Search results

The purpose of this inductive, exploratory study is to provide foundational insights into the role of management control in dealing with dysfunctional behaviour within accounting schools in changing environment of Australian universities.

Evidence is drawn from semi-structured interviews with 28 current or previous heads of school, research deans, deans of teaching and learning, school managers and human resource managers from 16 Australian universities and interpreted from the theoretical perspective of rational choice theory.

The findings suggest the incidence of a range of dysfunctional behaviours occurring in accounting schools. Even when such behaviours are limited in frequency, their consequences are nevertheless found to have far-ranging and potentially destructive change impacts for both individuals and the university. Formal management control systems designed to address such behaviours are perceived to be largely ineffective in identifying, managing, eliminating or even mitigating the consequences of such dysfunctionality. Instead, it is informal control processes that are preferred in dealing with dysfunctionality.

This study enhances our understanding of the role of management control in dealing with dysfunctional behaviour within university accounting schools, and points not only to the difference between the design and use of management controls but also to the implications of this disconnect between the underlying intent of control design and their actual use in the context of environments that are subject to significant change.

This paper studies how performance funding of education is perceived by principals, teachers and administrative staff and management. The dysfunctionality of performance measures often reflects how the measures prevent an organisation from achieving its goals. This paper proposes that perceptions of dysfunctionality can be analysed by separating the perceptions of the programme's intentions, of the school-level actions and of the outcomes for students.

Following a qualitative methodology, semi-structured interviews were conducted with teachers, school management, staff specialists and top management in a large Danish municipality when outcome-based funding was introduced.

The performance-funding programme affected teaching by changing educational priorities. Different perceptions of the (dys)functionality of intentions, actions and outcomes fuelled diverging responses. Although the performance measure was generally considered incomplete, interviewees' perceptions of the financial incentivisation and the dysfunctionality of actions depended on interpretations of the incentivisation and student-related outcomes of the programme.

Dysfunctionality can be contested; the interpretations of the intention of a performance-funding programme affect the perceived dysfunctionality of reactions. Both technical characteristics of funding schemes and administrators' and principals' mediating roles are essential for the consequences of performance funding.

The paper examines conditions for dysfunctionality of performance measures. We demonstrate that actions can be perceived as dysfunctional because of a measurement's intentions, actions themselves and the actions' outcomes. Further, the paper illustrates how the reception of performance funding depends on how consequences are enacted based on educators' interpretations of the (dys)functionality of intentions, actions and outcomes.

To discuss some of the reasons why performance measurement systems in public services can lead to dysfunctional consequences even when people operate with the best of intentions.

The paper draws together literature from the UK public sector, from writers in performance measurement and from cultural insights in anthropology to understand why some of these perverse effects occur.

Though many reasons are cited for public service performance measurement regimes, it is clear that control aspects dominate the others. This, when allied to an unthinking use of cybernetic metaphors, is what can lead to dysfunctionality.

The paper should appeal to those who wish to improve the performance of performance measurement systems in public services and to those who wish to understand why things can go wrong.

Emerging in the literature on organizational design is the question of the efficacy of self‐managed work groups. From task‐forces and matrix prescriptions of the 1970s, imperatives towards de‐centralization, networked capabilities and self‐managed teams seem to be part of the IT‐driven prescriptions emanating from contemporary re‐structuring and social re‐engineering of workplaces. This article explores some interesting dysfunctionality dynamics of corporate “citizenship” behaviour in de‐centralized contexts and suggests the necessity to study, in some further depth, the unquestioned virtues of self‐regulated and de‐centralized teams. As the article implies, cultural engineering, leadership dynamics and complex motivation/citizenship behaviour within such organized settings also require critical re‐examination.

Develops a critical perspective on organizations and psychoanalysis. Following a brief review of various strands of psychoanalytic theorizing about organizations, argues that psychoanalysis can make an important contribution both to recognizing and to restoring the human subject in the organization. However, psychoanalysis also runs the risk of becoming complicitous with the larger context of domination that structures and governs organizations, unless it explicitly acknowledges and incorporates this context. Discusses the importance of acknowledging relations of power, recognizing the normalization of dysfunctionality in organizations, and moving away from individualizing issues of emotion, resistance and control.

This chapter aims to analyze the interrelationships between the elements of sustainability, socio-interculturalism, and governance. This analysis advances from the assumption that the sustainable socio-intercultural governance requires to be supported by the development of systems that enable the economic growth, the social development and environmental socio-ecosystems of communities, institutions, organizations, and individual levels. The method employed is the reflective-analytical based on the review of literature. It is concluded that the new geographies of sustainable socio-intercultural governance are affected by the coexistence that have solutions to the capacity deficits and dysfunctionalities of processes, institutions, and knowledge systems which have many systemic failures on the capacities of the natural resource management systems. This analysis proposes a new model of socio-intercultural sustainable governance.

Issues of performance measurement are ubiquitous in modern organizations and are often concerned with evaluations of outputs or efficiency (which encompasses both inputs and outputs) of an entity or process. Examples of output measures include revenue generated, defective units produced, on-time shipments, etc. Efficiency examples include standard cost variances, machine up-time rate, and efficiency scores from input–output models such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).

Difficult-to-measure outputs are often included even though they cannot be measured with precision. When outputs of a production process are not easy to measure, serious dysfunctional decision-making can be expected and these problems may be particularly acute when efficiency measurements from input–output models are directly tied to rewards and incentives. Both for-profit firms and public sector organizations may share output measurability problems.

In this paper, we examine the possible problems of using input–output models (such as DEA) when outputs are difficult to quantify within an agency theory perspective and illustrate the potential problems using recent proposals in the UK for evaluating and rewarding police unit performance. We conclude that although input–output models, particularly those such as DEA may be useful as a diagnostic tool to assist decision-makers in altering future operating strategies and policies, it has serious limitations when rewards and incentives are attached to the DEA performance evaluations. In our view, overreliance on mechanical, formula-based approaches is potentially a serious threat to improving performance in these situations.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature by examining the generation of collective tacit knowledge (CTK) in organizations through social ludic activities (SLAs) as a specific form of playful micro-practice carried out by employees.

This paper builds upon socially distributed cognition (SDC) and transactive memory systems (TMS) to analyze SLAs’ contribution to CTK creation in the workplace. These theories provide conceptual underpinnings for comprehending how workers self-organize shared activities to store, retrieve and use each other’s tacit knowledge within the collective. An example is provided to illustrate SLAs’ manifestation in an agile-based software development firm.

SLAs may facilitate collective members’ knowing and learning whereby different solutions are sought and potential tactics to cope with work issues are attuned to changing conditions by the collective members at work. Four moderating factors, namely physical proximity, psychological safety, richness of communication pathways and intensity of interactions, are identified and propositions to conceptualize their role in CTK generation through SLAs are formulated.

SLA players’ efforts to solve dysfunctionalities at work are not merely prompted by interdependencies among work-related tasks but also driven by high levels of social embeddedness and interaction among employees. Managers should become more supportive of collective playful activities in their organizations by building a propitious corporate climate for the mobilization of CTK in the workplace. Understanding SLAs as a soft group device where CTK resides, transits, is enacted and continuously metamorphosed represents an important complement to hard devices offered by information systems.

Relying on the notion of SLAs as a means to cope with work concerns, the authors integrate insights from organizational play, knowledge management, SDC and TMS literatures to advance the authors’ understanding of CTK creation through collective playful undertakings at work.

This study aims to offer a better understanding of supply side of bribery and corruption in an international business perspective by conceptualizing it in the narrower concept of misconduct in business (MIB) derived from the deontological perspective to business ethics.

The authors use a case study methodology of professionals working within Canadian mining multinational corporations operating in Africa. The authors conducted 2 focus groups, 25 in-depth interviews, document search and an open-ended questionnaire to 15 professionals. Further, they drew on a combination of the classic relationalist sociological framework and its recent revision, that they named the relationalism-substantialism framework to analyze the data.

The triangulated empirical data show that the reason why MIB in the form of bribery supply occurs is not exclusively tied to any given perspective, whether the individual, the organization or the wider societal context. Rather, these different layers are tightly intertwined and interact with each other for the supply of bribery to occur.

Although the three siloed perspectives of MIB have been studied in the literature, they have not been addressed in relation to one another, and even less with a relationalism-substantialism framework. Yet, this perspective contributes compellingly to the understanding of the supply side in bribery. The authors propose a net of conceptually related constructs that intervene in the process of bribery supply occurrence, namely relationality influenced by institutional dysfunctionality and conflation and substantiality through agency and culture.

The impact of accounting earnings based compensation contracts an effort allocation is analyzed using an agency‐theoretic model. In this model, the CEO of a publicly traded firm expends effort on operational short‐run activities and strategic long‐run activities. The shareholders desire the CEO to expend more effort in the strategic long‐run activities because the return to shareholders depends more on long‐run than short‐run activities. More specifically, they desire the effort to be allocated between these two activities on the proportion of the sensitivity of stock returns to these two activities. Compensating the CEO based on the stock returns performance measure is shown to induce the CEO to exert the desired proportion of effort in the long‐run activities. Unlike stock returns, accounting earnings are believed to focus more on the short‐run performance of the firm and not reflect the full impact of a CEO's long‐run effort. Compensating the CEO based on accounting earnings, in addition to stock returns, is shown to induce the CEO to expend less than the desired proportion of effort in long‐run activities. As the emphasis placed on accounting earnings relative to stock returns increases, the CEO decreases the proportion of effort expended in long‐run activities. On the positive side, including accounting earnings in the contract increases the total effort that the CEO exerts in short‐run and long‐run activities. The benefit accruing from the increase in total effort more than offsets the dysfunctionality caused by the short‐run focus. More specifically, adding accounting earnings to the incentive contract is shown to increase the expected return to the shareholders. In summary, while accounting earnings cause the CEO to be short‐run focused, their use in the incentive contract improves the firm's performance by motivating the CEO to work harder overall.