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Employees, as internal stakeholders, not only play significant roles in a company’s operations but are also important users of a company’s financial information. However, prior accounting research to date has not explored whether employees incorporate a firm’s ability to meet earnings benchmarks in forming and revising their perceptions of firms. This study aims to focus on whether a firm’s ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks impacts employees’ perceptions.

The authors use employees’ perception scores from the 100 Best Companies to Work for from 1998 to 2015. The authors conduct an empirical study to examine the impact of beating earnings benchmarks on the perceptions of employees by estimating regression analyses. The dependent variable is employee perceptions of the firm. The variables of interest are the earnings growth and the analyst forecast benchmarks. The authors control for earnings performance and other determinants of employees’ perceptions.

The authors find that beating the earnings benchmarks is relevant for employees but has different impacts on the employees’ perceptions of firms. Specifically, both level and change analyses suggest that a firm’s ability to beat the earnings growth benchmark affects employees’ perceptions. However, the authors find no associations between employees’ perceptions and the analyst forecast benchmarks.

The authors recognize the amount of variation among the two groups’ perceptions from the binary variable creates an inherent limitation that the authors examine the best firms in terms of employee perceptions compared to the second-best firms. Therefore, the authors create another measure, EMPLOYEE_PERCEPTION2, which equals one if the firm’s ranking is within the top quartile and zero if the firm’s ranking is within the bottom quartile. This new variable increases the variation of employees’ perceptions in the sample to address the inherent limitation by allowing us to compare the best firms to the worst firms in the sample.

The study highlights the importance of beating earnings benchmarks for employees as a broader group of stakeholders. The study contributes to accounting benchmarks literature by exploring a different group of earnings benchmarks users. The authors also contribute to psychology studies by providing empirical evidence on the previously untested, intuitive prediction that employees’ views depend on a firm’s ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks.

Prior literature has revealed three key earnings benchmarks: earnings level; earnings change; and analysts’ expectations. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors seek to establish which earnings benchmark induces the largest extent of earnings management. Second, the authors explore the implications of earnings management on firm future performance. Both of these purposes are investigated for Chinese listed companies during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era.

The authors rely upon the unique regulations and incentives for Chinese listed companies in order to develop four testable hypotheses. Next, the authors employ both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to test the hypotheses.

The results suggest that Chinese listed firms have the highest level of income increasing discretionary accruals around the earnings level benchmark, followed by the earnings change benchmark. The authors do not find any evidence of earnings management to beat analysts’ expectation. In addition, the authors find evidence that Chinese listed firms with relatively high level of earnings management and low earnings exhibit relatively weak future stock performance.

The findings are the first to document an earnings management benchmark hierarchy with respect to the extent of income increasing discretionary accruals, while simultaneously establishing a link between earnings management and firm future stock performance, for Chinese listed companies. The findings are valuable for regulators and investors by suggesting that management intervention in the reporting process during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era may act to circumvent delisting regulations and cloud earnings signal for firms that beat certain earnings benchmarks.

The purpose of this paper is to examine stock price crash risk (SPCR) as a function of meeting or missing three earnings thresholds – reporting a profit (earnings level), reporting an earnings increase (earnings change) and meeting analysts’ forecasts (earnings expectation).

The authors rely upon the research design of Herrmann et al. (2011) to identify the incremental impact of the earnings level and earnings change benchmarks on SPCR, after controlling for the effects of meeting or missing analysts’ expectations.

The authors find that meeting analysts’ expectations is negatively associated with SPCR, and this relationship strengthens with the magnitude of the unexpected earnings. However, the authors find little evidence of incremental threshold effects to suggest that earnings level and earnings change benchmarks are critical thresholds with respect to SPCR. Our results are robust after including a number of control variables.

This study contributes to the literature that investigates determinants of SPCR while simultaneously providing new evidence to conclusions that analysts’ earnings forecast is at the top of the earnings benchmark hierarchy.

This paper aims to examine whether firms meeting or just beating an earnings benchmark engage in tone management in earnings conference calls to complement earnings management in the UK context. It also investigates whether the audience tone in beating or just meeting earnings fails to predict future performance.

This study was performed using a sample of non-financial UK firms listed in the FTSE 350 index over the period 2010–2015.

The findings show that firms that exercise more earnings management to meet or just beat earnings are positively associated with the abnormal tone during earnings conference calls. The outcomes also reveal that the audience’s tone of firms meeting or just beating an earnings benchmark fails to predict future performance. This confirms the effectiveness of the tone management in managing the perception of audience.

This study highlights the need for increased accountability by firms on earnings conference call. It also supports academics and practitioners in understanding the management discretion used in reporting and communication during the earnings conference call. Overall, the results of this study are beneficial for regulators, policymakers and professionals, regarding confirming the need for the earnings conference calls to be regulated.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the association between earnings management and tone management in the UK earnings conference calls. It adds to the existing literature by examining the self-serving behaviour of managerial tone during earnings conference calls within a sitting in which meeting or just beating a benchmark is used. Unlike several studies that explain the behaviour of tone as a signalling strategy, this study reveals that the tendency of impression management behaviour can explain the tone management.

Recent literature suggests that sin firms (firms in tobacco, gambling and alcohol industries) have lower institutional ownership, fewer analysts following, higher abnormal returns and higher financial reporting quality. This study aims to investigate empirically how sin firms engage in real activities manipulation (RAM) to meet earnings benchmarks in comparison to non-sin firms.

The authors examine two types of RAM, namely, Cutting discretionary expenditures including research and development (R&D), SG&A and advertising to boost earnings. Extending deep discount or lenient credit terms to boost sales and/or overproducing to decrease COGS to increase gross profit. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), the authors use abnormal discretionary expenditures as the proxy for expenditure reduction manipulation and abnormal production costs as the proxy for COGS manipulation.

The results for the abnormal discretionary expense model suggest that sin firms do not engage in RAM of advertising, R&D, SG&A expense to just meet earnings benchmarks. The results for the production costs model suggest that sin firms do not engage in COGS manipulation to just meet earnings benchmarks. The results are robust after controlling accrual-based earnings management (AEM). Overall, in this setting, these results suggest that managers of sin firms engage less in RAM to meet earnings benchmarks.

The findings are of interest to investors, auditors, regulators and academics with respect to financial statement analysis and earnings quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate earnings management by firms reporting a small profit or a small loss after the recent evidence that the discontinuity around zero earnings has disappeared.

Using a large sample of US firms for the period 2002–2011, regression analysis and earnings distribution approach are employed to examine the earnings management of small-profit and small-loss firms in terms of both accruals management and real activities manipulation.

The results suggest that both small-profit and small-loss firms are engaged in upward manipulation of accruals and real activities. This implies that failure to document a difference between firms to the right and left of zero by prior studies is not due to small-profit firms not managing earnings, but rather this is more attributable to loss firms engaging in upward manipulation. Furthermore, it is indicated that the discontinuity around the distribution of earnings change has also recently disappeared as firms reporting a small earnings decrease demonstrate similar earnings management behaviour to those reporting a small earnings increase.

This study is subject to the measurement error which is a common limitation in the earnings management literature.

The results suggest that the users should be aware that, in addition to firms that meet benchmarks by a slight margin, firms narrowly missing benchmarks are also involved in earnings management.

This study shows that the disappearance of the discontinuity around zero earnings and zero change in earnings should not be interpreted as a sign of no earnings management. It also explains how earnings management could have contributed to the disappearance of the discontinuities in earnings distribution.

The authors propose an alternative robust technique to test for discontinuities in distributions and provide consistent evidence of discontinuities around zero for both scaled and unscaled earnings levels and changes. The advantage of the proposed test is that it does not rely on arbitrary choice of bin width choices.

To evaluate the power of the test, the authors examine the density function of non-discretionary earnings and detect no evidence of discontinuities around zero in levels and changes of these non-discretionary earnings. As robustness, the authors use pre-managed earnings excluding accrual and real manipulation and find similar evidence.

The finding using our technique support the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) interpretation on earnings management, even for smaller sample sizes and reject the theory that discontinuities arise from scaling and sampling methods.

The study provides an overview of those studies that support and those that oppose using “testing for discontinuities” as a way to examine earnings management. The authors advance the literature by providing an alternative methodology supporting the view that the kink in the distribution represents earnings management.

This paper aims to examine the extent to which real earnings management (REM) is used in Jordan to meet zero or previous year's earnings, and how this impacts the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms.

The study used a sample of 98 Jordanian listed firms over the 2010–2018 period. To test the research hypotheses, which are formulated in accordance with both, agency theory and signalling theory, multivariate regression is performed using a pooled OLS estimation. Additionally, a two-step dynamic generalised method of moment (GMM) model has been estimated to address any concerns regarding the potential occurrence of endogeneity issues.

The results show that Jordanian firms that meet zero or last year's earnings tend to exhibit evidence of real activities manipulations. More specifically, suspect firms show unusually low abnormal discretionary expenses and unusually high abnormal production costs. Further, consistent with the signalling earnings management argument, the authors find that abnormal real-based activities intended to meet zero earnings or previous year's earnings potentially improve the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. This implies that REM is not totally opportunistic, but it can be used to enhance the subsequent operating performance of Jordanian firms. Our findings are robust to alternative proxies and endogeneity concerns.

The findings have several implications for policymakers, regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain REM practices to enhance financial reporting quality in Jordan. Managing earnings by reducing discretionary expenses appeared to be the most convenient way to manipulate earnings in Jordan. It provides flexibility in terms of time and the amount of spending. The empirical evidence, therefore, reiterates the crucial necessity to refocus the efforts of internal and external auditors on limiting this type of manipulation to reduce the occurrence of REM activities and enhance the subsequent operating performance of listed firms in Jordan. Drawing on Al-Haddad and Whittington (2019), the evidence also urges regulators and standards setters to develop a more effective enforcement mechanism for corporate governance provisions in Jordan to minimise the likelihood of REM incidence.

This study contributes to the body of the accounting literature by providing the first empirical evidence in the Middle East region overall on the use of REM to meet zero or previous year earnings by Jordanian firms. Moreover, the study is the first to empirically examine the relationship between REM and Jordanian firms' future operating performance.

This study aims to verify the circumstances under which managing the allowance for uncollectible accounts is used as a tool of earnings management.

The authors investigate whether bad debt expense, which is an income statement counterpart of allowance for uncollectible accounts, is adjusted downward when pre-managed earnings is slightly above zero earnings, prior year’s earnings or analysts’ forecasts.

The findings of this study show that firms manage bad debt expense downward to avoid losses, sustain the prior year’s earnings and meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. The authors also find that the understatement of bad debt expense to meet earnings benchmarks is pronounced for firms with high tax costs.

Standard setters and auditors can gain a better understanding in detail of the practices and methods of managing earnings via the allowance for uncollectible accounts.

This study is the first to examine earnings management via the allowance for uncollectible accounts in non-financial Korean firms. In addition, the findings provide the evidence that firms prefer to use the allowance for uncollectible accounts as a strategic tool to meet benchmarks, especially when their tax costs are high.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether earnings boosts before the year end trigger earnings management. It examines whether firms that substantially outperformed their last year earnings during the first three quarters push their earnings down to avoid reporting earnings boosts.

Regression analysis is used to compare earnings management of firms with earnings boosts and other firms.

The results indicate that firms outperforming their last year results by the end of the third quarter manipulate their earnings downwards by means of real activities manipulation, while they do not indicate income-decreasing accruals management. It is also found that consistent with the prominent shift from accruals management to real activities manipulation, accruals management is less costly which justifies why it is used for downward manipulation.

The results are limited to one single earnings benchmark i.e. last year earnings. Further research may individually or collectively examine other benchmarks including analysts' forecasts.

The findings suggest that users should be more vigilant of firms exceeding their last year interim results, as they could be involved in downward earnings management.

This study documents earnings management in a new setting where earnings boosts before the year end trigger downward manipulation of real activities.