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The Treaty drafting the Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004. The Constitution provided for a federal form of government. Signatories to the Treaty included all heads of state or government of the 25 Member States of the European Union (EU). As per the EU principle of consensus, it requires unanimous approval by all Member States to become effective. As per protocol, the two – Bulgaria and Romania – who joined the EU in 2007, accepted the Treaty.

The prevalence of anti-EU integration and anti-immigration rhetoric across the continent, the increased presence of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament, and most importantly Brexit suggest that the European Union is having an existential crisis. This chapter debates the role of the EU citizenship regime on this crisis, by resting its central thesis that there is a fundamental mismatch between the way that EU citizenship is at present derived from Member State citizenship, and the transnational affinity of the EU citizenry that is invited by the internal market and migration. As a remedy, the chapter projects a supranational EU citizenship regime that coexists with the current EU citizenship regime. Focussing on the social and political imperatives, the chapter brings forward tangible policy recommendations for the proposed EU citizenship regime and expounds how it can be an effective policy instrument for the EU’s internal and external struggles.

In just a short half century, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a paradigm of supranational, continent-based, integrated single economy with its micro- and macroeconomic parameters. The process began soon after World War II. The initial steps, which started with the Benelux Customs Union and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of France and Germany in 1951, soon progressed to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (see Chapter 1). A unique framework of Free Trade Area (FTA) came into existence. Its success called for the Single Europe Act (SEA) in 1986, followed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, whereby a select group of sovereign nation state economies on one common geography volunteered to become one single economy. The Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty of Nice followed. The EU-25 as of 2004, on to the EU-27 as of 2007, became an epochal event.

The European Union (EU) is not a state, though it has some statelike attributes; it is not an empire, though it includes many former European imperial powers; and it is not a federation, though Euro-federalists seek to make it one. There is, however, no need to argue that the Union is a singularity, nor to invent novel terminology, such as that deployed by “neo-functionalists” and “intergovernmentalists” to capture its legal and political form. The EU is a confederation, but with consociational characteristics in its decision-making styles. This conceptualization facilitates understanding and helps explain the patterns of crises within the Union.

The purpose of this study is to assess how the recent financial and economic crisis has affected European Union (EU) member states’ ability to attract intellectual capital. The issue was found to be relevant, as one of the key elements of competitiveness today is the ability to attract intellectual capital and the question how the recent financial and economic crisis has changed this ability of EU member states can be asked. The question is relevant in relation to the diversity of effects that the crisis had on EU member states, including, the different levels of real economy adjustment constraints.

The concept of competitiveness applied by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in constructing the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) was used. Based on selected WEF GCI sub-indicators and the WEF’s methodology, we a new index named “Ability to attract intellectual capital” was generated. EU member states’ performance was compared along this indicator for the 2007-2008 (pre-crisis) and the 2013-2014 (post-crisis) periods. In this way, EU member states can be ranked before and after the crisis; their performance can be compared in the two periods, relatively to each other, and in relation to their performance along other relevant indices.

The findings show interesting results. First, many peripheral EU member states, deeply affected by the crisis, could considerably improve their relative positions between 2007 and 2013. Second, the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries show a rather mixed picture, drawing up rather different individual development paths. Third, the advancements in some countries do not imply that overall convergence is proceeding in the EU. Nevertheless, some countries have not wasted the “good” crisis to take those steps of structural reform.

Because we only look at two time periods (pre-and post-crisis), the authors are not able to describe the processes that were going on in the EU member states during the years of the crisis; the results can only show the difference between the two periods. Furthermore, there may be other methodological approaches to countries’ abilities to attract intellectual capital that may bring results different from this study’s results. For the countries who, according to our investigations, could improve these abilities, enhanced competitiveness is likely to occur in a few years’ time.

For those countries aiming at improving their abilities to attract intellectual capital, or for EU policy design, this research may provide useful results. Moreover, not only this study’s results but also the methodology can be used by others, for other purposes: to compare different years, different sets of countries included in the WEF GCI or even along different dimensions.

This study’s research findings, the authors believe, will help EU member states and the EU as a whole in getting to know their abilities to attract intellectual capital better. In the introductory part of this paper, the aim was also to collect arguments from the economic theory to explain why such abilities are crucial for future competitiveness of countries.

The methodology that was used is the adoption of WEF methodology, and the data are from the WEF GCI dataset. However, to the authors’s knowledge, no other research work has applied this methodology on this set of WEF GCI sub-indicators, with such purposes as to compare EU member states’ abilities to attract intellectual capital before and after the crisis.

The difficulties of enacting a constitution for the European Union (EU) reflect the basic problem: What kind of federation is it? The Union has gone through a number of extensions and at the same time has been capable of deepening the integration between member states. The huge 2004 enlargement of the EU to 25 member states poses the question whether this combination of extension and deepening really will go on any longer in the coming years. The risks connected with the entire endeavour have increased with the huge enlargement in 2004, as reflected in the still unresolved issue of the decision-making rules of the key body, the Council.

In this article, fiscal redistribution in the European Union (EU) of 15 member states and the enlarged EU is analyzed. Specifically, net fiscal transfers between EU member states are analyzed, i.e. which countries are net beneficiaries, which are net contributors and what factors affect countries' net fiscal balances. The results show that, at present, fiscal transfers among EU member states are partly explained by differences in countries' relative economic prosperity and partly by institutional features that systematically favor smaller EU member states. Small member states can use their overrepresentation in the Council votes to obtain more benefits than their level of economic development alone would justify. If the pre-enlargement level of redistribution is extended to include the new member states, the net costs could amount to 60 billion euros. This means that the net fiscal balance of the current member states would decrease significantly. Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice does not change the malapportionment of Council votes and European Parliament seats, which gives an advantage to small member states in bargaining for transfers

The European Union has pursued two contradictory policies over the last decade in response to the challenges of globalization. On the one hand, the EU has loosened borders to facilitate trade and make the EU more competitive globally. On the other hand, the EU has tightened borders to enhance its security, fearing the negative consequences of a globalized world. In this paper, I examine the effects of implementation of the EU's Schengen border regime, a set of rules governing external border control, on the post-communist countries and the difficulties that Schengen has posed for the governments in the region. I also discuss the EU's emerging European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), designed to address many of the concerns voiced by the Central and East European (CEE) officials regarding Schengen. An important element of ENP is to work across the EU external border to facilitate economic relations and develop joint institutions with non-members to create new cooperative borderlands.

Two images are frequently invoked with regard to the evolution of the EU. Certain scholars portray the organization as moving toward a new, post-modern, post-Westphalian entity comprising an increasingly borderless Europe. Other scholars view European integration as a process by which the EU is increasingly taking on the trappings and functions of the state to build a “Fortress Europe.” The discussion of Schengen and the eastern enlargement suggests a more complex reality than either of these two images in which borders are constantly shifting and whose functions are changing in response to the different challenges posed by globalization and internal developments. The EU's external borders will continue to change, both in terms of where they are located and how important these will be. Europe's ENP, with its emphasis on cross-border cooperation, is changing borders into borderlands, zones of cooperation and collaboration across a line on a map. Governance and the shaping of policy are increasingly taking place at multiple sites and with different kinds of actors, further transforming the importance of borders. Perhaps, a new vision of European integration is needed to capture the evolution of the EU.