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The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

Emotions, understood as evolving mental states, are pivotal in shaping individuals“' decision-making, especially in ambiguous information evaluation, probability estimation of events, and causality analysis. Public–private partnership (PPP) projects represent a confluence of “economic–environmental–social” dimensions, wherein stakeholder behavior follows the sequential progression of “cognition–emotion–action.” Consequently, comprehending the effects of emotional shifts on stakeholder's decision-making processes is vital to fostering the sustainability of PPP projects.

The paper utilizes rank-dependent expected utility and evolutionary game theory to systematically examine the influence of emotional factors on stakeholders' behavior and decision-making processes within PPP projects. The paper integrates three emotional state functions—optimism, pessimism and rationality—into the PPP framework, highlighting the intricate interactions among the government, private sector, surrounding public and the media. Furthermore, the paper amalgamates the evolutionary pathways of environmental rights incidents with the media's role. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, the paper delves into the diverse interplay of emotions across different phases of the environmental rights incident, assessing the impact of these emotions on the evolutionary game's equilibrium results.

Emotions significantly influence the microlevel decisions of PPP stakeholders, adapting continually based on event dynamics and media influences. When the private sector demonstrates optimism and the surrounding public leans toward rationality or pessimism, the likelihood of the private sector engaging in speculative behavior escalates, while the surrounding public refrains from adopting a supervisory strategy. Conversely, when the private sector is pessimistic and the public is optimistic, the system fails to evolve a stable strategy. However, when government regulation intensifies, the private sector opts for a nonspeculative strategy, and the surrounding public adopts a supervisory strategy. Under these conditions, the system attains a relatively optimal state of equilibrium.

The paper develops a game model to examine the evolutionary dynamics between the surrounding public and private sectors concerning environmental rights protection in waste incineration PPP projects. It illuminates the nature of the conflicting interests among project participants, delves into the impact of emotional factors on their decision-making processes and offers crucial perspectives for the governance of such partnerships. Furthermore, this paper provides substantive recommendations for emotional oversight to enhance governance efficacy.

Set-based design (SBD) is a lean tool widely adopted for improving design processes and providing value maximization to clients. The purpose of this paper is to present the development and testing of a lean simulation game that incorporated point-based and SBD principles. The objective of the game was to enhance learning of lean design management among construction students.

After a thorough and comprehensive literature review consisting of secondary data in journal papers, books, thesis references and primary data in the form of interviews with lean practitioners, the simulation game prototype was developed. The testing of the game was carried out with a study group. Data were collected during the gameplay with the help of a questionnaire survey on a confidence scale and Likert scale and assessed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, histogram, one-sample t-test and false discovery rate (Benjamini–Hochberg) correction method.

The data collected both pre- and post-simulation showed an increase in average confidence in understanding from 3.33 to 3.89, a 16.7% rise. The data was further interpreted by using Wilcoxon signed-rank test, indicating that the post-simulation learning experience was significantly better than the pre-simulation one. Promising positive results were obtained for the questions on game design, engagement and understanding of point-based design and SBD concepts.

The simulation game helps bridge the gap between knowledge building and real-life by effectively imitating the process. The game facilitates a dynamic and critical approach toward developing new educational simulation games and their successful incorporation in propagating lean principles in the construction industry.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.

In the context of constructing an integrated national strategic system, collaborative innovation among enterprises is the current social focus. Therefore, in order to find the interest relationship between multiple game subjects, to explore the influencing factors of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises. This paper constructs a collaborative innovation mechanism for military–civilian integration involving four game subjects (military enterprises, private enterprises, local governments, and science and technology intermediaries). It aims to solve and reveal the evolutionary game relationship among the four parties.

To explore the mechanism of military–civilian collaborative innovation involving four players, this study employs game theory and constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation with the participation of military enterprises, civilian enterprises, local governments, and technology intermediaries. The model reveals the evolutionary game patterns among these four entities, analyzes the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process of the game system, and numerical simulation is used to show these changes more specifically.

The research findings demonstrate that active government subsidies promote cooperation throughout the system. Moreover, increasing the input-output ratio of research and development (R&D), the rate of technological spillovers, and the R&D investment of civilian enterprises all facilitate the tendency toward cooperation within the system. However, when the government chooses to actively provide subsidies, increasing R&D investment in military enterprises may hinder the tendency toward cooperation. Furthermore, central transfer payments, government punishment from the central government, and an increase in the information conversion rate of technology intermediaries may suppress the rate of cooperation within the system.

Most of the previous studies on the collaborative innovation of military–civilian integration have been tripartite game models between military enterprises, private enterprises, and local governments. In contrast, this study adds science and technology intermediaries on this basis, reveals the evolution mechanism of collaborative innovation of civil-military integration enterprises from the perspective of four-party participation, and analyzes the factors influencing the cooperation of the whole system. The conclusion of this study not only enriches the collaborative innovation evolution mechanism of military–civilian integration enterprises from the perspective of multiple agents but also provides practical guidance for the innovation-driven development of military–civilian integration enterprises.

This paper develops a theoretical model that analyzes the decision problem the landowner has to face between the construction of second homes and hotels. The starting point implies verifying that for a given tourist destination, the land available for the construction of accommodation is limited. For this reason, when choosing between building second homes or building hotels, many factors influence the decision model. The theoretical mechanism generalizes the model introduced in Brida and Boffa (2010) and is based on a four-stage sequential game with four players. From the results of the model, the authors conclude that it is optimal from the social point of view both to build a hotel and to build a second home because both generate added value during the year. For this reason, the construction of second homes should be taken into account in the planning policy of the tourist destination. This arises from considering that second homes, as they remain occupied all year like hotels, in certain tourist destinations, do not generate seasonality.

In demand-driven markets, customer value, sometimes called perceived use value or consumer surplus, is defined by the customer rather than the firm. The value a firm can appropriate, its profits, is driven by the customer’s willingness to pay for the value they receive, adjusted by costs. This paper introduces a conceptual framework that helps understand value creation and appropriation in demand-driven markets and shows how to influence them through strategic decision-making.

This paper uses an axiomatic approach combined with an extended analytical formulation of the jobs-to-be-done framework to contextualise demand-driven markets. It mathematically derives implications for managerial decision-making concerning selecting customer segments, optimising customer value creation and maximising firm value appropriation in a competitive environment.

Rooting strategic decision-making in the jobs-to-be-done framework allows distinguishing between what customers want to achieve (goal), what product attributes need to be satisfied (opportunity space/constraints) and what value creation criteria related to features are important (utility function). This paper shows that starting from a job-to-be-done, the problem of identifying which customer segments to serve, what product to offer and what price to charge, can be formulated as an optimisation problem that simultaneously (rather than sequentially) solves for the three decision variables, customer segments, product features and price, by maximising the value that a firm can appropriate, subject to maximising customer value creation and constrained by the competitive environment.

Applying the derived results to simultaneously deciding which customer segments to target, what product features to offer and what price to charge, given a set of competing products, allows managers to increase their chances of winning the competitive game.

This paper shows that starting from a job-to-be-done and simultaneously focusing on customers, product features, price and competitors enhances firm profitability. Strategic decision-making is formulated as an optimisation problem based on an axiomatic approach contextualising demand-driven markets.

The purpose of this study was to compare four different consumer pathway models based on identity theory, attitude/loyalty theory, lifestyle theory and hierarchy of effects theory, each with associated instruments measuring connection to the team.

The authors did a two-study analysis, first collecting data from people aware of an NFL team (N = 218) and then an MLS team (N = 209) to determine which connection item performed better.

The authors found that the Consumer Pathway for Sport Fandom based on the hierarchy of effects theory and its associated interest measurement item performed better than the other three frameworks and items. The Interest item shared the most variance with games attended, games intending to attend, games watched via media and games intending to watch via media.

The Consumer Pathway for Sport Fandom represents the entire consumer spectrum from non-aware consumers all the way up to die-hard sports fans. This pathway will allow sport marketers to track their consumers from initial awareness of the product or service all the way through the brand relationship to ultimate loyalty.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This paper analyzes the advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain where the e-retailer provides wholesale contract or agency contract to the fresh products supplier.

This paper constructed a two-period sequential-move game of fresh products supply chain members.

This analysis showed that the supply chain members had different preferences for contracts under different market conditions. The advance selling of fresh products was not a decision of the seller, but also required the support of other supply chain members. And the advance selling strategy was not always beneficial to all supply chain parties. Under the two contracts, there were market conditions in which the profits of supply chain members were Pareto-improved through the implementation of advance selling.

The model presented in this study focuses solely on the context of monopoly, overlooking the competition from alternative suppliers or retailers. Consequently, exploring the competitive landscape within the fresh products supply chain, particularly in relation to pre-sale pricing, emerges as a crucial avenue for further investigation. By employing empirical research methods, valuable insights are gleaned, thereby significantly augmenting the existing body of relevant theories.

The decision to pre-sell fresh products should be based on market conditions. Supply chain members can control production costs and fresh products circulation losses to maximize profits.

From the perspective of game theory, this study analyzed the optimal advance selling and pricing strategies of fresh products supply chain members under two kinds of contracts. These results can provide practical implications for fresh products suppliers and e-retailers.