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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of career concerns on CEOs’ use of expectations management to meet or beat analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The authors posit that early career-stage CEOs are less (more) likely to use expectations management than are late career-stage CEOs if the market views expectations management as an opportunistic strategy (efficient process) due to reputational capital concerns.

The authors obtain data for CEO career stages and CEO compensation from ExecuComp, analyst earnings forecasts from the detailed I/B/E/S database, financial statement data from quarterly Compustat and stock returns from the daily CRSP database over the period 1992–2013.

The results are consistent with the opportunistic hypothesis and early-stage CEOs seeking to build reputational capital by avoiding the perception of engaging in an inefficient managerial strategy. The authors find robust evidence that late career-stage CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations management than early career-stage CEOs. Furthermore, the authors show that late career-stage CEOs tend to employ expectations management to boost the value of their equity-based compensation.

The findings have important implications because the authors document a different implication of the “horizon problem” related to CEOs’ opportunistic forecasting behavior and the manipulation of analysts’ forecasts for CEOs who are approaching retirement.

The results have practical implications for analysts who provide earnings forecasts for firms whose CEOs are in early or late career stages and for investors who use such analysts’ forecasts in firm valuation models.

The authors contribute to the literature on expectations management by documenting how reputational incentives of CEOs affect the likelihood that managers engage in expectations management. The authors show that an important managerial incentive to engage in expectations management is CEO career concerns. Furthermore, the authors show that CEOs who are in early stages of their careers choose not to engage in expectations management due to the market’s perceived degree of opportunism pertaining to this strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine stock price crash risk (SPCR) as a function of meeting or missing three earnings thresholds – reporting a profit (earnings level), reporting an earnings increase (earnings change) and meeting analysts’ forecasts (earnings expectation).

The authors rely upon the research design of Herrmann et al. (2011) to identify the incremental impact of the earnings level and earnings change benchmarks on SPCR, after controlling for the effects of meeting or missing analysts’ expectations.

The authors find that meeting analysts’ expectations is negatively associated with SPCR, and this relationship strengthens with the magnitude of the unexpected earnings. However, the authors find little evidence of incremental threshold effects to suggest that earnings level and earnings change benchmarks are critical thresholds with respect to SPCR. Our results are robust after including a number of control variables.

This study contributes to the literature that investigates determinants of SPCR while simultaneously providing new evidence to conclusions that analysts’ earnings forecast is at the top of the earnings benchmark hierarchy.

Prior literature has revealed three key earnings benchmarks: earnings level; earnings change; and analysts’ expectations. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors seek to establish which earnings benchmark induces the largest extent of earnings management. Second, the authors explore the implications of earnings management on firm future performance. Both of these purposes are investigated for Chinese listed companies during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era.

The authors rely upon the unique regulations and incentives for Chinese listed companies in order to develop four testable hypotheses. Next, the authors employ both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to test the hypotheses.

The results suggest that Chinese listed firms have the highest level of income increasing discretionary accruals around the earnings level benchmark, followed by the earnings change benchmark. The authors do not find any evidence of earnings management to beat analysts’ expectation. In addition, the authors find evidence that Chinese listed firms with relatively high level of earnings management and low earnings exhibit relatively weak future stock performance.

The findings are the first to document an earnings management benchmark hierarchy with respect to the extent of income increasing discretionary accruals, while simultaneously establishing a link between earnings management and firm future stock performance, for Chinese listed companies. The findings are valuable for regulators and investors by suggesting that management intervention in the reporting process during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era may act to circumvent delisting regulations and cloud earnings signal for firms that beat certain earnings benchmarks.

In capital markets research, analysts’ consensus forecasts are widely used as a proxy for unobservable market earnings expectation. However, they measure the market earnings expectation with error that may vary cross-sectionally, as the market does not consistently rely on analysts’ consensus forecasts to form earnings expectation (Walther, 1997). Based on this notion, this paper aims to relate the prediction of future stock returns to the cross-sectional variation of the error in measuring market earnings expectation embedded in analysts’ consensus forecasts.

This study uses empirical analyses based on stock returns and annual analysts’ consensus forecasts.

Based on the analytical work by Abarbanell et al. (1995), this study reports that when the measurement error in annual analysts’ consensus forecasts is the smallest, forward earnings-to-price ratio (constructed with annual analysts’ consensus forecasts) best explains future stock returns, and the forward earnings-to-price ratio-based investment strategy is the most profitable.

Findings of this study are useful to capital markets research that relies on the market earnings expectation and to practitioners seeking more profitable investment strategies.

The literature suggests that management discretion to adjust resources in response to changes in sales can create asymmetric cost behavior and management incentives to move stock prices can influence its decision to release management earnings forecasts (MEF). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between a firm’s degree of cost stickiness and its propensity to release MEF. The authors propose that both MEF and cost stickiness are influenced by management strategic choices and provide two possible explanations along with supportive evidence. First, when management is optimistic about future performance, it tends to increase both cost stickiness and is willing to disclose the optimistic expectations through MEF. Second, cost stickiness increases information asymmetry between management and investors, thus management tends to issue earnings forecast to mitigate the perceived information asymmetry.

The authors collect firm-level fundamental data from the COMPUSTAT database, and market data from the CRSP database during 2005 and 2016. The data used to measure variables related to institutional ownership and financial analysts are, respectively, obtained from the Thomson Reuters and the I/B/E/S databases. The quarterly MEF data are from two databases. The authors obtain the data before 2012 the from Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance database and manually collect the data between 2012 and 2016 from the Bloomberg database for the largest 3,000 publicly traded US companies. The measurement of cost stickiness is based on the industry-level measurement developed by Anderson et al. (2003) and the firm-level measurements developed by Weiss (2010). The authors construct two measurements, management’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF, to capture management’s voluntary disclosure strategy.

The analyses of a sample between year 2005 and 2016, indicate that the firm-level cost stickiness is positively associated with the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, the authors find that the level of cost stickiness is associated with more favorable earnings news forecasted by management. Additional tests suggest that both information asymmetry and managerial optimism may explain the relationship between cost stickiness and MEF. Finally, the authors find that the association between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the resource adjustment cost is high and when the firm efficiency is high. The results are robust after using alternative measurements of cost stickiness and MEF.

First, this paper attempts to build a bridge between managerial accounting and financial accounting by providing evidence of managerial incentives and discretions that affect both cost structure and earnings. The authors contribute to, and complement, prior studies that primarily disentangle the complicated accounting information system by focusing on either the internal information system or the external information system. Second, the paper complements prior studies that examine cost stickiness and its determinants of asymmetric cost behavior by providing additional evidence for the value-relevance of cost stickiness strategy and its link to MEF releases in mitigating information asymmetry. Third, the findings are also relevant to current debates among policymakers, academia and practitioners regarding modernization of mandatory and voluntary disclosures through discussing the managerial incentive behind the managerial disclosure strategies as reflected in MEF releases (SEC, 2013). Fourth, the authors provide evidence regarding management’s role in influencing cost asymmetry and MEF releases, which support the theoretical argument that management discretions affect the firms’ cost structure and MEF disclosures.

This paper asks whether market fundamentals can explain the run-up and collapse of Enron’s stock price and price-earnings ratio. We use a variant of the discounted cash flow model proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961) to show that the growth rates implied by the stock’s valuation have rarely been achieved in recorded business history. We also provide evidence of earnings management by the company that may have contributed to extravagant investor expectations of earnings growth. Between 1990 and 2000 the firm’s reported earnings met or exceeded analysts’ earnings forecasts 77% of the time. Furthermore, beginning in 1997 Enron used asset sales (often to related parties) to generate as much as 83% of its annual earnings.

This paper seeks to investigate whether disaggregated bank earnings better predict next period earnings than contemporaneous aggregated earnings.

Fairfield et al.'s (1996) regression approach is used for predicting next period's return of equity (ROE) and stock prices using disaggregated earnings data.

The results show that the mean adjusted R‐square significantly increases with the progressive disaggregation of earnings. The results also demonstrate that disaggregated components are better able to predict next period earnings and stock prices than aggregated earnings.

The findings support the US Financial Accounting Standard Board's contention that disaggregated information may be more useful than aggregated information for investment, credit, and financing decisions.

Investors and analysts should use disaggregated income statement information in predicting next period earnings and stock prices for the banking industry.

The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how fully disaggregated earnings explain ROE, stock prices, and analysts forecast error in the banking industry.

This paper examines perceived labor market earnings among adolescents and their parents by gender and caste. Previous research has established that lower subjective expectations of labor market returns among parents affect educational investment. Likewise, subjective expectations of adolescents about labor market returns are likely to affect their commitment to their education. In the labor market, gender and caste biases manifest itself in terms of lower wages for women and persons from marginalized communities. The authors ask if perceived earnings among adolescents and their parents vary by caste and gender over and above their intrinsic ability.

The authors use a unique dataset on adolescents that has been recently collected (2013-2015) by ASER Centre, the research and assessment wing of Pratham Education Foundation for the analysis. To answer the research question posed in the paper, they use standard OLS and quantile regression techniques.

Results confirm that girls have lower expected earnings than boys. Caste differences appear more rigid in Bihar.

The authors recognize that the results presented do not take into consideration the issue of selection bias. Hence, they are applicable not to the average adolescents in the study districts, but only to those who reported expected earnings. That said, they do not think that this technical limitation dilutes the broad policy conclusions emerging from the study.

The paper uses cognition as a measure of an adolescent’s intrinsic ability. Therein lays the uniqueness of the paper. It brings into the discussion on expected earnings test scores as a measure of an adolescent’s cognitive ability. It is also unique in that it focuses on adolescents in the age group of 11-16 years who are likely to join the labor force in few years. Previous discussion of subjective expectations in India did not include any measure to capture cognitive ability and did not focus exclusively on adolescents.

We highlight two mechanisms of limited attention for expert information intermediaries, i.e., analysts, and the effects of such limited attention on the market price discovery process. We approach analysts' limited attention from the perspective of day-to-day arrival of information and processing of tasks. We examine the attention-limiting role of competing tasks (number of earnings announcements and forecasts for portfolio firms) and distracting events (number of earnings announcements for non-portfolio firms) in analysts' forecast accuracy and the effects of such, on the subsequent price discovery process. Our results show that competing tasks worsen analysts' forecast accuracy, and competing task induced limited attention delays the market price adjustment process. On the other hand, distracting events can improve analysts' forecast accuracy and accelerate market price adjustments when such events relate to analysts' portfolio firms through industry memberships.

Student-managed investment funds typically pursue “plain vanilla” objectives. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the value of adding option strategies to reduce the risk of equity positions around earnings announcements. The collar strategy is one such technique with the advantages of a low net cost and limited potential losses.

The authors provide recommendations for utilizing the collar strategy around earnings announcements. The authors also discuss how the value of this strategy is related to the literature on option pricing and earnings announcement returns.

Risk management strategies can enhance the pedagogical value of student-managed investment funds. The authors document how students have successfully utilized the collar strategy to immunize risk.

The collar strategy can enhance the pedagogical value of student-managed investment classes in several ways. First, students learn how to implement risk reduction strategies. Second, the proper implementation of these strategies requires students to learn the complex mechanisms associated with corporate earnings dissemination and analyst coverage. This also provides an opportunity to study earnings drift, which is a persistent and economically significant financial anomaly.