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Why have so many overlapping regional institutions been established in the Asia-Pacific? Is there any possibility of a convergence of these institutions into a single (or a few) “authoritative” regional institution(s)? What implications do the emerging overlapping regional institutions have for an evolving regional architecture in Asia? I argue first that the proliferation of regional institutions reflects complicated strategies taken by the countries to respond to the increased insecurity and uncertainty caused by the structural changes. Second, the countries of the region are taking a variety of national strategies through regional institutions, ranging from engagement to soft balancing and risk-hedging, to respond to these changes. Third, all the states of the region want to maintain a variety of institutional choices to respond to their uncertain futures. Fourth, what makes the institution-building so complicated lies in the fact that there are two major (and uncertain) powers to whom the regional countries have to respond through regional institutions: the United States and China. This makes the bargaining game for regional institution-building more complicated and competitive. Fifth, the amalgamation or convergence of the existing institutions into a single (or few) “authoritative” institution(s) through “institutional competition” will not take place in the foreseeable future. Sixth, the countries of the region may engage in “forum shopping.” Seventh, the roles of these institutions have been and will be quite modest. However, the regional institutions could to some extent contribute to moderating inter-state tensions and putting institutional constraints on the deviant behaviors of member countries.

This study investigates Asia Pacific banks' annual report disclosures on derivatives using the Basel Committee and IOSCO joint recommendations as the derivative and risk management disclosure benchmark. Based on our constructed disclosure index, the mean score is 35%, suggesting that many of the disclosure recommendations are not being adopted by the banks in our sample. Cross‐country and regional variation exists in the disclosure practices, with the variation associated with the extent to which accounting regulations for derivative instruments are operational. Hong Kong banks have the highest mean disclosure scores while the Philippines banks have the lowest mean disclosure scores. Australasian banks generally provide more disclosures than East Asian and South East Asian banks, and banks in developed countries generally have a higher level of disclosure relative to developing countries. The transparency of derivative activities by the banks is expected to improve as Asia Pacific countries promulgate accounting regulations congruent with international accounting standards.

This paper aims at discussing the determinants of strategic transparency and the governance structure of the East Asian firms. The relatively weak institutional infrastructure in East Asia raises the question about the adaptable governance structure and transparency in the East Asian firms.

The paper presents theoretical underpinnings of the literature on corporate governance, corporate strategy and international business. This paper argues that one of the common factors that determine the success of corporate governance structure is the extent to which it is transparent to the market forces within particular institutional arrangements.

When the institutional arrangements favor mandatory versus voluntary corporate disclosure, this study suggests a reform measure for the East Asian corporate governance system that relies, inter alia, on the percentages of long‐term and short‐term financing to total financing. The higher the percentage of long‐term financing, the more we can infer the extent of outside investors' confidence in the future of the East Asian firms. When more active role of banks involvements with the firms' business is permitted and an effective banks' and firms' strategic transparency can be assured, the East Asian banks and stock market can both lead firms to long‐term favorable achievements. This study also suggests that the protection of both shareholder's rights and creditors' rights can go in parallel lines with the latter is to be given first priority until the investors' confidence in the near and far future of East Asia corporate governance system is built.

This paper extends the value of corporate governance structure to the East Asian firms through advocating the determinants of strategic transparency in East Asia.

The rise of Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar Airways in the Middle East (collectively referred to as “ME3”) has been absolutely dramatic. How should other full-service carriers respond? This study takes a look at how one carrier, Singapore Airlines, has responded and may offer clues to how others may choose to respond. Facing ME3’s ascent in service quality and rapid capacity expansion, Singapore Airlines stuck to its niche as a premium carrier and refrained from tit-for-tat type competition. It managed to command a fare premium in select markets even in the presence of ME3, but had to sacrifice growth in its passenger count. This offers valuable lessons for other full-service carriers.