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The paper aims to provide a longitudinal view of successful turnaround phases and of how management accounting practices played a significant role in improving performance in one company.

The company provided internal documents to cover the period of the study and permitted access to key individuals who were able to elaborate and clarify the motives which underpinned the numbers reported and the strategies employed.

The success of the corporate turnaround appeared to be attributable to an effective leadership style that was able to motivate and support the employees whilst making strategic changes to the organization's capital, financial well‐being and operations.

Recognition of the key factors in the turnaround process has implications for the implementation of corporate recovery strategies elsewhere.

Sara Lee Corporation's acquisition binge in the 1980s and 1990s left the company with a portfolio of vastly different businesses operating independently of one another. It had experienced rapid top-line growth, but at the same time cash flows had declined. Sara Lee ignored both internal and external warning signs until a major transformation plan became necessary. This case examines the company's multiple turnaround attempts. The learning objective of the case is to analyze “early stage” turnaround efforts by examining how the company found itself in decline, evaluating its attempts to improve its performance, and assessing the turnaround plan.

(1) Learn to identify a specific challenging moment when reading and analyzing a turnaround plan; (2) address the implementation problems of an early stage turnaround and discuss exit options; (3) evaluate when a change of long-held beliefs and decades-long strategy by a company is warranted; (4) evaluate Sara Lee's marketing strategies in light of the disappointed retail and wholesale customers; and (5) show the similarities in traits between turnaround managers and high-growth entrepreneurs.

Strategy.

The case can primarily be used for a Strategic Management course for teaching the revival strategies for financially weak plants. The case highlights the need to shift from a product manufacturing perspective to a market orientation perspective and, hence, may add value as an add-on case in a Strategic Marketing course. The case also covers the topic of benchmarking which may be of use in an Operations Management course.

DJSL Ltd. is the largest engineering and manufacturing enterprise in India in the energy-related/infrastructure space in the public sector. Its Lucknow unit, manufacturing porcelain insulators and wear resistant ceramic lining (CERA LINING), has started reporting losses. A change of management took place in October 2015, whereby Mr. S P Singh was appointed as the Head of the Lucknow Unit. Mr. Singh had rich functional experience of 30 years, mainly in the domains of strategy, project execution and commercial aspects. He was asked to come up with a revival plan for the Unit by the top management of DJSL. The case highlights the importance of operational issues in turnaround management.

Students may be encouraged to debate the benchmarking practices that are best suited for the Lucknow unit. They can also discuss the impact of benchmarking efforts upon turnaround strategy. Students are also encouraged to understand the constraints which may limit the success of initiatives impacting operational improvements. Students need to develop the understanding of marketing strategy to perform a SWOT analysis of each product of the Lucknow unit and to sense the business opportunities in and around the environment. Students need to discuss how productivity may be improved with the adoption of appropriate people development strategies. Students are encouraged to discuss the revival/turnaround strategies and to identify the influence of improvement in operational efficiency/productivity upon revival plan.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

CSS: 11: Strategy.

Middleby Corporation was a designer and manufacturer of commercial food processing and food service equipment for fast food as well as high-end restaurants. During the latter half of the 1990s, Middleby became increasingly unfocused as its number of product lines increased dramatically. Margins and sales slipped. At the same time, some of the company's high-profile product development initiatives ended in failure. Although Middleby's top management recognized some of these apparent warning signs, rather than take action, they seemed eager to blame the disappointing results solely on the company's overseas operations. This inaction caused Middleby's financial performance to deteriorate further, resulting in violations of its loan covenants. To finally correct the situation, Selim Bassoul was moved from his role as general manager of Middleby's Southbend plant up to chief operating officer for the entire corporation. Bassoul had taken the underperforming Southbend plant and turned it into a star performer, correcting and improving customer service, operations, and finances and establishing a clear strategic direction. Bassoul had to craft a turnaround plan for the entire company in the areas of strategy, operations, and finance. He cut the number of products substantially, fired some key customers after a customer profitability analysis, and focused product development on innovative products that saved Middleby's customers time and money. Following these changes and others, the company returned to profitability and Bassoul was named CEO. Bassoul then decided to present a major acquisition opportunity to the board of directors.

1. Successful turnarounds require three essential elements to be addressed: strategy, finance, and operations, all under the CEO's leadership. Students will learn how each element alone and in combination work to make a successful turnaround. 2. Students will learn turnaround leadership skills and see their parallel as entrepreneurial leadership skills. 3. Students will learn that decisions on products, customers, and employee motivation all affect a turnaround strategy.

Most mature organizations face a major decline in performance at some time during their existence. For more than three decades, it has been suggested that the management practices that could cure a troubled company could have also kept it well. Inspired by this concept, this paper is proposing a preventive approach to early implementation of turnaround strategies as an alternative for otherwise traumatic rescue efforts, further along the downward spiral.

Corporate turnaround strategies and associated risks are integrated with a risk-based approach, along with a proactive decision-making process. The link between turnaround research, resource-based view, the sources of organizational decline, and the governance of organizational-decline-related risks – is explained.

The integrated model streamlines a preventive organizational process for considering the suitability of commonly used turnaround practices – for the non-crisis business routine of a mature company. By considering and adjusting the risks associated with such practices, it addresses risk aversion at the early stages of decline and determines the optimal sequence and timing of retrenchment and recovery activities. As such, it encourages mature companies to take actions for reducing their exposure to organizational decline. Accordingly, the model is named the “Anti-Aging” framework.

Empirical testing of the suitability of turnaround strategies for non-crisis situations is proposed as a direction for future research.

The Anti-Aging framework opens an opportunity for the senior management of a mature organization to respond earlier to organizational decline and avoid the trauma associated with otherwise more challenging conditions, for the benefit of all stakeholders.

The Anti-Aging framework proposes an innovative way of bridging the gap between the benefits of early implementation of turnaround strategies, and major obstacles faced by willing, traditional management teams of mature organizations.

Existing models of decline and turnaround assume an automatic initiation of a turnaround strategy when decline occurs. However, extended decline over time suggests that the turnaround strategy did not match the causality and severity of the situation. Borrowing from the crisis management literature, this paper argues that a triggering event or events needs to shock incumbent management into realizing that different action is called for. Such triggering events, or triggers, also play a role in the turnaround process by influencing strategies and inducing management changes. Incorporating the need for, and role of, triggers in understanding the decline/turnaround sequence helps explain the iterative and non‐sequential nature of this process.

The purpose of this paper is to report on a research study aimed at comparing the causes of organisational decline and turnaround strategies involved in cases of successful and unsuccessful turnarounds, with a view to identifying the differences, if any, between the two groups, which in turn is expected to provide useful information to academics, practitioners and policy makers.

Since turnaround is a business phenomenon of general interest, their stories are often published in business periodicals, which are a rich source of data on them. In order to tap this data source, the present paper employed a method of content analysis for the proposed investigation on the cause of organisational decline and turnaround strategies used. In order to quantify the data, a three-point scale was developed, where the presence of a cause/strategy is rated as “3”, its ambivalence as “2” and its absence as “1”, whose validity was assessed through the inter-rater agreement indices. The data thus generated are amenable to statistical analyses, using which the more commonly prevalent causes of organisational decline and the strategies commonly employed for turnaround by the successful and unsuccessful companies are identified.

The findings of the present study have generated a few useful insights. First, the primary causes for organisational decline are the internal weaknesses of the organisation; in fact the external changes can adversely affect the organisation only if it is internally weak. Second, organisational decline caused by multiple factors (which is usually the case) can be managed effectively by adopting a variety of strategies; hence a single-pronged strategy is often found to be ineffective. Third, the more successful turnarounds had a diverse portfolio of strategies including those of institution-building, often employed in a phased manner, consistent with the stage theories of turnaround.

The limitations of this research arise mainly from the generation of data from published sources and the consequent biases, which can be managed, to a large extent, by using multiple sources for the same case for reducing the publishers’ biases as well as by having multiple raters for identifying the researcher’s biases, if any.

The study has highlighted the need for addressing the internal causes of organisational decline on a priority-basis rather than blaming the external factors, besides pointing to the need for adopting a variety of strategies for dealing with the diversity of causes affecting the organisation’s health, particularly the need for institutionalising the changes. These findings can be of help especially to turnaround managers and policy-makers in dealing with organisational decline and thus contribute to the creation and enhancement of economic value.

The process of business decline can be identified through various warning signals that are concomitant with the decline process. These warning signals are noticed in both the internal and external business environments. The successful turnaround of a failing or declining business requires that management analyze the causes of decline and then implement a strategy for reversal of the decline. This article addresses the signals of decline, internal and external business environments and the strategies for reversal of decline.

In empirical research and practitioner guides, turnaround processes tend to be described in terms of discrete stages and strategies. Though necessary, this characterization belies the twists and turns of turnaround leadership. The purpose of this paper is to expand the assumptions of how turnaround proceeds in linear chronos time with the sensibilities of kairos time or the “right” time for turnaround leadership moves.

This study is an exploratory qualitative multi-case study with principals and their key supports (assistant principals, district leaders, teacher leaders) in four public turnaround schools. The grounded theory analysis conceptualizes the experiences of turnaround principals in flexible, complex ways.

The findings begin with a metaphor and definition of “shifting gears” at chronos and kairos times that emphasizes how turnaround principals make adaptive, agentic adjustments when moving forward through changing terrain. The second half of findings describes each principal’s experiences and reflections on their discernment of the right times for change within a chronological trajectory of turnaround. In addition, the leaders described shifting gears as strategic and responsive to contexts, sometimes taking a psychological toll.

Expanding notions of time in turnaround re-centers turnaround leaders as engaging in intellectually and emotionally demanding work. Such recognition challenges future research to address experiences and emotions in dynamic contexts. Hence, with this study, preparation programs and state and local systems may adjust holistic supports and leadership pipelines to sustain turnaround leaders.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey of the empirical literature on environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) estimation of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions over the period of 1991–2017.

This survey categorizes the studies on the basis of power of income in empirical models of EKC. It has been hypothesized that the EKC shows an inverted U-shaped association between economic growth and CO₂ emissions.

For all the contexts, the results of EKC estimation for CO₂ emissions are inconclusive in nature. The reasons behind this discrepancy can be attributed to the choice of contexts, time period, explanatory variables, and methodological adaptation.

The future studies in this context should not only consider new set of variables (e.g. corruption index, social indicators, political scenario, energy research and development expenditures, foreign capital inflows, happiness, population education structure, public investment toward alternate energy exploration, etc.), but also the data set should be refined, so that the EKC estimation issues raised by Stern (2004) can be addressed.

By far, no study in the literature of ecological economics has focused on the empirical estimation of EKC for CO₂ emissions. This particular context has been used for this study, as CO₂ is one of the highest studied pollutants in the ecological economics, and especially within the EKC hypothesis framework.