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This chapter studies the evolution of the relationships between the US imperialism and Venezuela in the last 100 years. The main purpose is to insert the present form of these links in their historical perspective. The first section is about the implications of Venezuela’s integration into the world economy through oil exports. The second one discusses the effects on the Venezuelan economy of the post-WWII economic expansion. The third and fourth sections deal with the consequences of the world economy changes since the 1980s on Venezuelan society. The last three sections explain the contradictions generated by the development of the Chavista transition project within the local ruling classes and with the US imperialism itself.

This ethnographic study explores how local and global forces influence a unique set of self-employed people in Havana’s tourism industry – dance instructors – and how these circumstances drive the strategies and rationalities they use to navigate socioeconomic transformations. Cuba’s recent history of economic crises, the decline in welfare assistance, and an array of market-driven economic reforms have driven many Cubans to search for incomes in Havana’s lucrative tourism industry. Global circulations of people, wealth, and ideas shape the opportunities Cubans find in this type of work. Furthermore, strict state policies and regulations, in conjunction with underlying systems of oppression, hinder and constrain Cubans who work in tourism-based ventures. Building on theories of neoliberalism and tourism, we discuss how Cuban dance instructors develop professional skills, standardize their activities, and address global consumer desires/demands while simultaneously drawing from collectivized social norms cultivated under Cuban socialism. These hybridized formal/informal business tactics reveal how self-employed Cubans are positioned between socialist configurations and the capital-driven tourism industry. These innovative socioeconomic logics are also critical in understanding how people living in centrally planned economies, some of which are socially marginalized because of patterns of inequality, gain access to and participate with contemporary modalities of the global economy.

We aim to analyze the early trajectory of Argentine industry from the perspective of uneven and combined development. Argentine integration into the world market based on the export of agricultural goods had not neglected industrial development. At first, Argentine industry benefited from its late emergence and rapidly followed the path of leading countries’ manufactures. But initial advantage soon turned into a liability. The emergence of large-scale industry required expanded markets that were already occupied by older and stronger competitors. The 1930 crisis and the impact of the Second World War aggravated this problem. Attempts to remedy the situation – an export-led industrialization scheme and an internal-market-oriented economy – failed successively. We study this process through the analysis of Argentine industrial chambers’ journals, reports from the United States Department of Foreign Trade and Argentine official government documents. We find that the export-led industrialization project failed because of the weakness of Argentine industries and not because of economic nationalism. That was the outcome of the previous failure of liberal projects and of the international constraints imposed by the Second World War and its aftermath. During this later period of internal-market-oriented economy, the gap between Argentine and international productivity widened. This paper presents an innovative interpretation that transcends liberal and nationalistic explanations and serves as a case study of the implications of uneven and combined development.

To discuss the historical roots of contemporary geopolitical economy, this paper aims to explore the complex and influential analysis of Tilly's formation of European national states as a predominant type of territorial political organization in contemporary world. To do this, Tilly described different eras of dominant organization of warfare in relation to state organization: patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, specialization. In this paper, we explore the link between the organization of military power and trade policy. We are trying to answer the question, if it is possible to credibly state a connection between the trade policy types pursued by selected states in specific historical periods and Tilly’s eras of dominant form of organization of warfare. For this purpose, we developed a typology of trade policies of important states throughout the history, using the economic history research of leading experts in the field. Our conclusion is that such a connection – between trade policy and Tilly’s eras of organization of warfare – can be made and that this connection is solidly supported by economic history. Our analysis may be of value for any critical assessment of international trade relations in contemporary geopolitical economy – and of influential cosmopolitan interpretations of the liberal trade regime of 19th century or globalization in 20th century.

This chapter argues that aspiring hegemons face a wide array of complex and distinct military challenges. Managing scarce military resources requires a subtle and complex global strategy that is likely to generate cognitive overload for the political system. As a result of cognitive overload, aspiring hegemons are likely to flail around, rapidly shifting from one global strategy to another. Such strategic flailing will occur independently of whether or not the economy is in crisis, though clearly economic crisis will exacerbate the tendency towards strategic incoherence. The chapter examines U.S. global strategy since the end of the Cold War, looking at the focus on “rogue regimes,” a growing concern with “global chaos,” worry about the rise of a peer competitor (China), and the debates about the root causes of, and best strategies to mitigate, terrorism. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of culture and notions of national identity and their role in the formulation of grand strategy.

China has, apparently, more trade union members than the rest of the world put together, but the unions are subservient to the Party-state. The theme of the paper is the gap between rhetoric and reality. Issues analysed include union structure, membership, representation, and the interaction between unions and the Party-state. We suggest that Chinese unions inhabit an Alice in Wonderland dream world and that they are virtually impotent when it comes to representing workers. Because the Party-state recognises that such frailty may lead to instability it has passed new laws promoting collective contracts and established new tripartite institutions to mediate and arbitrate disputes. While such laws are welcome they are largely hollow: collective contracts are very different from collective bargaining and the incidence of cases dealt with by the tripartite institutions is tiny. Much supporting evidence is presented drawing on detailed case studies undertaken in Hainan Province (the largest and one of the oldest special economic zones) in 2004 and 2005. The need for more effective representation is appreciated by some All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) officials, but it seems a long way off, so unions in China will continue to echo the White Queen: “The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday – but never jam today” and, alas, tomorrow never comes.

Lithuania has had a long and tumultuous history. Balts, an Indo-European ethnic group, was the first civilization to live in this territory, dating back to the 10th-3rd centuries BC. The first written mention of Lithuania appeared in the German historical documents “Annals Quedlinburgenses” in 1009. In 1236, Mindaugas became the first Grand Duke of a region encompassing Lithuania, Kaliningrad and part of Poland. Mindaugas converted to Christianity and was crowned king of Lithuania in 1252. In 1323, the capital city of Vilnius was mentioned for the first time. For the first 200 years of its existence, Lithuania was under attack from both the Teutonic and the Livonian Orders. Despite this, by the end of 14th century, it managed to become one of the most powerful states in Eastern Europe. Grand Duke Vytautas the Great, who ruled from 1392 to 1430, extended the great empire from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. At the Union of Lublin in 1569, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom was merged into a Commonwealth headed by a monarch. It was weakened by the wars against Russia, the Ukraine, and Sweden during the 16th–18th centuries. The end of the 18th century was marked by three partitions of the Commonwealth. In 1795, after the Third Partition, Lithuania lost not only tangible traits of statehood, but also its name. As a result, it became part of the Russian Empire.

Efficiency of peace-building relies on a vision of the future, partly at least. But nobody can provide a forecast free from prejudice and attitudes deeply rooted in the past. As a result, many so-called long-term “forecasts” are actually “geopolitical fantasies.” The chapter tackles forecasts of the possible fate of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China in the twenty-first century, a general issue of war and peace in both the remote and foreseeable futures, and prospects of peace-building.