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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

“It should also be noted that the objective of convergence and equal distribution, including across under-performing areas, can hinder efforts to generate growth. Contrariwise, the objective of competitiveness can exacerbate regional and social inequalities, by targeting efforts on zones of excellence where projects achieve greater returns (dynamic major cities, higher levels of general education, the most advanced projects, infrastructures with the heaviest traffic, and so on). If cohesion policy and the Lisbon Strategy come into conflict, it must be borne in mind that the former, for the moment, is founded on a rather more solid legal foundation than the latter” European Commission (2005, p. 9)Adaptation of Cohesion Policy to the Enlarged Europe and the Lisbon and Gothenburg Objectives.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

We examine whether variations in the most fundamental aspects of state corporate income tax regimes affect state economic activity as measured by personal income, gross state product, and total non-farm employment. We focus on a variety of statutory components of state corporate income taxes that apply broadly in most U.S. states and for most multi-state corporate taxpayers. Our econometric strategy consists of a series of fixed effects panel regressions using state-level data from 1996 through 2010. Our results reveal important interaction effects of tax rates and policies, suggesting that policy makers should avoid making decisions about tax rates in isolation. The results demonstrate a relatively consistent negative economic response to the combination of high tax rates with throwback rules and heavy sales factor weights. Combined reporting has no discernible effect on personal income, GSP, or employment after controlling for tax rates, apportionment, and throwback rules. In an effort to gauge the relative impacts of tax policies on the location of economic activity, we also estimate alternative models in which each state’s economic activity is measured as a share of the national economic activity in each year. Statistically significant effects for tax rates, apportionment formulas, and throwback rules in the shares models suggest that at least some of their impact involves the movement of activity across state lines, thereby leaving open the possibility of a zero-sum game among the states.

This paper examines how changes in immigration policy levers actually affect the skill characteristics of immigrant arrivals using a unique Canadian immigrant landings database. The paper identifies some hypotheses on the possible effects on immigrant skill characteristics of the total immigration rate, the point system weights and immigrant class weights. The “skill” characteristics examined are level of education, age, and fluency in either English or French. Regressions are used to test the hypotheses from Canadian landings data for 1980–2001. It is found that (i) the larger the inflow rate of immigrants the lower the average skill level of the arrivals, (ii) increasing the proportion of skill-evaluated immigrants raises average skill levels, and (iii) increasing point system weights on a specific skill dimension indeed has the intended effect of raising average skill levels in this dimension among arriving principal applicants.

Purpose – This chapter examines the impact of armed conflict and three forms of militarization on child mortality rates cross-nationally. Previous theorizing argues that praetorian militaries create conditions particularly adverse to the well-being of civilians, but the effects of praetorian militarization are likely confounded both by economic and social militarization, and by armed conflict, economic development, and political regime.

Methodology – This study conducts a cross-national panel study of the impact of armed conflict and militarization on civilian life chances using data from 175 countries with populations 200,000 or larger. Analyses employ a fixed-effects model, which controls for stable country characteristics; the analyses also control for time-varying characteristics of countries that influence the impact of armed conflict and militarization on life chances.

Findings – Praetorian militarization appears to increase child mortality, as does social militarization (particularly during years of internationalized internal armed conflict), once stable country effects and other variables are controlled. This chapter is the first to systematically examine the impact of praetorian militarization on social development (indexed by child mortality rates).

The purpose of the chapter is to compare social and economic effects that accompany crises of economic systems.

According to the adopted classification of causes of conflicts of socio-economic systems, the indicators that reflect potential social and economic causes of crisis are determined. Regression analysis is performed, and multiple regression dependence of economic growth of Russia’s economic system (values of growth of GDP in constant prices) on the indicators that characterize social and economic causes of crisis is determined; correlation analysis is performed and correlation of each indicator of causes and the indicator of economic growth is determined.

It is shown by the example of modern Russia that subjective (social factors) have the key role in determining cyclic fluctuations of economic system – together with objective (economic effects). Social causes of crisis are almost as important as economic causes. In view of generally acknowledged social consequences of crises (growth of inflation and unemployment level), it is possible to state a relatively equal role of economic and social effects that accompany crises of economic systems. The information and empirical basis of the chapter consists of the statistical materials of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the OECD. The research is performed by the example of modern Russia’s economic system; its timeframe covers 1999–2018 (recent 20 years).

The obtained conclusions show the necessity and open perspectives for specifying the existing theory of cycles in the aspect of inclusion of social effects into the model of cyclic (wave) fluctuations of economic systems.

In addition to their effects on economic growth, prolonged terrorist activities can reduce government revenue. Apart from the destruction of physical infrastructure and human capital, terrorism also has lagged-effect on investment, which ultimately dampens the fiscal position and further affects the economic growth. This chapter is devoted to the discussion on the interaction between terrorism, growth, and fiscal variables in Nigeria using real per capita income, government revenue, government expenditure and defense expenditure. The findings show that terrorism is associated with low economic growth which has the potency to reduce government expenditure. It was also observed that government expenditure can be improved by fostering government revenue. In view of this, apart from domestic efforts, interventions of international communities are further needed to reduce the drastic effects of terrorism, especially in meeting and improving expenditure on growth-enhancing sectors.