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1 – 10 of over 24000Yong Wang, Tianze Tang, Weiyi Zhang, Zhen Sun and Qiaoqin Xiong
In this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.
Abstract
Purpose
In this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.
Design/methodology/approach
This study applies fair game and repeated game theory.
Findings
This study reveals that, in a one-shot game, if consumers have fairness preferences, dynamic prices will slightly decline. In a repeated game, dynamic prices will be reduced even when consumers do not have fairness preferences. When fairness preferences and repeated game are considered simultaneously, dynamic prices are most likely to be set at fair prices. The authors also discuss the effect of platforms' discounting factors, the consumers' income and alternative choices of consumption on the dynamic prices.
Research limitations/implications
The study findings illustrate the importance of incorporating behavioral elements in understanding and designing the dynamic pricing strategies for platforms and the implications on social welfare in general.
Originality/value
The authors developed a theoretical model to incorporate consumers' fairness preference into the decision-making process of platforms when they design the dynamic pricing strategies.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly over the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly over the last 25 years through the development of phenomena such as the supply chain and the progressive overcoming of monopolistic and oligopolistic frameworks. By exploring the state of the art in inter‐firm relationships, this paper aims to identify the most suitable research methods to be used by future research in this domain and to highlight the major areas under investigation.
Design/methodology/approach
This research adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach describes the technical differences between static and dynamic methods and gives evidence of their appropriateness when applied to a game. Quantitative analysis transforms some of the information extracted from the qualitative analysis into categorical variables in order to obtain an indication of the major issues still to be addressed.
Findings
The resulting findings identify the extent of the use of static and dynamic modelling in previous research and how their use has changed over time, what resolution methods need to be applied when investigating inter‐firm relationship, what features influence this decision and what research areas still remain unexplored.
Originality/value
The existing literature on the modelling of static and dynamic games lacks an exhaustive review. Several contributions investigate the literature on inter‐firms relationships and review numerous issues, but focus only on static or dynamic modelling. This paper fills this gap by reviewing a number of theoretical papers.
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This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Abstract
Purpose
This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.
Design/methodology/approach
The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.
Findings
The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.
Originality/value
The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.
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The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of optimal management of ecosystems by developing a dynamic model of strategic behavior by users/communities of an ecosystem such…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of optimal management of ecosystems by developing a dynamic model of strategic behavior by users/communities of an ecosystem such as a lake, which is subject to pollution resulting from the users. More specifically, it builds a model of two ecosystems that are spatially connected.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses the techniques of optimal control theory and game theory.
Findings
The paper uncovers sufficient conditions under which the analysis of the dynamic game can be converted to an optimal problem for a pseudo authority. It is shown that if the discount rate on the future is high enough relative to ecological self‐restoration parameters then multiple stable states appear. In this case, if the pollution level is high enough it is too costly in terms of what must be given up today to restore the damaged system. By using computational methods, the paper evaluates the relative strengths of lack of coordination, strength of ecosystem self‐cleaning forces, size of discount rates, etc.
Originality/value
The methodology as well as findings can help to devise an optimal management strategy over time for ecosystems.
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This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.
Design/methodology/approach
In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.
Findings
The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.
Research limitations/implications
Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.
Practical implications
This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.
Social implications
Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.
Originality/value
Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.
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Marjan Raoufinia, Vahid Baradaran and Reza Shahrjerdi
The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.
Design/methodology/approach
To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.
Findings
An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.
Practical implications
This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.
Originality/value
This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.
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Yuebin Zhang, Xin Yi, Shuangshuang Li and Hui Qiu
This study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government departments, and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system of PB construction.
Design/methodology/approach
Considering the information asymmetry between government supervision departments and construction contractors and the interactive relationship between the two parties under bounded rationality, we propose an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of PBs and analyze the evolutionary strategy of the game. The system dynamics (SD) method is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under a dynamic supervision strategy and the adjustment of external variables.
Findings
The cost difference between the government's strong and weak supervision, the construction contractor's additional expenditure for strengthening safety management, and other factors affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust the penalties based on the construction contractor's subjective willingness to ignore safety management and further adjust their rate of change based on the completion of the supervision goals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision.
Originality/value
This study makes contributions in two areas. Through a combination of SD and an evolutionary game, it provides new insights into the strategic choice of the main body related to PB construction safety. Additionally, considering the nonlinear characteristics of construction safety supervision, it provides useful universal suggestions for PB construction safety.
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Hashim Zameer, Ying Wang, Humaira Yasmeen, Amirhossein Akhavan Mofrad and Rashid Saeed
The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to design a game theory based model that not only provide theoretical basis to control brand counterfeiting, but it also provide a mechanism to enhance brand revenue.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used the dynamic game theory of incomplete information to understand and encounter the brand counterfeiting issues. The study analyzed the economic relationship of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and consumers using mixed strategy of the dynamic game theory of incomplete information.
Findings
The results have indicated that brands those take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting earn maximum revenue, even when the legitimate brands and consumers are unaware from the actions of counterfeiting firms, the legitimate brands should take countermeasures to reduce counterfeiting to earn maximum revenue, and there exists optimal anti-counterfeiting cost for the legitimate brand. Further, this study provides theoretical basis where brand managers can decide to adopt or not to adopt anti-counterfeiting strategy, and also indicate the consequences of each decision.
Practical implications
Based upon the findings, the study put forward valuable managerial implications. The study revealed that the legitimate brand must emphasize on the significance of taking countermeasures against counterfeiter and also, brand managers should focus on making product traceable, empowering the consumer and ensuring coordination with government officials to control the counterfeiting issues.
Originality/value
This paper incorporates the role of legitimate brand, counterfeiter and a consumer to establish the dynamic game theory model using mixed strategy to understand and address the counterfeiting issues in the global market.
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This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.
Design/methodology/approach
A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.
Findings
The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.
Research limitations/implications
This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.
Practical implications
This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.
Originality/value
Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.
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Xiaoyan Jiang, Haoyu Sun, Kun Lu, Sainan Lyu and Martin Skitmore
In China, external supervision on construction safety mainly comes from the government and supervision engineers (SEs). However, the construction safety supervisory mechanism…
Abstract
Purpose
In China, external supervision on construction safety mainly comes from the government and supervision engineers (SEs). However, the construction safety supervisory mechanism (CSSM) contains some dilemmas affecting the improvement of safety performance, such as the declining impact of SEs, the increasing rent-seeking behaviors of contractor and excessive government interference. This study aims to depict and analyze the CSSM in China from an evolutionary game view. The objectives are to understand the supervision strategy and evolutionary behaviors of different stakeholders, propose suggestions for improving safety performance and help the key safety supervision stakeholders, especially the government, formulate a suitable safety supervision strategy.
Design/methodology/approach
This research uses tripartite dynamic evolutionary game theory to study the CSSM in China and solve the stable equilibrium solution using system dynamics.
Findings
This study has revealed the game relationship of construction safety supervision mechanisms in China and solved the stable equilibrium solution. The results prove that a supervision engineer (SE) plays a crucial role in the CSSM, and “supervision engineer useless” is an unreasonable assertion. For government supervision agency (GSA), excessive inspection and free-market regulation are neither wise strategies. GSA can reduce the inspection frequency when general contractors (GCs) input high safety investments and SEs implement responsible supervision. But keeping proper government supervision to avoid GC's unlawful behaviors and SE's rent-seeking is indispensable. In addition, excessive governmental supervision will weaken SE's role, so the government should transfer some supervision powers to SE.
Originality/value
This study focuses on the dynamic evolution process between GSA, GC and SE. This method is different from most research that neglected the dynamic characteristic of system and game solution stability. The research methods not only contribute to construction safety supervision policy-making in China but also help to improve supervision efficiency in other countries and other fields.
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