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The effects of economic liberalization have been subject to academic and political discussion for many decades. The trade war between the United States and China brought new perspectives to this debate and raised the question: do fewer trade barriers and more economic freedom lead to better functioning societies? Following the perspective of the transaction cost theory, we argue that more economic freedom reduces non-productive expenses and allows private companies to improve the allocation of resources. It also allows more competition among companies, which facilitates access to funding. In this research, we use data of 1,248 publicly traded companies in the seven largest Latin American countries to analyze the effect OF increasing economic freedom on administrative expenses and financial. Our results indicate that, on average, increasing economic freedom allows the reduction of transaction costs and facilitates financial leverage for companies.

The literature has documented evidence that economic freedom is positively associated with economic growth, investment spending, income equality, employment, gender equality, etc. Economic freedom is also found to be associated with a country’s rule of law and legal regime. There is, however, little studies examining how economic freedom affects a firm’s performance such as firm valuation and profitability. The evidence presented in this study shows that economic freedom strengthens a firm’s valuation and profitability. Additionally, firms headquartered in emerging markets or younger firms from countries with higher levels of economic freedom experience higher valuation and profitability. That is, economic freedom is more beneficial for firms from emerging markets and is crucial to the success of early-stage firms.

The author examines key factors which affect intangible asset holdings of foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The author developes the hypotheses by drawing upon the pecking order theory in the finance literature and the institution theory. The author theorizes that MNE foreign subsidiaries combine and utilize their cash holdings (finance-based firm-specific advantages [FSAs]) with host country economic freedom (host country-specific advantages [CSAs]) in their holdings of intangible assets which are internally created and/or purchased. The author empirically tests the hypotheses using a new original dataset of European subsidiaries of US MNEs. The author finds that cash holdings and host country economic freedom share a significant and positive relationship with intangible asset holdings. The author discusses the implications of the findings for theory and practice.

The role of financial institutions and financial intermediaries in fostering economic growth (ECO) by improving the efficiency of capital accumulation, encouraging savings, and ultimately improving the productivity of the economy has been well established by the researchers. The reforms in the financial sector worldwide during the 1980s and 1990s were aimed at ushering in greater efficiency and more competitiveness.

The impact of financial market freedom (MF) on the overall development of the financial sector and thereby the growth in an economy is one of the most important considerations for policymakers over the years. This chapter aims to examine the causal relationship between financial MF and ECO in the Indian economy in the post-reform period.

Chester Whitney Wright (1879–1966) received his A.B. in 1901, A.M. in 1902 and Ph.D. in 1906, all from Harvard University. After teaching at Cornell University during 1906–1907, he taught at the University of Chicago from 1907 to 1944. Wright was the author of Economic History of the United States (1941, 1949); editor of Economic Problems of War and Its Aftermath (1942), to which he contributed a chapter on economic lessons from previous wars, and other chapters were authored by John U. Nef (war and the early industrial revolution) and by Frank H. Knight (the war and the crisis of individualism); and co-editor of Materials for the Study of Elementary Economics (1913). Wright’s Wool-Growing and the Tariff received the David Ames Wells Prize for 1907–1908, and was volume 5 in the Harvard Economic Studies. I am indebted to Holly Flynn for assistance in preparing Wright’s biography and in tracking down incomplete references; to Marianne Johnson in preparing many tables and charts; and to F. Taylor Ostrander, as usual, for help in transcribing and proofreading.

There is a long-lasting debate on the relationship between democracy and economic growth, though it remained inconclusive. On the other hand, corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world that lessens the efficiency of a good government, distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and particularly hurts the poor. Moreover, the corruption–growth relationship has been shown to be contingent upon the political regime. This chapter has chosen a set of emerging market economies (EMEs), which consists of democratic as well as authoritarian countries, to throw light on democracy–growth relationship through the channel of corruption using a system generalized method of moments estimation of a panel of 27 countries for a period of 2006–2018. Results show that democracy is growth-enhancing but corruption dampens its positive impact to some extent. However, for authoritarian countries corruption can enhance growth.

Paul Samuelson was attracted to the irregular economic development pattern of some South American countries because of the links between economic performance and political factors. He discussed the influence of “populist democracy” on Argentina’s relative economic stagnation, which, he argued in the 1970s and early 1980s, served as a dangerous paradigm for the American economy under stagflation. Stagflation phenomena marked the end of Samuelson’s “neoclassical synthesis.” Moreover, he applied his concept of “capitalist fascism” to deal with military dictatorships in Brazil and (especially) in Chile. The Brazilian translation of his Economics in 1973 brought about a correspondence with Brazilian economists about the “fascist” features of the regime. The main variable behind the South American economic and politically unstable processes discussed by Samuelson was economic inequality, which became also a conspicuous feature of the American economy since the adoption of market-based policies in the 1980s and after.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Polish economic situation was extremely difficult: high public debt, shortages, high inflation and more than 8,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) waiting to be restructured and/or privatised; along with a GDP per capita lower than in Ukraine.

This chapter provides an overview of the Polish economic transition, and presents the results of this process, taking into account four aspects of the changes, i.e. stabilisation, liberalisation, institutional reforms and privatisation. Special attention is paid to intentionally unfinished privatisation and the still significant role of state-owned enterprises, which have remained important economic agents.

Critical analyses were made of the literature dedicated to the economic transition and of the role and characteristics of state-owned enterprises. Empirical evidence is drawn from original datasets about the scale of SOEs in the contemporary economy and rotations in management and supervisory boards in Polish joint-stock companies.

Despite the unfavourable initial conditions, Poland soon emerged as a leader in economic growth, successfully stabilising, liberalising and privatising its economy. The institutional foundations of a democratic market economy were consistently built, and the applications for membership in the OECD, the EU and NATO were an important driver of institutional reforms. In terms of state institutions, political and economic freedom and quality of governance, Poland is more similar to the G7 countries than to the other post-socialist countries, though the need to maintain high-quality state institutions is still a priority. The significant share of SOE is regarded as a challenge of the Polish economy because state-owned enterprises are an object of rent-seeking by politicians and political parties.