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1 – 10 of over 14000Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and…
Abstract
Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.
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Academic library consortia activity has become an integral part of academic libraries’ operations. Consortia have come to assert considerable bargaining power over publishers and…
Abstract
Academic library consortia activity has become an integral part of academic libraries’ operations. Consortia have come to assert considerable bargaining power over publishers and have provided libraries with considerable economic advantage. They interact with publishers both as consumers of publishers’ products, with much stronger bargaining power than individual libraries hold, and, increasingly, as rival publishers themselves. Are consortia changing the relationship between academic libraries and publishers? Is the role of academic library consortia placing academic libraries in a position that should and will attract the attention of competition policy regulators? Competition policy prohibits buying and selling cartels that can negatively impact the free market on which the Canadian economic system, like other Western economies, depends. Competition policy as part of economic policy is, however, only relevant where we are concerned with aspects of the market economy. Traditionally, public goods for the greater social and cultural benefit of society are not considered part of the market economic system. If the activities of academic library consortia are part of that public good perspective, competition policy may not be a relevant concern. Using evidence gained from in-depth interviews from a national sample of university librarians and from interviews with the relevant federal government policy makers, this research establishes whether library consortia are viewed as participating in the market economy of Canada or not. Are consortia viewed by librarians and government as serving a public good role of providing information for a greater social and cultural benefit or are they seen from a market-economic perspective of changing power relations with publishers? Findings show government has little in-depth understanding of academic library consortia activity, but would most likely consider such activity predominantly from a market economic perspective. University librarians view consortia from a public good perspective but also as having an important future role in library operations and in changing the existing scholarly publishing paradigm. One-third of librarian respondents felt that future consortia could compete with publishers by becoming publishers and through initiatives such as open source institutional repositories. Librarians also felt that consortia have had a positive effect on librarians’ professional roles through the facilitation of knowledge building and collaboration opportunities outside of the home institution.
Olga B. Digilina, Daria V. Lebedeva and Ivan A. Konstantinov
This chapter explores the transformation and interrelation of the concepts of ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’. This analysis enables us to substantiate the elements of…
Abstract
Purpose
This chapter explores the transformation and interrelation of the concepts of ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’. This analysis enables us to substantiate the elements of national economic competitiveness and, subsequently, build strategies to increase the competitiveness of economic agents in world markets.
Design/Methodology/Approach
The authors use systemic, historical, adaptive and synergetic methods. Moreover, the authors apply structural and functional analysis, empirical generalisation and grouping. The research object is the transformation of the concept of competition.
Findings
Under the conditions of digitisation, geopolitical aggravation, geo-economic factors, and more general scientific and technological progress, competition becomes a dynamic process and transforms into an endogenous component of the market environment, which stimulates change in economic entities.
Originality/Value
Competitiveness is a diverse economic concept that encompasses mechanisms of interactions and interrelations of economic entities, multi-level economic coordination apparatus and competitive advantages that help achieve economic goals. Nevertheless, contemporary definitions of competitiveness are unclear because of its scale and the simultaneous need for its application to entire nations. Consequently, this research analyses the transformation and interrelation of the concepts of ‘competition’ and ‘competitiveness’. Moreover, the research identifies and substantiates the main elements of the national economic competitiveness of Russia. The research findings facilitate future micro- and meso-level research on strategies for managing and transforming the national economy.
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Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this chapter I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual…
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Intellectual property rights and competition policy are intimately related. In this chapter I survey the economic literature analyzing the interaction between intellectual property law and competition law and how the boundary between these two policies is drawn in practice. Recognizing that intellectual property rights and competition law can interact in many different ways, the presentation focuses on several key issues. The economic literature on the interaction between competition law and intellectual property rights shows that these regulatory systems are consistent in terms of basic principles. Significant tensions exist, however, and it is difficult to balance IPR and competition law in practice. The significant differences in approach between the United States and the European Union simply reflect the underlying reality that efforts to achieve a sensible balance do not result in policy harmonization.
This is the first paper in a volume devoted exclusively to antitrust law and economics. It summarizes the other papers and addresses two issues. First, after showing that the…
Abstract
This is the first paper in a volume devoted exclusively to antitrust law and economics. It summarizes the other papers and addresses two issues. First, after showing that the federal courts generally view consumer welfare as the ultimate goal of antitrust law, it asks what they mean by that term. It concludes that recent decisions appear more likely to equate consumer welfare with the well-being of consumers in the relevant market than with economic efficiency. Second, it asks whether a buyer must possess monopsony power to induce a price discrimination that is not cost justified. It concludes that a buyer can often obtain an unjustified concession simply by wielding bargaining power, but the resulting concession may frequently – though not always – improve consumer welfare.
Hanh Thi My Phan and Kevin Daly
This study aims to investigate both market concentration and bank competition of banking across six emerging Asian countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Philippines…
Abstract
This study aims to investigate both market concentration and bank competition of banking across six emerging Asian countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam) over pre and post the 2008 global financial crisis. The conduct parameter approach following the framework suggested by Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) is used to estimate bank competition in these countries. The study employs both seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) to estimate simultaneously the system of equations in our model. Generally we find a negative association between market concentration and bank competition across most of the countries in the study suggesting that banks in concentrated markets collude to generate higher profits. Monopolistic competition was the best description of competitive structure of banking across the majority of countries investigated by this study. The study fills the gap in the banking literature by investigating bank competition, concentration, and their relationship across emerging Asian economies over the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, several policy implications for banking industry are suggested.
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William Baumol is best-known as an academic. He was a prodigious researcher and publisher of texts on microeconomic theory, and a highly regarded educator with roles as head of…
Abstract
William Baumol is best-known as an academic. He was a prodigious researcher and publisher of texts on microeconomic theory, and a highly regarded educator with roles as head of the Department of Economics at Princeton University, director of the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and director of the Berkley Center for Entrepreneurship and Innovation at New York University. Less well-known were his engagements as a corporate consultant, notably for the telecommunications monopoly AT&T. Baumol’s work as an advisor, expert witness and theorist for AT&T spanned three decades from 1966. His relationship with AT&T arguably forms the context within which we can better understand his work on contestability theory, which he developed with a team of economists working for AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories in the 1970s. Contestability theory was later deployed as a policy tool to justify industry deregulation and even advocate for monopolies and oligopolies on the ground that they were optimally efficient industry structures if potential competitors faced low barriers of entry. Baumol’s intellectual contribution to contestability theory was arguably influenced by the Chicago school and by AT&T’s drive toward the technological integration of telecommunications. Contestability was a rebellion against economic orthodoxies concerning competition and government regulation, and the status quo within AT&T which opposed market competition on the ground that it threatened the technological integration of the Bell system. The outcome was a revolution in industrial organization that would pave the way for the emergence of platform business models incorporating multi-sided and two-sided markets as exemplified by Amazon and Uber.
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A populist backlash has seized a number of Western democracies. Two broad sets of explanations have emerged to address the sources of this backlash, with credible empirical…
Abstract
A populist backlash has seized a number of Western democracies. Two broad sets of explanations have emerged to address the sources of this backlash, with credible empirical evidence for each. The first focuses on economic drivers, and specifically on global economic integration, and exposure to trade competition. The second turns instead to cultural explanations, arguing that the shifting political winds are due to strictly nonmaterial considerations, like status threat and racial beliefs. How might we reconcile two apparently conflicting conclusions in the scholarly work examining this backlash? The question comes down to the particular interplay of these factors. I argue that the most promising approach may lie in tweaking our ideas about the relevant group that individuals use to make assessments about general welfare and the role of political entrepreneurs in manipulating these relevant groups. This, in turn, might explain why right-wing political parties appear to consistently gain from the ongoing backlash. I end with a consideration of the policy means that governments have to curb the political effects of economic grievances, and what explains the success or failure of such efforts. An economic recipe for backlash suggests the existence of an antidote.
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Paul Ingram, Jiao Luo and Joseph P. Eshun
It is now widely accepted that the institutional interventions of states are a foundational influence on the dynamics of organizational forms. But why do states act? In this…
Abstract
It is now widely accepted that the institutional interventions of states are a foundational influence on the dynamics of organizational forms. But why do states act? In this chapter, we apply the behavioral theory of the firm to develop an explanation of state actions based on the fact that they are boundedly rational rivals. The instrument of state competition we examine is the founding of business incubators, a primary tool in the entrepreneurial strategy of economic development. We predict that business incubators are more likely to be founded in a state when (1) the state falls behind comparable states in the indicators of economic development; (2) the state falls behind its own historical trajectories of economic development; (3) the state has slack resources in the form of budget surpluses; (4) comparable and rival states adopt incubators as a development strategy. Our analysis of incubator foundings in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania throughout 1980–2004 supports all of these propositions.