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The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of local government spending on local government financial performance. Furthermore, this study also investigates the moderating role of re-election on the relationship between local government spending and the financial performance for all local government and dynastic local government. The hypotheses are analyzed using multiple regression with fixed effect using two groups of samples: all local governments and dynastic local governments from 2010 to 2015. The result shows that local government spending positively affects local government financial performance, but in dynastic local government, spending has negative effect on financial performance. Moreover, this study proves that re-election strengthens the positive effect of local government spending on local government financial performance in all sample and weaken the negative effect of spending on financial performance in dynastic local government. The finding of this study is very useful for the central government in terms of policy formulation and mechanisms to limit the practice of political dynasty.

This study aims to investigate the use of discretionary spending, especially by incumbents, to win the election and whether incumbents can take more advantage of such spending than the new local government heads. This study also examines the political monitoring effect in suppressing discretionary spending. By using panel regression on 225 local governments during 2013–2016, the results indicate that political motive positively affects discretionary spending proportion ahead of the election. Following the public choice theory that although local government heads act on the interests of voters, their primary motivation is personal interest. Incumbent’s victory does not affect total discretionary spending and the financial assistance expenditure/transfer but has a significant positive effect on grant and social assistance spending. It generally supports Corruption Eradication Commission’s allegations of “returning the favor” is carried out by elected heads in one year following the election. But, it shows that incumbents are more able to utilize grants and social assistance spending than the new local government heads. Political monitoring from the opposition party has proven to have a direct negative effect on discretionary spending proportion. Tracking of the one year after the election should be done to prevent misuse of discretionary spending for incumbent political interests. The results of this study are expected to provide input to regulators to develop more comprehensive regulation, for example, strict sanctions for violations related to accountability for the use of such funds to limit the opportunistic behavior of the local government heads.