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INTRODUCTION During the past dozen years a relatively large theoretical literature has grown out of the models proposed by Averch‐Johnson (2) and, to a lesser extent, Wellisz (90). Averch‐Johnson (here‐after A‐J) pointed out the now famous overcapitalization effect‐that a monopoly subject to rate of return regulation has an incentive to use more than the cost minimizing value of capital. The A‐J model was at first regarded as simply a theoretical explanation of what was long thought to be a significant cost of regulation. After languishing in this state for several years, the model achieved some popularity as a vehicle for theoretical explorations of various aspects of rate regulation. To date, the A‐J model has given rise to nearly forty papers on what has come to be called “the theory of regulatory constraint.”

The U.S. 2009 Tobacco Control Act opened the door for new antismoking policies by giving the Food and Drug Administration broad regulatory authority over the tobacco industry. We develop a behavioral welfare economics approach to conduct cost-benefit analysis of FDA tobacco regulations. We use a simple two-period model to develop expressions for the impact of tobacco control policies on social welfare. Our model includes: nudge and paternalistic regulations; an excise tax on cigarettes; internalities created by period 1 versus period 2 consumption; and externalities from cigarette consumption. Our analytical expressions show that in the presence of uncorrected internalities and externalities, a nudge or a tax to reduce cigarette consumption improves social welfare. In sharp contrast, a paternalistic regulation might either improve or worsen social welfare. Another important result is that the social welfare gains from new policies do not only depend on the size of the internalities and externalities, but also depend on the extent to which current policies already correct the problems. We link our analytical expressions to the graphical approach used in most previous studies and discuss the information needed to complete cost-benefit analysis of tobacco regulations. We use our model as a framework to reexamine the evidence base for strong conclusions about the size of the internalities, which is the key information needed.

The rise of the regulatory state during the Gilded Age was closely associated with the development of institutionalist ideas in American academia. In their analysis of the emergent regulatory environment, institutionalists like John Commons operated with a fundamentally marginalist theory of value and distribution. This engagement is a central explanation for the ultimate ascendancy of neoclassical economics, and the limitations of the regulatory environment that emerged in the Progressive Era. The eventual rise of the Chicago School and its deregulatory ambitions did constitute a rupture, but one achieved without rejecting preceding conceptions of competition and value. The substantial compatibility of the view of markets underlying both the regulatory and deregulatory periods is stressed, casting doubt about the transformative potential of the resurgent regulatory impulse in the New Gilded Age.

The “economic” (Chicago School) theory of regulation fails to explain many important features of regulatory history in the USA, such as the periodicity of regulatory innovation, the role of the organized consumer movement, and the roots of reform, including deregulation. J.Q. Wilson′s political theory of regulation accounts for these phenomena when interpreted in historical context. The widely‐held social values of Wilson′s theory are identified with the values articulated by the consumer movement. This theory suggests that regulation can indeed serve the public interest as understood from the perspective of consumerist values.

This chapter provides comments and suggestions to the lawmaker, and especially to economic policy-makers in the field of the optimal regulatory framework and implementation of sustainable practices. The main findings are as follows: (1) degradation of the rule of law in several European Union (EU) Member States and constant political undermining of the legal institutions represent the main threat for the implementation of sustainable practices and development; (2) the golden regulatory rule of thumb provides that regulatory intervention is suggested merely in cases of market failures under the condition that the costs of such intervention do not exceed the benefits; (3) over-regulation might impede implementation of sustainable practices, distort the operation of the market, undermine productivity, diminish growth and social wealth and consequently also sustainability; (4) efficiency and wealth maximization should be the lawmaker’s leading normative principle in designing the legal framework that will enable effective implementation of sustainable practices; (5) the efficient level of harmonization or subsidiarity of decision-making in the EU urges for a rigorous investigation of costs and benefits of the EU top-down harmonization policies which should lead to a better, efficient vertical allocation of sustainability agenda between EU and the Member States; and (6) The Reflection Paper on Sustainable Development Goals – “Towards a Sustainable Europe in 2030” – represents an effective institutional framework in pursue of the overall sustainability targets.

The purpose of this paper is to describe a theoretical model for banking regulation in relation to Basel accords implementation. As a risk manager practitioner at a financial institution and in-charge of Basel implementation in a Basel accords environment of banking regulation, the author has been intrigued by the theoretical basis of the design of Basel accords. The objective was to investigate a theoretical model in the literature according to which the accords were designed. In case of deficiency in the literature of this model, the author seeks to provide a juxtaposition to the theoretical model that explains the accords adoption and implementation by regulators.

This paper presents a review of existing literature.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

After reviewing of public interest theory, cultural theory, administration theory and the new-institutionalism theory, the author found little application of these theories to the capital-based regulation, particularly in relation to Basel 2 accord. There is deficiency in the literature of a conceptual theoretical framework based on which the author can explain the adoption of Basel accords. The author has provided a theoretical model that links these theories to the practice of banking regulation. This paper found deficiencies in theories of how banks should be regulated as compared to several theories that explains why banks are regulated.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 and the dual role of the government in this process.

When the government is simultaneously the owner and regulator of the securities market, the evolution of securities market regulation follows a path of compulsory institutional change. China's Government authorities have played a dual role in this process by acting both as the securities market regulator and the controlling owner of the stock exchanges. The paper uses the evolution of China's securities market regulation from 1980 to 2007 to illustrate this theoretical framework.

Using the case of China, this paper provides unique evidence of how securities regulation evolves in response to government direction and supervision if the government is both the owner and the regulator of the securities market.

The paper offers insight into issues of securities market regulation in China and other emerging markets.

The aim of the paper is to examine alternative methods of regulating prices and/or profits of privatised utilities in low‐income countries with a view to identifying their strengths and weaknesses.

The economics of regulation literature has favoured the use of a price cap over rate of return or cost of service regulation because of its greater incentive effects. A third alternative, sliding‐scale regulation, has been put forward as a compromise between the price cap and a controlled rate of return, which is said to combine the merits of both methods. This paper considers the operation of a price cap, rate of return regulation and sliding‐scale regulation in the context of low‐income economies by reviewing the theory in relation to the conditions likely to be found in low‐income economies.

It is concluded that the case for the use of a price cap is much reduced in low‐income economies. This is because of its information requirements, need for regulatory expertise and, more broadly, the institutional endowment found in many low‐income countries.

It is recognised that this conclusion is tentative and deserves further research, comparing theory and practice.

Countries need to consider carefully which method of regulation will work best in the context of the institutions of the country, rather than simply copy a method from the developed world.

This is one of the first papers to challenge the prevailing belief that price cap regulation is superior to rate of return regulation in the context of economic development.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a recent proposal by the State of New York that would subject a large portion of the credit default swap (CDS) market to state‐based insurance regulatory oversight.

Using the collapse of AIG as an example of the systemic risk inherent in unregulated CDS transacting, the Coase Theorem is then applied to determine the optimal level of CDS regulatory oversight.

Although CDSs resemble insurance contracts in many respects, they are also uniquely complex financial instruments that are continually changing and thus not well suited for the antiquated state‐based model of insurance regulation. Furthermore, the external forces that influence state‐based regulatory decision‐making are likely to produce inefficient regulation.

The Coase Theorem states that the optimal level of regulatory oversight is the one that causes market participants to internalize the risk inherent in transacting and does so at the lowest cost. Because of the complexity of CDS contracts and the unique forces that guide state‐based regulatory decision‐making, the State of New York's proposal is ill advised.

By utilizing a law and economics perspective, it becomes clear that although a state‐based model of regulatory oversight may force market participants to internalize systemic risk, it is nevertheless suboptimal because it does not do so at the lowest cost.