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In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chains have become important policy tools to ensure the security and resilience of regional trading blocs of major economies. The US government’s focus on supply chains for selected strategic industries and the EU Commission’s renewed efforts to strengthen its supply chains using ‘sustainability standards’ coincides with the global trend in the shift towards digital and low-carbon economies. Furthermore, the rising tensions between the US and China, with no signs of reconciliation over key issues of contention, have emphasized the need for more credibility and trust in global supply chains. However, such policies also have the potential to serve as new barriers to participation in supply chains by less-developed economies which are not yet prepared to meet the high-level sustainability criteria which aim for higher protection of the environment and labor rights. There also seems to be an apparent shift in paradigm supporting the interventionist role of government that emphasize the need for more discretion for policy objectives that pursue societal and democratic values, not to mention national security interests. The current rules of international trade, however, do not sufficiently address these new issues and need to be realigned in order to meet the new demands. The current ‘rules of the game’ need to be reinforced in order to accommodate the rising need of countries for increased consideration of issues of sustainability and competitiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to outline how the EU figures out the importance of strengthening its relations with Egypt as one of the most strategic countries in the region to keep the union secured and stable. The paper also assesses to what extent the EU succeeds to promote democracy in Egypt.

The EU pursues its policy through a series of both bilateral and multilateral agreements with Egypt aiming at positioning their relations in a strategic context. The research adopted different approaches as descriptive and analytical ones.

Following the Arab uprisings, the EU was caught by surprise and announced a paradigm shift in its relations and introduced a set of policies to foster democracy promotion that witnessed some successes but with extremely modest results in some areas compared to the costs of the process. The EU succeeded in important reforms in trade liberalization while it did not bring clear changes in the political arena in Egypt.

The findings of this paper convey that the Arab uprisings were a wake-up call for the EU. It was the right time for the EU to conduct such a strategic and sincere reflection based on the role it wants to play in the changing region. In addition, findings prove that the EU’s response to revolutionary events has been weak and hesitant, and the EU has not an effective role in promoting democracy in Egypt.

This chapter summarises the role of EU actions in supporting healthcare policies in the EU Member States, both looking at implemented actions and describing current priorities for the future. It argues that these coordinated actions can be beneficial for EU Member States by helping them to avoid duplication of effort and to attain economies of scale. Moreover, data sharing with proper safeguards can unleash vast amount of ‘learning what works’ both for medical treatments and for healthcare sustainability measures. The need for this common learning appears ever more urgent while facing the health and economic consequences of the present pandemic.

Is the need for stability pre-empting the need for democratic values? How can the EU cope with two contradictory security requirements: the need to promote democratic norms and to secure geostrategic interests? This paper takes on the security-democracy dilemma in a complex way that transcends the realpolitik frame overshadowing the analysis of the EU’s policy orientation in the Southern Mediterranean while considering its normative role as a fig leaf for security interests.

This paper investigates the EU’s foreign policy orientation reflected in the ENP in terms of the two logics of action of consequentialism and appropriateness. Tracing changes at the policy level over time between 2011 and 2015, the paper zooms into the implementation of the “new” ENP in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to highlight additional variation across countries.

Building on a document analysis of the official declarations for the policy-making level and of ENP action plans for the implementation level, the paper argues that local political dynamics and the level of the EU’s threat perception shape the EU’s response to the partner countries.

The purpose of this paper is to identify knowledge gaps on insinuations of possible directions of European Union (EU) and international climate policies.

This study has used participatory approach of highly experienced stakeholders’ engagement, involved directly or indirectly in the process of policymaking. A range of priority issues has been initially identified through desk analysis and key stakeholders have been selected and invited to partake in the process. Preliminary results have been validated through interaction with stakeholders during a series of workshops.

The results show the identification of a series of sectors, where climate policy is expected to focus in the future and the definition of 11 specific topics upon which knowledge gaps are expected to appear. Results on the identified knowledge needs are analysed and categorized by each prioritized main topic and compared with literature findings. Emphasis is identified to be placed on the topics of renewable energy, EU climate policy and international climate negotiations, which are the most popular ones, followed by energy policy and energy efficiency.

A key element of the approach is the consideration of key experts’ feedback on their specific area of expertise, instead of general public engagement, therefore leading to accurate results. Despite the fact that our approach was applied to a specific problem, the overall analysis could provide a framework for supporting applications in various problems in the field of priorities’ identification and even expanding to decision-making problems.

This paper defines the emerging intermodal issues, identifies alternative solutions and develops strategies to achieve them. It reviews intermodal logistics policies in the EU, NAFTA and Asia, focusing on the United States and Japan in NAFTA and Asia respectively, because they have been the prominent motors of international trade in their regions. From an Asian standpoint, it is a pity that it is not yet possible to report on a common intermodal strategy.

This study aims to establish the position of the European Union (EU-28) countries in the dynamics of international trade openness linkages and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) in correlation with the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, research and development (R&D) expenditures, innovation capability and information and communication technology (ICT) adoption.

In the panel data set, comparative analyses were applied to scatter diagrams, correlation and regression analyses and structural equation models using Eurostat and World Economic Forum (WEF) data for the EU-28 countries in the period 2008–2019.

The empirical results did not confirm the hypotheses that a positive correlation exists between GCI and trade openness indicators and between GDP per capita and GCI. The ICT adoption and innovation capability increase GCI, which affects GDP per capita.

The empirical results provide a better understanding of the importance of trade policies, particularly in terms of trade openness and trade shares of the EU-28 countries, as it could contribute to increasing the GCI of the EU-28 countries. Furthermore, the results of this study underline the importance of ICT adoption and innovation capability and the need for appropriate government policies that improve global competitiveness.

This study, through empirical analysis, demonstrates the existence of correlations between trade openness (exports as % of GDP, imports as % of GDP and export market shares as % of world trade), R&D expenditures, innovation capability, ICT adoption, GDP per capita and the GCI in the EU-28 countries. In addition, this study contributes managerial and policy-based implications on driving forces of global competitiveness.

The European Union (EU) has notified its revised Generalized System of Preference (GSP) on 31 October, 2012 which will come into effect from 1 January, 2014. The EU is also in the process of, or contemplating, to sign Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with many developing countries. Recently, EU has officially announced initiation of FTA negotiations with USA. Such preferential tariff arrangements could lead to significant erosion of preferences enjoyed currently by the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In this backdrop, the main objective of the present study is to investigate the economic impacts originating from preference erosion in the EU market which could potentially affect LDCs in general, Bangladesh in particular. In this context, a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis has been developed by using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database to explore the aggregate impact of the preferential erosion as well as sectoral implications for which different partial equilibrium analyses were used. The analysis evince that if the EU eliminates all tariffs for Pakistan, India and Vietnam, Bangladesh's real GDP could decrease by 0.27 percent whilst welfare loss could be to the tune of US$ 54 million. Total exports to the EU will be reduced by 0.18 percent; consequently, Bangladesh’s terms of trade and exports of textiles and clothing could be fall by about 1 percent. The product level disaggregated analysis using RCA and unit price of major items also indicate that a number of products including textiles and clothing will be confronted with formidable market access difficulties in the EU.

The aim of this article is to investigate how the use of financial instruments influences the development of Regional Development Funds (RFR) in Poland and to assess the maturity and coherence of the regional development financing system in this country.

The methodology is based on the multilevel governance literature and on data collected during 26 in-depth interviews in regional, national and international institutions.

The authors demonstrate that the use of financial instruments stimulates new kinds of cooperation between several institutions and contributes to the establishment of RFR. The authors also show that the Polish regional financing system is still developing and formulate recommendations about necessary improvements.

The main contribution of this article, in addition to taking up a new, relevant topic for the regional development policy in countries benefiting from European Union (EU) cohesion policy, is the application of the multilevel governance (MLG) concept to explain the development of the Polish regional development financing system. Moreover, the significant added value of this study comes from the use of data collected during 26 in-depth interviews (IDI) in regional, national and international institutions on the use of repayable instruments in regional development policy.

Unique among European Union (EU) economic governance entities and multilateral banks, the European Investment Bank (EIB) possesses a dual nature, as an EU body and a bank. The EIB has been ever evolving to adapt to policy and market developments and to reflect the geo-economic landscape. In 2019, in association with the EU's Green Deal, the bank announced its metamorphosis into a “Climate Bank,” ending its fossil fuel lending after 2021. Additionaly, upon the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) and its attendant health and economy crisis, EU decision-makers have solicited the bank to support both urgent needs for tackling and countering the spread of the disease and the post-pandemic economic recovery. Nevertheless, devastated economic actors in need of assistance fall within many sectors, including some less green ones.

This article is grounded on agency theory for developing a generic stakeholder framework, which is then subsequently applied in investigating the EIB, in interaction with its main stakeholders.

This article investigates the EIB stakeholders in pursuing these two seemingly contradictory objectives of exclusively restricting its activity to green funding and expanding its action for achieving a broad impact in the real economy. By exploring this tension, the article argues that by prioritizing the post-COVID restart, the EIB risks to deviate from its strict green commitment.

The analysis of the EIB's divergent stakeholder stances demonstrates some ambivalence in future EIB activity in an effort to equipoise climate finance with a post-pandemic boost. The same ambivalence might equally occur with other major economic governance actors. The stakeholder framework developed and applied in the case of the EIB can be useful for studying also the stakeholder dynamics of other organizations.

The analysis demonstrates a tension between selective climate-related funding for “building back better” and the need for a wide broaching of countercyclical stimulus, with implications for economic and social actors alike.

The approach is novel, as it develops a new analytical framework for understanding stakeholder dynamics and tests it empirically on the EIB. This constitutes the first study of EIB stakeholder management.