Search results
1 – 10 of over 2000
Jill Hooks, David Coy and Howard Davey
At any time, there will be differing views on what needs to be done to be properly accountable, because accountees are likely to be in favour of more accountability, and…
Abstract
At any time, there will be differing views on what needs to be done to be properly accountable, because accountees are likely to be in favour of more accountability, and accountors, of less (Perks, 1993). This leads to a tension between these two groups (Ijiri, 1983).
The platform economy reflects the business model of some of the largest and fastest-growing firms in the economy. Platform business models emerge and thrive because of the…
Abstract
The platform economy reflects the business model of some of the largest and fastest-growing firms in the economy. Platform business models emerge and thrive because of the potential profit in taking advantage of transactions cost reductions to connect people for mutual benefit, and this value creation is best understood by thinking about the epistemology of decentralized market processes. Three essential aspects of knowledge are relevant to platform business models: (1) knowledge can be private and diffuse; (2) knowledge can be contextual; and (3) knowledge may not exist outside of the economic process. After defining and analyzing the technology, economic, and institutional aspects of platforms the author defines and applies market epistemology to explore how platforms harness technological and organizational features to create value-enhancing market platforms by exploiting the epistemic benefits of technology-enabled decentralized market processes. The author concludes by using this epistemic framework to propose an electricity distribution platform business model – the retail electricity industry is undergoing a process of technological dynamism, and as a regulated infrastructure industry, evolving into a decentralized market industry is presenting challenges to which this epistemic framework can bring increased understanding.
Details
Keywords
We present empirical evidence on the productive efficiency of electric utilities in the United States from 1990 to 2004. This period is marked by major attempts to introduce…
Abstract
We present empirical evidence on the productive efficiency of electric utilities in the United States from 1990 to 2004. This period is marked by major attempts to introduce deregulation with an expectation that it will lead to improved operating efficiency and ultimately to lower consumer prices. However, relying on improved techniques of estimating productive efficiency, we find that firms in jurisdictions that adopted deregulation have in fact lower productive efficiency, and have also experienced decreases in efficiency over time. In particular, the vertical separation of generation, a hallmark of an effort to deregulate the industry, is associated with an adverse impact on productive efficiency.
A typology of interventionism can categorize regulations, taxes, and subsidies both theoretically and as they sequentially unfold in practice. This typology is inspired by, but…
Abstract
A typology of interventionism can categorize regulations, taxes, and subsidies both theoretically and as they sequentially unfold in practice. This typology is inspired by, but broader than, the Mises interventionist thesis, which, similar to Madison's lament, recognizes the propensity of intervention to expand from its own shortcomings in the elusive quest to achieve economic rationality (Lavoie, 1982, p. 180; Ikeda, 1997, pp. 41–46; Bradley, 2006).
The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport…
Abstract
The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.
Details
Keywords
By drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted amongst waste-pickers and recycling traders in the waste paper, plastic and scrap metal sectors, and engaging with literature from…
Abstract
By drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted amongst waste-pickers and recycling traders in the waste paper, plastic and scrap metal sectors, and engaging with literature from economic anthropology and history, as well as archival sources, this paper documents changing perceptions of just price, morality and fairness in the Turkish recycling market. The paper suggests that multiple markets imply multiple prices, which are contingent and contested. When dealing with price mechanisms largely outside their control, actors tend to associate a fair price with the going market price, rather than factors such as state regulation. Approaches to morality and assessments of fairness become more ambiguous when prices are mediated by actors’ own practices. These range from gift relations to paternalism, envy and deception.