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The globalisation of western countries creates large forces with which to compete. States that Islamic/Arab countries often compete with each other rather than forging strong partnerships. Attempts to outline the strategy needed to achieve the Arab shared objective of co‐operation and peaceful existence. Builds on existing research and presents a theoretical, conceptual and empirical discourse based on recent developments in economics and relationship management and marketing theories using semi‐structured interviews. Discusses the barriers to success and makes recommendations for change such as an Arab Common market.

Presents an essay on Asia Pacific Economic Co‐operation (APEC), an innovative and flexible form of co‐operation designed to accommodate the diversity of the economies on the Pacific Rim. The main challenge for the APEC process is finding a workable compromise between different approaches to economic co‐operation. Points out that the structure of APEC will need great flexibility to accommodate the declining influence of the USA in the Asia Pacific and the increasing strength of the Chinese and South East Asian economies compared to both Japan and the USA. Appendix contains an executive summary of the targets which were agreed by APEC governments, at Bogor, Indonesia, in 1994, in order to realize their vision of free and open trade and investment.

Despite the apparent orientation of the world economy and markets towards globalisation, it is obvious that this process is dominated by trends of regionalisation and big economic blocs. Needless to say that this inclination towards groupings is dictated by the fierce competition at the world scale, economically and politically. Almost all of these economic blocs group countries with a lot of similarities in their socio‐economic and political structures as well as cultural set‐ups, geographical proximity and apparent vested mutual interests. An immediate question which comes to the mind when one thinks of the Islamic Common Market (ICM), where there is supposed to be free flow of products, capital, entrepreneurship, labour and technology among the members, as well as a common tariff wall against third parties, is whether the Islamic countries qualify for these criteria or not. The Islamic countries are known to be a diverse group in terms of their economic structures and levels of development, political systems, ethnic backgrounds, as well as a diversified social cultural milieu, although most of them draw on a common source, Islam. This heterogeneity has often been taken as the major argument against the feasibility of an ICM. However, we believe that although this heterogeneity creates a lot of problems, it is also a source of strength if it is positively thought of in terms of diversity and is carefully manipulated.

Evaluates how economic co‐operation can be organized for the mutual advantage of the two economies of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The methodological approach adopted by the authors explores the dynamics of market design within the two transitional economies and examines how they could contribute to the performance of an all‐island economy. The emphasis is on public utilities, electricity and telecommunications as sources of inter‐firm synergies. At a time when many European countries are moving towards greater integration, it is imperative that the two economies on the island of Ireland integrate in order to realize competitive advantages. Integration may not be the panacea for solving specific economic problems such as unemployment or housing shortages, however, it will solve the problem of diseconomies of small scale which impair the competitiveness of commercially oriented public utility firms on the island. The politics is not about the spoils of a united Ireland but the gains from participation in an integrated Europe. The primary objective is in realizing the economic reality of all‐island commercial activities which will dissipate rents, eliminate inefficiencies, create incentives and release real economic growth.

A range of agreements designed to revive East and Central European States′ (ECES) mutual trade and their trade with the former Soviet Union have proliferated since early 1993. Considers the extent to which these initiatives represent a genuine revival of regional co‐operation, and looks at the factors affecting the chances for successful implementation of existing agreements and for development of more intensive forms of co‐operation.

Aims to find an appropriate economic model for the reunification question. Perhaps the most important economic issue is what model is to be applied in integrating the two Koreas into a single, viable and eventually highly‐competitive economy. Because of the dissimilarities between the German and Korean economies, and the enormous economic problems created by the swift German reunification, the instant‐reunification German model was rejected. Instead, proposes a more gradual, four‐stage economic integration model for Korea, which was divided in 1945. For a successful economic integration of the two countries, economic reforms should take place in North Korea since the North Korean economy has been afflicted with too many difficult problems, mainly caused by a rigid, centrally‐planned, command economy.

Many of the early debates about economic methodology, marginalism versus discontinuous change, stasis versus turbulence, co‐operation versus competition, were at base questions of general scientific methodology. During the past 20 years or so there has been a virtual revolution in the field of evolutionary biology. This revolution has had a profound impact on the philosophy of science; an impact which is beginning to be felt in the field of economics. The purpose of this article is to analyse some past controversies in economic methodology in the light of recent developments in evolutionary biology.

Introduction It is the purpose of this paper to examine the issue of federal deficits from a general, and thus, a broader perspective than is traditionally employed. It is maintained in this paper that the deficit is not simply a “government” problem — because a representative government can do little to balance the budget if the people are doing all they can, not only to reduce their tax liabilities but also to demand a continuous increase of benefits from government. The deficit should thus be considered as a problem of the entire society and analysed accordingly. Also, it is not merely an economic problem, but also a moral problem. More specifically, from a general equilibrium viewpoint (i.e. both the public and the private sectors are considered), the federal budget deficit can be regarded as a consequence of a society that places a high value on individual economic freedom, economic efficiency, as well as on competition for economic success. This is the case because economic freedom and competition tend to create economic insecurity and immorality, both of which incline to cause government expenditures to increase, taxes to decrease, or both. Hence, a long term solution for budget shortfalls would depend upon the possibility of whether the society as a whole can be made more economically secure and moral without the unnecessary encroachment upon individual liberty and upon the opportunity for competitive success.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.