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Risk-sharing is a crucial issue in order to evaluate the performance of a monetary union. By implementing conventional econometric techniques, this paper intends to estimate the degree of risk-sharing through the cross-ownership of assets within 11 European countries in the period 1971–2014. We show that risk-sharing has been increasing after the launch of the euro due to increased cross-ownership of assets. Nevertheless, we also show that despite the extreme needs for adjustment mechanisms as a reaction to asymmetric shocks in the EMU during the crises, the estimated market risk-sharing mechanism seems to have remained marginal in this period. We also show that the degree of asymmetry (potential benefits from risk-sharing) has declined with the start of the EMU, but it has sharply increased during the crises period. This implies that EMU countries have needed good functioning risk-sharing mechanisms during the crisis, while in this period their estimated performance does not seem to have improved. We interpret these results as the evidence of a missing element of the EMU that forced governments to intervene by means of fiscal policy to tackle the imbalances deriving from the financial crisis. Therefore, we conclude that the weakness in the risk-sharing has been one of the channels that allowed the global financial crisis to mutate in a sovereign debt crisis in the EMU.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

Purpose — Analyze and assess the actions taken by the government of Iceland prior to a banking crisis that resulted in the collapse of Iceland’s largest banks in October 2008. Was the government’s behavior prior to the crisis dishonest in the sense that it deliberately tried to fake reality or was the government honest but incompetent in the sense that it did not see the problem coming, and was therefore not trustworthy?Design/methodology/approach — Review of the existing literature, analysis, and assessment of this literature. Case study of Iceland.Findings — The government showed negligence and made mistakes by not taking credible actions to manage risks following a rapid cross-border expansion of Iceland’s largest banks. This had severe consequences and resulted in the collapse of the largest banks in October 2008. Instead of addressing the problems in the economy the government launched a PR campaign and the analysis of various scholars may have helped to justify inaction. According to the Special Investigation Commission (SIC),¹ the government did not address an obvious problem and could perhaps on that basis be charged with dishonesty, including faking reality with PR campaigns. As some scholars put it, the authorities gambled for resurrection, and failed. The analysis carried out by a number of other scholars who downplayed the problem may have confused the government and it may have been honest in its inaction. In that situation one can argue that the government was honest but incompetent and not trustworthy, as according to the SIC and several international scholars the problem was obvious.Research limitations/implications — This is a case study. The study does not present results that can be evaluated on the basis of statistical significance and generalized. Some of the lessons, however, can have a wider relevance than for Iceland only. This is especially true for small countries with a large banking sector, using its own currency, and with limited fiscal space to support the banks during a crisis.Practical implications — The combination of a risk seeking behavior of businesses, in this case in the banking sector, and inactive or negligent governments can result in the collapse of a country’s economy. The Icelandic government should encourage and enforce more risk mitigation via regulations, monitoring, and supervision of the private sector’s cross-border activities. This does not only apply to the banking sector but also to other sectors such as the energy sector.Social implications — Less risk seeking behavior and more risk mitigating actions can stabilize Iceland´s economic growth in the medium and long term, and reduce the risk of an economic collapse that typically has severe social consequences.Originality/value — The so-called Viking spirit of Icelandic business people accompanied with aggressive risk taking and bold business behavior can be very detrimental for a small economy especially when global economic and financial crisis hit.

Institutions underpin the operation of national economies. These differ significantly between countries reflecting varying historical paths, policy choices and national cultures. Moreover, they need to be understood systemically as an ensemble of relations between their component parts: financial systems, corporate governance, industrial relations, patterns of state intervention, etc., have evolved together so that their operation and effects tend to reinforce each other. Different countries faced by common exogenous changes will tend to evolve along different lines rather than converge. National institutions matter: they significantly affect economic performance and distribution.

The Asia Pacific region is a geographical appellation that many still feel with justification will be the dynamic economic arena for this century. Accepting this premise and acknowledging the importance of the role of finance in that development brings with it the imperative to gain a greater understanding of the unique financial characteristics of the region. This chapter has two major pursuits. The first goal is to provide some background on the various markets of the region. An understanding of institutional detail (size and scope) of the relevant markets affords a view that lends or detracts from the credibility of intermarket comparisons. An exposure to institutional detail also supplies information that may bear on the statistical results of the empirical analysis. The vital roles played by stock markets of pricing capital, issuing new shares, providing a liquidity-creating secondary feature, serving as a vehicle for asset transfer and providing a linkage to international capital markets are as important to emerging markets as to developed countries. However, fixed income markets are still not as well developed in emerging markets and therefore an even heavier capital sourcing burden is placed on emerging stock markets. The Asia Pacific region derivatives markets (futures and options) play their risk-transfer role in equity and fixed income areas and are integral to the scene. The second pursuit in this chapter is to provide a thumbnail sketch of each of the contributions. The summary will include the nature of the empirical work, the type of methodology or statistical technique applied, and the results. In addition the results will be viewed in light of any reinforcement or digression from a priori expectations drawn from other markets. This volume contains 19 original research papers from 36 authors who represent major academic and financial institutions around the globe.

The paper was written to highlight the advantages of initiating economic integration among Muslim countries across the globe, drawing special lessons from Europe's experience; its successful economic integration and challenges which trailed the process.

The methodology is basically descriptive and analytical. Theoretical construct and model on economic integration was developed for adoption by the Muslim countries. The model seeks to enhance their economic strength through intra and inter trade relations and reduces their weaknesses through specialization. Secondary data from Organization of the Islamic Conference and Islamic Development Bank member countries were exhaustively used in the study.

The paper found out that integration is plausible and beneficial, however, a concerted effort must be made in promoting technological development, raise human capital, and improve the product diversification among Muslim countries while developing stable institutions and infrastructures. Two, the potential benefits of integrating exceed the costs. The emphasis needs to be, not in cutting costs/inputs (reductionist approach), but on generating more wealth/revenue/income (incrementalist approach) that results in reducing the huge external debt, poverty, diseases, frustration, and corruption in most Muslim countries. Three, key to Muslims' socio‐economic happiness is through mutual cooperation for growth and development (Qur'an 42:38, Q3:159).

The major contributions of this paper are three, firstly, the paper explores a faith‐based integration effort, and secondly, it identifies reasons for low success in the integration efforts among Muslim countries and finally suggests an econometric model based on faith that neglects the artificial geographical barrier.

The practical implication of the paper is the recommendation to establish a Muslim Economic Bloc because Muslim countries are economically heterogenous group, with uneven development and growth pattern.

The paper is major contribution in the field of Islamic economics and applied economics. Contrary to what we know in the conventional economics, this paper advocates a faith‐based economic model and bloc in a globalised world economy. It is a contribution to existing literature.