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Management has considerable discretion over how to present and announce earnings components that are either unusual or infrequent, but not both (hereafter referred to as special items). In this study, we study the independent and joint effects of the accounting presentation format of, and the level of announcement prominence given to income-decreasing special items on investors’ judgments about the persistence of declining earnings.

Our study uses a 3 (format) × 2 (prominence) between-subjects design. In the experiment, participants act as proxies for nonprofessional investors to assess the persistence of a hypothetical firm’s declining earnings and make investment decisions.

Our results suggest that investors’ judgments are influenced by accounting presentation format and the level of announcement prominence. With respect to format, both classification and disaggregation affect investors’ assessment of earnings persistence. In addition, the degree of prominence given to an income-decreasing special item, albeit self-serving and not audited, introduces additional influence beyond that of accounting presentation format. In particular, we find that announcement prominence has a greater effect when the special item is aggregated with other operating expenses than when the special item is presented under the two other alternatives.

Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that presentation format and announcement prominence both have significant impact on investors’ judgments and decisions, and that their effects are interactive. Our results also indicate that future research can possibly gain better insight if it considers the accounting attributes of the special items in addition to their economic attributes.

We analyze the quality of accounting information reported by public firms in Latin America and United States of America.

To reach our objective, an exploratory and descriptive research was developed. To analyze the dimensions of accounting information quality, the operational model present in literature were applied which assess the persistence in earnings (Dechow & Schrand, 2004), the level of conservatism (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), accounting earnings management (Pae, 2005) and accruals quality measurement (Dechow & Dichev, 2002), in a sample composed of publicly traded companies in the markets of Latin America and the North America (represented by USA), totaling 2,526 companies, from 2005 to 2011.

Our results evidenced that financial reporting of Latin-American companies are less conservative (except for Brazilian companies) and has similar level of earnings management in comparison to the North-American ones. Concerning to the quality of accruals it was observed that there are significant differences especially related to accruals of Brazilian companies.

Our results suggest differences in the quality of accounting information, originated by the economic environment where the company is inserted. So, investors must be careful when they are comparing firms between these markets, because the results were different for some cases, which may lead the investors to make misallocation of his resources.

We expanded previous literature by the use of various proxies for accounting quality, comparing firms on emerging markets with the major capital market (USA), and the crises period of time.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

This study aims to obtain empirical evidence and analyzes factors that are affecting earnings response coefficient (ERC). Manufacturing companies are used in this research, which are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. This study used panel data consisting of 114 firm years data. This research is using multiple regression method to examine the effect of independent variable to the dependent variable ERC. The result of this study shows that income smoothing (IS) and systematic risk (SR) have an effect on ERC; while IS, SR, and Firm Growth have an effect on Earnings Announcement; meanwhile, earnings persistence, audit quality, firm size, and leverage have no effect on Earnings Announcement. Implication of the research indicates that investors assess earnings quality of the company for their investment decision. These findings contribute to market reaction on earnings announcement and market-based accounting researches.

This paper documents how gender differences in occupational status (defined by earnings, education, and returns to skills) have evolved over time and across generations. The paper finds a persistent gender earnings gap, a reversal of the education gap, and a convergence in starting salaries and returns to experience. Divergent occupational choices might explain part of the persistent gender gaps and women’s failure to reach parity with men in the earnings distribution. Women choose more flexible jobs than men. But whereas men dominate women in high-powered occupations, they are also more likely to be in low-skilled low-pay occupations. Differential effects of children and time spent keeping house explain most of the gender gap in high-powered occupations but cannot explain fully why women choose more flexible occupations.

Can an estimate of the intergenerational elasticity (IGE) be interpreted as a measure of inequality of opportunity (IOp)? If parental income is the only childhood circumstance, then the answer is yes. However, parental income is one of many potential circumstances that can shape IOp. These circumstances can influence the offspring’s income indirectly – by influencing parental income – or directly, bypassing the IGE altogether. I develop a model to decompose the interaction between childhood circumstances, parental income and offspring income. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the United States, I find that childhood circumstances account for 55% of the IGE for individual earnings and 53% for family income, with parental education explaining over a third of those shares. Furthermore, the IGE misses a large part of the influence of circumstances: only 45% of the influence of parental education on the offspring’s income goes through parental income (36% for earnings).

This study focuses on a survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) in public firms in Japan concerning the following six points: the importance of the definition earnings quality; higher quality earnings; the determinants of earnings quality; prevalence, magnitude, and motivation of earnings management; accounting that influences earnings quality; and misrepresenting of earnings. The results are following: first, Japanese CFOs define earnings quality as earnings accurately reflecting economic reality, earnings accurately reflecting the results of operations, and earnings backed by cash flows, earnings sustainability, recurring, and consistent, and earnings reflecting long-term trend importance. Second, Japanese firms consider earnings that reflect consistent reporting choices over time as higher quality. They do not consider that earnings having accruals that are eventually realized as cash flow as higher earnings quality. Third, Japanese CFOs indicate that 30% of earnings quality is impacted by firm characteristics such as firm’s business model, industry, and macroeconomic conditions. Surprisingly, the influence of the board of directors is greater than the impact of their internal controls. Fourth, as for the determinants of earnings quality, CFOs consider that more than 70% of Japanese CFOs do not allow the discretion and that accounting standards limit their ability to report higher earning quality. Fifth, Japanese CFOs consider that higher earnings are influenced by accounting principles such as policies that match expenses with revenues and policies that rely on fair value accounting as much as possible. Sixth, CFOs themselves predict that 50% of Japanese firms use discretions and that they use 20% of earnings per share (EPS). Since there is inside and outside pressure to hit earnings benchmarks, Japanese firms possess the motivation to use earnings to misrepresent economic performance, Japanese managers see a red flag when generally accepted accounting principle’s earnings do not correlate with cash flow from operations.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relation between tax reporting and financial reporting, their influence on transparency, and empirical implications.

To create and sustain a resource-based competitive advantage, managers acquire and develop specialized resources as they grow their firms. The authors argue that an important part of committing to a resource-based strategy is a willingness to keep spending on specialized resources during periods when sales and profits are down. The authors seek to validate this conjecture by examining whether such resource-based commitment to a customer-centered strategy results in improved customer satisfaction. The authors use the stickiness of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses to capture this commitment empirically. The authors first document that future customer satisfaction is positively associated with SG&A cost stickiness, consistent with the premise that the retention of specialized SG&A resources during low demand periods helps firms to build and maintain relationships with customers over time. Next, the authors test whether expected future benefits of customer satisfaction are enhanced when SG&A cost stickiness is higher. The authors find that the positive relation between Tobin’s Q and customer satisfaction is positively moderated by SG&A cost stickiness. Finally, the authors test whether earnings persistence, a quality of earnings associated with sustained performance over time, is positively associated with the interaction between customer satisfaction and SG&A cost stickiness. The authors find that it is. Their evidence supporting these predictions is consistent with the conjecture that resource-based commitment reflected in cost stickiness is an important dimension of creating and sustaining a resource-based competitive advantage.

The article hypothesizes that the level of corporate social responsibility affects both the informativeness of earnings and the magnitude of discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. The hypothesis exploits: (1) the positive relationship between corporate social responsibility and firms’ risk-return profiles; and (2) managers’ incentives in using discretionary accounting accrual adjustments. Results show that corporate social responsibility is positively associated with earnings’ explanatory power for returns and related to the magnitude of accounting accrual adjustments.