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The role of money and monetary policy of the central bank in pursuing macroeconomic stability has significantly changed over the period since the end of World War II. Globalization, liberalization, integration, and transition processes generally shaped the crucial milestones of the macroeconomic development and substantial features of economic policy and its framework in Europe. Policy-driven changes together with variety of exogenous shocks significantly affected the key features of macroeconomic environment on the European continent that fashioned the framework and design of monetary policies.

This chapter examines the key basis of the central bank’s monetary policy on its way to pursue and preserve the internal and external stability of the purchasing power of money. Substantial elements of the monetary policy like objectives and strategies are not only generally introduced but also critically discussed according to their accuracy, suitability, and reliability in the changing macroeconomic conditions. Brief overview of the Eurozone common monetary policy milestones and the past Eastern bloc countries’ experience with a variety of exchange rate regimes provides interesting empirical evidence on origins and implications of vital changes in the monetary policy conduction in Europe and the Eurozone.

The development of the Russian banking sector was subject to numerous criticisms and pessimistic forecasts in the recent years. The observers pointed out the low ability of the Russian banking sector to provide financial intermediation in the economy and thus to perform the key functions which society expects from the banking sector – mobilization of savings and financing investments in the real sector of the economy. The study seeks to explain above-mentioned features from institutional, economic, and political perspective on the basis of the existing knowledge of the nature of transition banking.

“It should also be noted that the objective of convergence and equal distribution, including across under-performing areas, can hinder efforts to generate growth. Contrariwise, the objective of competitiveness can exacerbate regional and social inequalities, by targeting efforts on zones of excellence where projects achieve greater returns (dynamic major cities, higher levels of general education, the most advanced projects, infrastructures with the heaviest traffic, and so on). If cohesion policy and the Lisbon Strategy come into conflict, it must be borne in mind that the former, for the moment, is founded on a rather more solid legal foundation than the latter” European Commission (2005, p. 9)Adaptation of Cohesion Policy to the Enlarged Europe and the Lisbon and Gothenburg Objectives.

The paper aims to examine the reality of, and, conditions for economic growth for former Soviet and Soviet Block economies with special attention to Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Many of these economies' transition from “Communism” remain plagued by problems of institutional design and outcomes characterized by high levels of corruption and low levels of accountability and transparency. The purpose of this paper is to analyze aspects of these socio‐economic realities in the context of contemporary economic theory and ongoing revisions to it.

The type of economic theory used to assess issues of transition has significant implications for public policy. Conventional economic theory has traditionally focused on secure private property rights, competitive markets, inclusive of “flexible” labor markets, as the necessary if not the sufficient conditions to successfully and quickly transition from command style to market economies. Little attention is paid to the details of institutional design. The paper applies a behavioral‐institutional analytical framework to analyze important aspects of failures and successes in transition economies using both economic and governance data sets.

The paper finds that traditional measures of economic freedom are far from sufficient to generate economic growth. Accountability and transparency in governance structures is also required. Economic failure and success are closely connected with overall performance in socio‐economic governance. Also an unnecessary emphasis on low wages, highly constrained social safety nets and labor market policy impedes successful growth and development.

Transition economies' economic performance can be significantly enhanced through improvements in institutional design that facilitates the evolution of high‐wage market economies. The market in and of itself does not suffice to generate successful transitions from command to vibrant market economies.

This paper provides an original exposé and analysis of transition economies from a behavioral‐institutionalist perspective, with important public policy implications.

The last decade of this century has witnessed the transition of the formerly centrally planned economies of Europe and Asia to market economies, a process affecting some 1.7 billion people in 28 countries. While much agreement exists on the sorts of reform measures required, disagreement exists over their sequencing. The economic and social performance of these transition economies has varied considerably and for a variety of reasons, however China’s performance, in particular, has been outstanding. The paper reviews the reform measures required for economic transition, and alternative sequencing approaches to these reforms. It conducts an overview of the performance of the transition economies, with focus placed upon the experience of the Chinese economy. An analysis of China’s approach to economic reform, its key components, major outcomes and outstanding issues are discussed. Key lessons to be derived for other transition economies from China’s experience are also presented.

The study deals with key questions of Serbia’s economic development, including the regularities of transforming self-managed socialism to a standard capitalist system. It is based on the concept of endogenous growth and the general theory of market transition. In the empirical part of investigation, the main directions of economic development and transition in Serbia are analysed. Crucial issues of economic policy are also considered with a particular emphasis on the latest phase of transition. Concerning the problems of economic efficiency, an attempt is made to quantify the various types of technical progress and determine their contribution to its overall rate. The macroeconomic role of external factors is quantitatively shown through a globalisation effect related to inflows of FDI. The author believes that the Serbian economy, despite all its problems and difficulties, in principle has the potential necessary for finding adequate answers to the challenges of ‘neo-transition’. Of these challenges, he regards as most serious Serbia’s ability to comply with the standards of accession to the European Union, which, among others, requires closer regional cooperation.

The relationship between government and market is the key to the economic development performance of market economy countries. Due to the limits such as the state/market dichotomy, the focus on static allocation efficiency and the ignorance of the diversity of the market economy and the relationship between government and market, economic liberalism and state interventionism can hardly position and explain the role and evolution of government and market in the real world accurately.

China’s economic transition has always adhered to the reform direction of the socialist market economy and the development goal of a modern socialist country as well as the symbiosis and positive and progressive evolution of government and market, blazing a “third way” in handling the relationship between government and market.

The “China’s experience” shows that the key for emerging market economies to achieve good economic development performance lies in whether they can build a new relationship of the mutual integration between and common prosperity of government and market regarding target selection, production organisation, technological innovation, institutional change and regulatory adjustment.

The second part of this paper analyses the inherent defects of economic liberalism and state interventionism as well as the reasons why they can hardly be adopted as the theoretical guidance for emerging market economies to handle the relationship between government and market. The third part analyses how China has transcended the inherent thinking of liberalism and interventionism and shaped the new relationship between government and market through goal-oriented, active and progressive, two-way interactive exploration and practice to ensure the success of China's economic transition.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

Many transition economies are former socialist planned economies and have undergone market reforms of their financial sector to signal their transition towards democracy. However, governments in these countries have been reluctant to relinquish the pre-existing controls on economy and have adopted nuanced and sophisticated approaches to retain control. In such context, scholars may find it challenging to investigate the role played by the state in the success or failure of attempted market reforms. This work investigates the different forms of state-induced accounting controls that may preserve the status quo within the economy during transition, using Myanmar as an example.

The authors adopted a longitudinal qualitative research method aiming to reveal the very processes and mechanisms used by the banks and their evolution over time. This method is in accordance with the historical institutionalist perspective that they have applied within this research.

The authors found that the Myanmar government embarked on the privatisation of their financial sector from 1990 to 2016 as a major public sector reform initiative. Under the guise of market reforms, it used both state-led and market-led controls to emulate and retain the socialist banking model where banks are used to fund the immediate government's budget deficits. This created a series of intended and unintended consequences, resulting in the ultimate failure of the government's market reforms.

Previously, research on public sector management accounting in emerging economies was not relying consistently on using theory. The relative limited theorisation led to gaps when attempting to understand and explain the opaque forms of state control mechanisms in transition economies. By applying historical institutionalist perspective, and a more theory-driven, reflective approach to the interpretation of the data collected, the authors have provided a deeper insight and understanding on how different forms of state controls can emerge, adapt and persist in transition economies such as Myanmar.

The authors demonstrated that though the state may have implemented market reforms to signal regimes change, this does not necessarily mean that the government has relinquished their control on the economy. The state could take a more sophisticated, covert approach towards state controls leading to both intended and unintended consequences. Thus, even if the state's preferences change, the decisions cannot be easily reversed, as path-dependent state controls may have become pervasive affecting any further institutional and policy developments. Thus, the authors suggest that governments in both transition and developed economies should be cautious when enacting regulations on corporate control.

In this paper, the authors have applied a historical institutional perspective in their analysis instead of the more widely used sociological, institutionalist approach. This allowed authors to harness rich longitudinal data indicating that market reforms and their success or failure should be examined as an ongoing process rather than a completed action. This is especially important in transition economies where the state may be unwilling to renounce the existing controls on the industry and may resort to more opaque forms of state control, eventually obstructing the intended reforms.