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The main thesis of the chapter is to introduce a new idea to the field of peace negotiations, which will require the development of a new model of negotiations to enforce peace. The existing models of peace negotiations highlight the existence of a positive peace dividend to parties involved in conflicts and peace negotiation. They, hence, usually highlight a gradual and dynamic adjustment, or movement, away from a conflict-ridden outcome towards a peaceful outcome that offers a positive peace dividend to all relevant stakeholders. In comparison with the status quo, peace brings additional economic returns and peace therefore offers a win–win situation. Despite the fact that a win–win situation does not ensure the enforcement of peace, as agents can easily get locked into what is commonly known as the prisoners' dilemma – yet the possibility of Pareto improvement makes negotiations for peace somewhat artificial. At least in the short run all agents involved in active conflicts are apprehensive of peace as they expect immediate (expected) returns from making peace can outweigh the expected returns from conflicts. An important work that sidesteps the win–win situation of peace dividends is by Isard and Azis (1999) who introduced the possibility of an immediate loss of economic returns from the peace process in their conflict management procedure (CMP). However, in the existing work on CMP, the long-run returns from peace outweigh that from conflicts. One therefore presumes that peace brings economic benefits to all. The existing CMPs therefore assume away any possibility of lower economic returns from peace. There are some important models in which peace negotiations are also modelled as a zero-sum game in which the gain of a party represents a loss to others, which is known as win–lose negotiations. In this work we introduce the possibility of bargaining and negotiations against the backdrop of potential immediate losses while peace is favoured simply for its intrinsic value and not for pecuniary returns. In the real world, there is evidence to believe that agents involved in conflicts are painfully aware of two things: first, the decision-making agents who choose between conflicts vis-à-vis peace are the leaders who get rarely affected by economic returns from conflicts or peace. It is usually the foot soldiers who bear the brunt of costly conflicts and can benefit from peace. Secondly, most people value peace for the sake of it as peace has an intrinsic value that ensures the protection of rights and their lives and protection from violence. Thus, peace is a collective good that provides little extra economic returns to actual decision-makers who choose between courses of conflicts or peace.

Problems arose in the “market for information” (MFI) during the “dot.com” boom, the Enron case, Northern Rock failure and during the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. This paper aims to extend the understanding of the MFI through field research and theoretical sources. It also aims to understand the MFI during relatively stable periods and during periods of rapid change, crisis and failure. It seeks to use these insights to propose changes to reduce the possibilities for negative change and problems in the MFI.

Field studies are used to develop an “empirical narrative” for ongoing MFI structures, processes and outcomes during relatively stable periods. The paper develops a “theoretical narrative” to extend the understanding of the MFI empirical insights.

The paper reveals that the MFI structure that includes knowledge and social context is central to ongoing MFI economic processes for MFI agents. Outcomes include changes in markets, firms and others. Changes and problems are means to understand interactions between the MFI social structure, knowledge, actions and outcomes as they rendered visible the previously invisible issues.

The paper shows that a coherent combination of new empirical narrative and theoretical narrative is essential to develop a critical stance, new policy prescriptions and new regulations to deal with problems and changes in the MFI. This provides the frame to propose changes in the “world of knowledge” and in (concentrated and elite) social and economic structures in the MFI. It proposes: making explicit shared knowledge in the MFI, monitoring change processes and promoting active formal learning.

Lean projects seek to optimise the project rather than its parts and to maximize value to the customer. To better align the behaviour of project participants with a Lean project delivery model, the purpose of this paper is to argue for compensation structures that better address the economic and non‐economic motives that impact project performance.

Social science research increasingly shows that non‐economic human motives play a key role in job performance and that they interact in complicated ways with economic incentives. By reviewing and extrapolating from relevant literature, this paper explores certain key non‐economic human motives and their impact on project performance, how these non‐economic motives interact with economic incentives, and strategies for structuring effective incentives.

The paper identifies certain contract incentive principles that the authors believe should promote non‐economic motivation.

The paper provides a starting point for further research regarding compatibility of incentives with non‐economic motives on Lean projects. In particular, more research is needed on the applicability of the social science findings to corporate entities.

The paper suggests that traditional compensation systems are ill‐suited to project‐optimised behaviour.

This paper provides important insight into the problems of traditional compensation systems for construction projects and offers both concepts and strategies that could better align economic incentives with project‐optimised behaviour.

This paper aims to systematically review the concept of homo Islamicus discussed in the existing literature. The second objective is to offer a set of criticisms of the descriptions of homo Islamicus.

In this paper prespecified eligibility criteria are applied to select articles that are indexed in Scopus and ProQuest, or published by two major publishers, ScienceDirect and Emerald, or appear on ResearchGate. A set of books related to homo Islamicus was also used as secondary sources to support the selected articles. As a result, this paper systematically reviews 53 articles and four books to synthesize the homo Islamicus.

There are four notions of homo Islamicus: Firstly, homo Islamicus as the kind of economic agent that is required to achieve Islamic economic objectives. Secondly, homo Islamicus as a defining factor that makes the difference between Islamic and conventional economics. Thirdly, homo Islamicus as an economic agent whose characteristics are something Islamic economics aims to realize. Lastly, homo Islamicus as an economic agent representing the fundamental assumption in Islamic economics.

Mapping homo Islamicus can be helpful for future researchers to conduct analyses related to homo Islamicus, especially in the context of empirical studies of the existence of homo Islamicus in economic reality. This literature review can help other researchers to understand the development of literature related to homo Islamicus.

This paper seems to be the first to systematically identify, select and synthesize the description of homo Islamicus in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to examine three explanatory perspectives in the academic literature on informal economies that seek to account for agents’ engagement in informal economic practices.

The paper draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology to interrogate the existing perspectives and to provide a conceptual rethinking of informal economies and informal economic practices.

The paper reveals an inherent scholastic epistemocentrism in the established perspectives. By privileging either an objectivist or a subjectivist viewpoint, these accounts do not examine the practical knowledge and logic that constitute agents’ knowledgeable engagement in informal economic practices. By making use of Bourdieu’s thinking tools of “field”, “capital” and “the habitus”, the paper offers a conceptual rethinking of informal economic practices as the product of a dialectic relationship between socially objectivated structures and subjective representations and experiences.

The paper introduces a reflexive rethinking of informality that draws on but also develops an emergent literature on informal economic practices as relational and context bound.

This article models debt market equilibrium given an expanded notion of rational behavior. The model extends Diamond's model of reputation acquisition, by assuming that some prospective borrower‐investors are opportunistic utility maximizers, while others are unwilling to mislead borrowers as to their intended use of borrowed funds. We find that the presence of honest borrowers is necessary to the function of debt markets, and that, as in real‐world markets, opportunistic and honest agents can coexist. We further find that total economic activity is positively correlated to the proportion of trustworthy agents. A major research concern in financial economics is the reconciliation of observed behavior with the predictions of the perfect‐markets, utility‐maximization models, which have traditionally supplied the dominant paradigm in finance. The main focus of recent research has been on the predictions of Agency Theory, or simply Agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency has its origins in the property rights literature of economic theory (Alchian, 1969) and, in essence, addresses the following question: How do rational agents act in imperfect markets? A whole range of market imperfections have been analyzed ranging from the simplest type of moral hazard and adverse selection (Thakor, 1989) to the debt capacity of an industry (Maksimovic and Zechner, 1991). Indeed, few if any areas of business theory have escaped Agency's scrutiny; it has, in effect, recast the theory of the firm. In this light, the firm becomes a structure whose efficiency depends upon its ability to mitigate the costs associated with Agency. Firms are “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.310). One of the major gaps in the one‐period models of agency behavior has been the inability of these models to explain management's “honest” behavior (Thaler, 1992). That is, managers do not always engage in such “rational” acts as risk‐shifting, or paying excessive dividends, in order to enrich shareholders (and themselves) at the expense of bondholders. A significant move toward reconciling Agency's predictions with observed behavior has resulted from the reputation‐acquisition work of Diamond (1989), building on the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In these models, agents acquire reputations by demonstrating some consistent mode of behavior through multiple iterations of a contractual situation. Through these iterations, principals modify their beliefs concerning the future behavior of the agent by observing certain outcomes. In Diamond's model, rational agents will not continually choose either a risky project or safe project. Their choice is a function of the interest rate and the stage of the game. Specifically, these agents choose the risky project initially; then, as attrition among risk‐takers causes interest rates to drop, they shift to the safe project for some iterations. As the end of the game approaches, however, these agents once again revert to investing in the risky project. In comparison with the attention that has been devoted to identifying and analyzing market imperfections, the former part of the Agency question — namely the “rational agents” part — has attracted much less attention in the finance literature. In Agency models, rationality has been defined strictly in terms of the individual pursuit of pecuniary wealth. This expected‐utility model has been tested experimentally and has been found to be systematically violated, in at least two fundamental ways: 1) Individuals do not behave as if they are attempting to maximize wealth (Plott, 1986), and 2) Individual behavior is affected by notions of fairness and cooperation (Kahneman, et al, 1986). Attempts to construct a theory of capital market behavior which can accommodate this observed behavior are virtually nonexistent. This lack is probably due to the presumption that opportunistic agents will drive ethical agents out of the market. However, as we demonstrate in the model developed in this paper, this is not necessarily the case. By focusing attention specifically on Agency's rationality premise, the model developed here differs from antecedent Agency models. This article investigates the implication, for financial‐market equilibra, of an alternative rationality premise. We assume that some agents will display the virtues of honesty and trustworthiness in their dealings with Other agents. Modifying Diamond's (1989) model of reputation acquisition in debt markets, the impact of these ‘virtuous’ agents on financial‐market equilibria is investigated. The model indicates that the existence of trustworthy agents in financial markets is not merely desirable from an economic perspective, but actually is essential if debt markets are not to fail. Specifically, if lenders do not belief that some non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents exists, then lenders cease to lend and debt markets cease to function. Also, the greater the proportion of honest agents, the greater is the overall level of economic activity; indeed, the existence of honest agents will tend to induce at least some of the opportunistic agents to act virtuously. We find that, as Bowie observes in a more general context, “[i]t only pays to lie or cheat when you can free ride off the honesty of others” (1991, pp.11–12). In addition, the belief in a non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents can lead to the elimination of some agency problems.

The aim is to contribute to the personalist economics research agenda by exploring how personalist thought can theoretically inform the question of well-being and its measurement.

The paper draws on the work of personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier. After reviewing relevant aspects of Mounier's political economic thought, the second section considers the conceptual implications for a personalist well-being measure and analyses its key tenets: integrality; heterogeneity; objectivity vs. subjectivity; and autonomy and freedom. The third section consists of a dialogue between Mounier's personalist philosophy and some aspects of Sen's capability approach applied to the issue of well-being measurement, which echoes and parallels some fundamental dimensions of personalist thought.

Firstly, the conceptual analysis offers preliminary avenues for moving towards measuring well-being using an agent model that aligns more closely with the model of the economic agent as person, as is articulated by personalists and incorporating personalist principles. Secondly, the brief analysis of ways in which aspects of Sen's capability theory dialogue with personalist economic principles demonstrate the potential for personalist principles to be incorporated into welfare assessment theory.

Personalist economics strives to re-think the foundations of economic theory by introducing the acting person as the economic agent, as opposed to the individual. Dissatisfaction with a range of mainstream economic well-being indicators suggests that there is a deficit in the normative and ontological assumptions that underlie conventional welfare economic models.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-02-2023-0084.

The chapter aims to enhance the understanding of the development of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship. To do so, elements in Kirzner’s works published up until 1973 that enclose the central points of this theory are studied. The chapter has four sections, in addition to the introduction and conclusion, that highlight the arguments that relate to Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship: (i) before the publication of his 1967 paper that presents the entrepreneurial function in the market process (1960–1967); between the 1967 paper and the publication of his most important book, Competition and Entrepreneurship, in 1973 (1967–1973); (iii) in Kirzner’s latest version of entrepreneurship theory as presented in his 1973 book; and (iv) the evolution of Kirzner’s thinking. The evolution of the author’s thinking regarding equilibrium and the entrepreneur is highlighted by presenting the different stages of his theory of entrepreneurship between 1960 and 1973.

Suggests that, contrary to his neo‐Kantian methodological intentions, there is much textual evidence that Weber was not consistent in following through the non‐realist epistemology involved. In his search for the methodological bona fides of the empirical social sciences, he focused on the distinctive ontological nature of phenomena that originate in human action. Weber rejected the Homo oeconomicus concept of the agent required by exact theoretical economics. He espoused instead a deeper subjectivist understanding of individual human agents whose actions are shaped by the social complex that confronts them. It was this ontological emphasis that led him to devise the concepts of agent rationality and ideal types as foundations for his empirical inquiries. In these seminal endeavours, though, he understated the contingency of human agency that must be contended with and he fell short in understanding the full extent and influence of the situations within which agents must operate. Nonetheless, it is this focus on the fundamental role of subjective but situated human agency that could still find more of a place in the foundations of social economics.

This paper aims to survey literature on behavioral economics and finance, with particular emphasis on a selection of models, methods and tools that this strand of thought uses to approach and explain observable phenomena.

After a brief discussion on the meaning and context of behavioral economics, the manuscript identifies five topics of special interest: time preference, heuristics, emotions, finance and macro behavior. For each of these topics, relevant models, methods and tools are identified and scrutinized.

Behavioral economics and finance establish an effective bridge between orthodox economic thinking and new and revolutionary methods of analysis. Exploring the intricacies of human behavior can frequently be done by adapting the trivial and conventional intertemporal utility maximization models that economists insistently resort to, but to fully grasp such intricacies, a step forward is required. Agent-based models and other tools from complexity sciences constitute the analytical arsenal that is needed to improve our understanding of how behavioral issues attach to heterogeneity, local interaction, path-dependence, out-of-equilibrium dynamics and emergence.

Although surveys on behavioral economics and finance abound in the specialized literature, this study has the peculiarity of emphasizing five relevant topics that are particularly illustrative of the pivotal role of behavioral science in promoting the transition from the strict neoclassical perspective to a less mechanic and more organic view of economics and finance.