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Classical economics recognizes three categories of inputs into production: land, labor, and capital goods. The three factors are also germane to Austrian economics.

The paper published below was prepared by Taylor Ostrander for Frank Knight’s course, Economic Theory, Economics 301, during the Fall 1933 quarter.

When understood as an inevitable inconsistency of individual plans, disequilibrium is not only a necessary condition for the existence, and hence understanding, of the market process as we know it, it is also the glue connecting three other “Austrian” themes. In equilibrium heterogeneity of resources would have no strategic significance, specific and private knowledge would be much less problematic, and no profits net of contractual rent payments would be earned. In the real world of disequilibrium firm differences are not a mystery, rent is not an indication of inefficiency or monopoly power, and there is room to analyze, admire, reward, and consult about successful business strategy. Rent appropriation comes from ownership of valuable resources. And a successful strategy, one that earns enhanced rents, is one that acquires ownership of valuable and value-creating resources. Such a strategy is dependent for its success on superior vision (or luck), something which cannot exist in equilibrium.

The results of recent research suggest that certain provisions of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) may have been less successful than intended (e.g., Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2009). Based on two different descriptions of economic bonding between auditors and their clients, we propose an explanation of why this might be so by showing that the effect of SOX mandates, and regulation in general, aimed at enhancing auditor independence is dependent on whether shareholders or managers monitor the auditor. The results of prior empirical studies are examined in context of the framework we describe, and suggestions for future research on this important topic are outlined.

This chapter attempts to theorize the role of knowledge in the determination of the value of commodities. This draws from the South Korean controversy on the value and price of information commodities such as computer software and digital music. One group of writers has argued that the value of software copies (=commodities) is contributed by the labor time expended to produce the source code (=knowledge) in a piecemeal fashion. For another group, the source code has nothing to do with the production of the value of copies given that the source code is unnecessary for the (re)production of copies, and thus the value of software copies is approximately zero and its price is a high monopoly price. Both approaches are flawed. In the case of the former, no value can actually be transferred from the source code to copies because no changes are made to the source code before or after the production of copies. In case of the latter, knowledge is viewed as having nothing to do with value production. On the basis of this critique, an alternative view is put forward, in which knowledge plays an important role in value production by determining the productivity and/or complexity of labor. Knowledge “virtually intensifies” labor. It is also argued that intellectual property rights should be theorized in a way to refine and reproduce the role of knowledge – the virtual intensification of labor – at more complex and concrete levels of analysis.

This chapter assembles the key literature on value creation for consideration in relationship to stakeholder theory. The literature review identifies and explains the core topics concerning value creation and related ideas. The purpose is to stimulate research into the theory, practice, and social consequences of value creation in a stakeholder management framework. The construct of “value” lacks theoretical precision and empirical verification. The most fundamental and disputed question addressed is which value approach for the firm best contributes to overall (aggregate) social welfare. The vital issue is whether the managerial stakeholder theory is superior, at long-run value creation for multiple stakeholders including society at large, to the conventional agency theory. Business executives and directors are the ones who choose between agency and stakeholder approaches to management. Their actions influence organizational and social outcomes. Research is limited to a literature review, followed by a discussion of the likely role of value creation theory in future stakeholder research. The chapter first defines value. The basic approach is then to focus on key topics in the relevant literature. The last section addresses the role of value creation theory in future stakeholder research.