. Savings were calculated as differences in interest costs of bond bank loans and the bond offerings participants would have sold as alternatives to loans, (alternative market offerings). The present evaluation determines the sources of the savings. Savings are generated by not only differences in issue characteristics of bond bank issues and alternative market offerings, but also differential impacts of the same market forces and institutional factors on the interest costs of both types of sales. These findings verify that bond bank issues and alternative market offerings sell in different sub-markets, and confirm municipal bond market segmentation.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of Internal Revenue Code cost recovery provisions – Section 179 and “bonus depreciation” – on farm capital investment.

The authors construct a synthetic panel of data consisting of cohorts of similar farms based on state and production specialization using the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey for years 1996-2012. Employing panel data methods, the authors are able to control for time-invariant fixed effects, as well as the effects of past investment on current investment.

The authors estimate statistically significant investment demand elasticities with respect to the Section 179 expensing deduction of between 0.28 and 0.50. A change in bonus depreciation, on average, had little impact on capital investment.

The estimates suggest there is a modest effect of the cost recovery provisions on investment overall, but a stronger effect on farms that have more than $10,000 in gross cash farm income. There are other implications for the agricultural sector: the provisions may encourage technology adoption with its associated benefits, such as reduced cost of production and improved conservation practices. On the other hand, the policy could contribute to the growing concentration in production as large commercial farms expand their operated acreage to take advantage of increasingly efficient physical capital.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research to use a nationally representative dataset to estimate to impact of Section 179 and “bonus depreciation” on farm investment. The findings provide evidence of the provisions’ impact on farm capital purchases.

In this paper, I support the usefulness of using microsimulation models for the normative analysis of real redistribution system. Drawing from three recent works (Bourguignon & Spadaro, 2000, 2005; Oliver & Spadaro, 2004), I propose an application consisting in analyzing how social preferences on inequality have changed since the introduction of the 1999 reforms to the Spanish personal income tax (PIT). The starting point is the observed distribution of a population's gross and disposable incomes and the observed marginal tax rates as computed in standard microsimulation models. I show that, using a set of simplifying assumptions, it is possible to identify the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. I apply this methodology to the 1998 and 1999 Spanish PIT, using the Eurostat (ECHP) dataset on the income and socio-demographic characteristics of Spanish households.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between a firm's propensity to lease and several firm characteristics: tax position, financial constraint, ownership structure, growth, and size.

Controlling for industry, total lease share, operating and capital lease share ratios, obtained using an income statement approach, are regressed on a trichotomous tax variable, a dichotomous cash flow coverage ratio variable, debt over fixed assets, ownership concentration, market to book value of shares and the natural log of sales.

Total lease share increases with leverage, tax position and growth; it decreases with cash flow coverage, ownership concentration and firm size. Results for operating lease share are similar to those for total lease share. In contrast, capital lease share decreases with tax position and increases with ownership concentration and size.

The results suggest that leasing offers added debt capacity and increases in financially constrained firms. Firms that pay high taxes seem to place more value on the constant stream of tax deductions from the rental payments than on deductions from decreasing interest costs and amortization. Finally, highly concentrated Canadian firms may use less leasing because they are more family‐controlled.

The literature offers mixed reasons for firms' decisions to lease or purchase assets. This study provides further evidence in a rich setting. In 2001, the Canadian tax authorities changed the tax treatment of leases, thus providing an opportunity to validate prior results on the impact of taxes on leasing. By including two different measures of financial constraint, this study disentangles the substitution and the added debt capacity hypotheses.

Provides a framework for analysing the financing of state pensions with a wide range of policy options. Special attention is given, however, to two special cases: the first involves a means‐tested pension similar to the Australian scheme, while the second is similar to the basic pension (the first tier) in the UK. Emphasis is given to the implications of population ageing for pension finance in each scheme; a range of policies can be considered using specially designed computer programs.

This paper aims to examine the effects of marginal and general wage subsidies on employment and income distribution.

The paper constructs a theoretical, partial‐equilibrium model of an economy in which a large number of competitive firms produce a homogeneous output good. Involuntary unemployment arises from a too high and rigid wage. By conducting comparative static analyses, the paper evaluates the impact of general and marginal wage subsidies on employment and incomes.

The paper shows that a marginal wage subsidy is a fiscally more efficient instrument for employment creation than a general wage subsidy because it resembles a combination of a general wage subsidy with a profit tax. These favorable effects persist even if between‐firm displacement effects are taken into account.

In line with most of the literature on marginal employment subsidies, attention is restricted to a partial‐equilibrium analysis in which the wage is assumed to be fixed. This helps to sharpen the focus on between‐firm competition, but is perhaps implausible when analyzing a general‐equilibrium setting. The inclusion of endogenous wage setting is bound to provide an interesting area for future research.

If politicians want to implement a wage subsidy scheme that has to be self‐financing, marginal wage subsidies are an effective policy instrument for employment creation. Its downside is an inefficient allocation of labor among firms, because some firms become larger than is necessary.

The paper provides a novel approach to model the between‐firm displacement effects of marginal wage subsidies and derives policy conclusions.