Search results

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the characteristics of strategic behavior during knowledge cooperation in organization and compare the differences in strategy choice between knowledge transferor and knowledge receiver under intricate context consisting of two different objective orientations (organizational and individual) and two different information conditions (perfect and imperfect information) that represent different knowledge application contexts (conventional and available knowledge and intricate and personalized knowledge). Moreover, this paper also wishes to develop a new analysis paradigm of dynamic cooperation game to the micro-interactive mechanism research on individuals’ knowledge sharing in organization.

Through comparing and referring to previous literatures, and considering the authentic knowledge cooperation practice, this paper first suggested that the behavior characteristics of knowledge sharing between individuals in organization should be observed from the perspective of dynamic cooperation game that would accurately describe the “coopetition” essence of knowledge sharing. Further, an intricate multi-analysis context including two different objective orientations and two different information conditions was constructed. Under this multi-analysis context, the objective functions of knowledge transferor (knowledge output) and knowledge receiver (knowledge returning) were established respectively. Lastly, according to the revenue optimum principle of organizational and individual the strategic choice characteristics were analyzed through the Nash equilibrium to analyze objective functions.

“Knowledge transaction” motive is classic strategic characteristic of individuals’ knowledge cooperation, and to increase competitiveness of knowledge sharer is a crucial prerequisite for knowledge sharing under any analysis context combination (no matter organizational or individual objective, no matter perfect or imperfect information). Knowledge sharing appears more conservative and stringent under imperfect information condition, and the effort level of knowledge transferring is strategically adjusted according to the value assessment of received knowledge. The institutional constraints and incentives have little effect on the promotion of knowledge sharing under the imperfect information condition where professional knowledge is more intricate, personalized and implicit, because organization members are more sensitive to knowledge competitiveness.

This paper provides a knowledge sharing study with a new analysis paradigm from micro-interactive perspective by aiming at the “coopetition” essence of knowledge cooperation in organization. This analysis paradigm chooses the way of dynamic cooperation game to reveal the strategic characteristics of knowledge sharing among individuals (knowledge transferor and knowledge receiver) and to assess the role of institutional constraints and incentives in promoting the knowledge sharing. At the same time, the establishing of multi-context model with two different perspective dimensions (objective orientation and information condition) make research closer to the authentic circumstance of knowledge cooperation in organization.

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.

Determining the optimal capital structure becomes more complicated by the presence of an agency problem. The issuance of debt as a corporate governance mechanism introduces the asset substitution problem – the agency cost of debt. Thus, there is a recognized need for models that can resolve the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager who acts on behalf of the shareholder, leading to optimal capital structure choice, and enhanced firm value. The purpose of this paper is to model the debtholder-manager agency problem as a dynamic game, resolve the conflicts of interests and determine the optimal capital structure.

As there is no satisfactory model for dealing with the above issues, this paper uses a differential game framework to analyze the incongruity of interests between the debtholder and the manager as a non-cooperative dynamic game and further resolves the conflicts of interests as a cooperative game via a Pareto-efficient outcome.

The optimal capital structure required to minimize the marginal cost of the agency problem is a higher use of debt, lower cost of equity and withheld capital distributions. The debtholder is also able to enforce cooperation from the manager by providing a lower and stable cost of debt and a greater debt facility in the overtime framework.

The study develops a new dynamic contract theory model based on the integrated issues of capital structure, corporate governance and agency problems and applies the differential game approach to minimize the agency problem between the debtholder and the manager.

The purpose of this paper is to address the issue of optimal management of ecosystems by developing a dynamic model of strategic behavior by users/communities of an ecosystem such as a lake, which is subject to pollution resulting from the users. More specifically, it builds a model of two ecosystems that are spatially connected.

The paper uses the techniques of optimal control theory and game theory.

The paper uncovers sufficient conditions under which the analysis of the dynamic game can be converted to an optimal problem for a pseudo authority. It is shown that if the discount rate on the future is high enough relative to ecological self‐restoration parameters then multiple stable states appear. In this case, if the pollution level is high enough it is too costly in terms of what must be given up today to restore the damaged system. By using computational methods, the paper evaluates the relative strengths of lack of coordination, strength of ecosystem self‐cleaning forces, size of discount rates, etc.

The methodology as well as findings can help to devise an optimal management strategy over time for ecosystems.

Using Brandenburger and Nalebuff's 1995 co‐opetition model as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to seek to develop a tool that, based on the tenets of classical game theory, would enable scholars and managers to identify which games may be played in response to the different conflict of interest situations faced by companies in their business environments.

The literature on game theory and business strategy are reviewed and a conceptual model, the strategic games matrix (SGM), is developed. Two novel games are described and modeled.

The co‐opetition model is not sufficient to realistically represent most of the conflict of interest situations faced by companies. It seeks to address this problem through development of the SGM, which expands upon Brandenburger and Nalebuff's model by providing a broader perspective, through incorporation of an additional dimension (power ratio between players) and three novel, respectively, (rival, individualistic, and associative).

This proposed model, based on the concepts of game theory, should be used to train decision‐ and policy‐makers to better understand, interpret and formulate conflict management strategies.

A practical and original tool to use game models in conflict of interest situations is generated. Basic classical games, such as Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax, are mapped on the SGM to suggest in which situations they could be useful. Two innovative games are described to fit four different types of conflict situations that so far have no corresponding game in the literature. A test application of the SGM to a classic Intel Corporation strategic management case, in the complex personal computer industry, shows that the proposed method is able to describe, to interpret, to analyze, and to prescribe optimal competitive and/or cooperative strategies for each conflict of interest situation.

In the context of sharing economy and online shopping, establishing a stable urban joint distribution alliance (JDA) is extremely necessary for the entire logistics service market. The purpose of this paper is to rationally allocate the profits and determine the most stable allocation scheme for the urban JDA as well as provide a direction for cooperation between express enterprises and lead managers to pay more attention to the comprehensive performance.

Cooperative game-based methodologies including the proportion method, the core theory, nucleolus and Shapley value have been employed. Four criteria consisting of enterprise operation, customer satisfaction, environmental sustainability and information technology have been incorporated into Shapley value for improvement.

This paper reveals that express enterprises in logistics service market can achieve more benefit from JDA than those who operate separately. Among proposed profit allocation schemes, improved Shapley value scheme shows more rationality by considering partners’ asymmetric contribution. Besides, a stable alliance can be always ensured with partners’ lower propensity to disrupt and relatively balanced negotiation power under improved Shapley value scheme.

This paper makes a few attempts to contribute to the literature on the improvement of Shapley value and applies the concept of “propensity to disrupt” into the field of logistics. Besides, this paper provides various profit allocation schemes and incorporates influencing factors into Shapley value for an improvement thus helping policy-makers make better-informed decisions on urban distribution. Additionally, a case study based on urban express enterprises in Southwest China has been conducted to verify the proposed profit allocation schemes.

In today’s global competition, supply chain quality management is the key to a firms’ competitiveness. However, managers find that making sound quality and pricing decisions under a complex multi-echelon in the current competitive electronic commerce environment is daunting and challenging. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimum quality strategies under different cooperative mechanisms and investigate its effects on channel members’ profits.

This paper is a result of a China-UK collaborative research effort, involving researchers with expertise in information systems, quality management, supply chain management, pricing, and game theory models. The authors consider the quality decisions of a single product in a supply chain system that consists of a supplier and two competing manufacturers. The authors examine the optimum quality strategies under different cooperative mechanisms and investigate its effects on channel members’ profits. A modified Nerlove-Arrow model is employed to investigate the quality levels on goodwill and product sales.

The results reveal that the traditional cooperative program is not very effective in the horizontal competitive market; and each channel member may have a profit improvement when the supplier integrates with a manufacturer.

The authors believe that this paper will contribute to the existing body of knowledge. Moreover, the paper provides insights for managers to better manage their supply chain quality management in an information-centric context.

This study aims to examine how brands can leverage on advergames as an interactive marketing tool to foster prosumer culture and build a sacred brand. Drawing from game theory, this research scrutinizes how advergame format (cooperative vs noncooperative) influences consumers’ perceived brand sacredness by harnessing positive brand relationship quality (BRQ) and intention to prosume. It also examines how reward types moderate the relationship between advergame format and advergamers’ BRQ.

Three different studies were conducted. Study 1 develops a measure to capture advergamers’ intention to prosume. Study 2 uses survey to collect data from brand-controlled gaming community platform. Study 3 is an experiment that uses 2 (game format: cooperative vs noncooperative) × 2 (reward type: hedonic vs utilitarian) between-subject format.

Study 1 provides a reliable and valid measure to capture “intention to prosume.” The results of Study 2 elucidate that (non) cooperative advergame format generates strong cold (hot) BRQ, leading to intention to prosume, which, in turn, drives brand sacredness. The results of Study 3 elucidate that using (utilitarian) hedonic rewards strengthens the impact of (non) cooperative advergame format on (cold) hot BRQ.

This research has examined the roles of cooperative vs noncooperative game design formats and hedonic vs utilitarian reward formats. Future research may focus on other possible advergame design formats and reward types.

This research provides insights to advergame marketers toward designing appropriate hedonic or utilitarian game rewards to strengthen the impact of cooperative vs noncooperative advergame format on brand sacredness through enhancing BRQ and intention to prosume among the target advergamers.

This research applies game theory in the advergaming context to manoeuvre game format and rewards so that a sustainable prosumption culture is built, which has strong beliefs about the sacredness of the brand.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the short-term development pattern and long-term development trend of the digital supply chain.

This study uses the combination of short-term game and long-term evolutionary game theory.

Findings of this study suggest that irrational decisions can make the evolutionary path of the digital supply chain complex and unpredictable.

This study proposes an evolutionary game model for the digital supply chain that can provide good guidance for the digitalization process of enterprises.