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In a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutability and observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. The model suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest rate, affect the likelihood of dumping.

The purpose of this paper is to examine zeroing jurisprudence under the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement and to see if the jurisprudence can still be applied to situations of targeted dumping where dumping takes place in a specific region, at specific timing, or for specific consumer groups.

This paper examines the prior decisions of the WTO panels and the Appellate Body relating to the zeroing practice. It categorizes the key elements of these prior decisions where the zeroing practice has been found WTO-inconsistent. While there has been no specific dispute addressing targeted dumping per se, this paper proves that core elements of the zeroing practice have been anatomized and dissected by the panels and the Appellate Body in prior proceedings. The paper then analyzes whether these key elements still exist in the specific context of targeted dumping and thus whether application of zeroing is still prohibited in targeted dumping situations.

The existing jurisprudence on zeroing from previous WTO disputes should apply to targeted dumping situations as well. Unbridled application of zeroing in the targeted dumping situations will effectively nullify the existing zeroing jurisprudence accumulated through a decade of WTO disputes. If unchecked, this calculation methodology in the context of targeted dumping may open the back door wide open for “zeroing” negative anti-dumping margins. The paper concludes that the existing jurisprudence on zeroing stands for the proposition that zeroing in targeted dumping should also be prohibited.

This paper examines the legality of the zeroing practice in targeted dumping situations, which has been one of the most controversial issues among WTO members for the past several years. The analyses and discussions contained in this paper will provide legal guideline to evaluate zeroing in targeted dumping within the WTO framework. The outcome of the research will provide a platform for continued research and discussion in this area.

Explores the question of whether initiating an anti‐dumping action constitutes unethical conduct. Suggests that it is generally accepted that stealing and destroying the property of others are wrong, and that hiring someone to do the stealing or destruction for you is also wrong. Concludes that initiating an anti‐dumping action constitutes unethical conduct, since anti‐dumping actions involve theft and the destruction of property, not to mention the violation of contract and property rights and the freedom of association.

Anti‐dumping laws have been around for decades. They have increased in importance in recent years and will become even more important in the future as a result of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the World Trade Organization. Yet anti‐dumping laws are inherently protectionist because they protect domestic producers at the expense of consumers. They have a chilling effect on price competition and cause the prices on a wide range of products to be higher than would otherwise be the case. Examines the anti‐dumping laws in theory and practice, from both a utilitarian and human rights context, and concludes that these laws cannot be justified on any reasonable grounds. Calls for their repeal, the sooner the better.

The purpose of this paper is to review the use of zeroing in the weighted average-to-transaction (W-T) comparison methodology and targeted dumping under the anti-dumping agreement by reviewing the WTO appellate body’s rulings on the use of zeroing in the W-T comparison methodology in the USA – anti-dumping measures on large residential washers from Korea (DS464). Although the appellate body has ruled that the use of zeroing would not be allowed in the weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison methodology nor in the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology, it has not ruled on whether the use of zeroing is allowed in the W-T comparison methodology prior to the instant case.

This paper mainly analyzes the WTO appellate body report on the USA – anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential washers from Korea’s rulings (DS464) and reviews other WTO appellate body reports on the use of zeroing in anti-dumping measures. This paper reviews the relevant provisions of the WTO anti-dumping agreement and the US Anti-Dumping Act, and also referred prior papers on the use of zeroing.

The appellate body upheld the panel’s finding that the USA’s use of zeroing in the W-T comparison methodology is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the anti-dumping agreement. As zeroing inflates dumping margins, increases the amount of duty collected, and hinders the expansion of trade in goods. The use of zeroing should be prohibited or permitted only in very limited circumstances.

Zeroing, which has been the subject of many WTO disputes between the USA and foreign governments, causes dumped sales to be masked by fair value. The WTO appellate body has consistently condemned the US practice of zeroing over the past decade as an unfair commerce practice. The instant case and this paper will help to stop the practice of zeroing in anti-dumping measures.

The text of Article 2.4.2 does not clearly prohibit the use of zeroing. The paper reviews the WTO appellate body’s rulings on the use of zeroing in the W-T comparison methodology in the USA – anti-dumping measures on large residential washers from Korea (DS464). The appellate body report was very recently circulated, on September 9, 2016. The appellate body has not ruled on whether the use of zeroing is allowed in the W-T comparison methodology prior to the instant case. This paper, first, concludes that the W-T comparison methodology is inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the anti-dumping agreement.

Dumping is a permanent feature of marketing strategies of numerous firms aiming to increase their market share, to optimise the volume of their production or to maximise profits through price discrimination. Anti‐dumping complaints are increasingly resorted to as a defensive tool to stop the challengers. A brief summary of the basic issues involved is offered and relates them to marketing concerns in export operations. Considers the essential mechanics of anti‐dumping actions and shows how they are used to gain a strategic advantage. Discusses the elements of the export marketing mix which should be subjected to self‐restraint to minimise the threat of anti‐dumping accusations. Concludes by presenting a number of the marketing options that are at the disposal of a dynamic exporter to move potential antagonists in the area of anti‐dumping closer to a co‐operative partnership.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of implementing anti-dumping duties on imported Australian wine to China in the short- and long-run, respectively.

First, the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method is used in this study to evaluate the short-run causal effect of implementing anti-dumping duties on imported Australian wine to China. Second, a Bayesian ensemble method is used to predict 2023–2025 wine exports from Australia to China. The disparity between the forecasts and counterfactual prediction which assumes no anti-dumping duties represents the accumulated impact of the anti-dumping duties in the long run.

The anti-dumping duties resulted in a significant decline in red and rose, white and sparkling wine exports to China by 92.59%, 99.06% and 90.06%, respectively, in 2021. In the long run, wine exports to China are projected to continue this downward trend, with an average annual growth rate of −21.92%, −38.90% and −9.54% for the three types of wine, respectively. In contrast, the counterfactual prediction indicates an increase of 3.20%, 20.37% and 4.55% for the respective categories. Consequently, the policy intervention is expected to result in a decrease of 96.11%, 93.15% and 84.11% in red and rose, white and sparkling wine exports to China from 2021 to 2025.

The originality of this study lies in the creation of an economic paradigm for assessing policy impacts within the realm of wine economics. Methodologically, it also represents the pioneering application of the DID and Bayesian ensemble forecasting methods within the field of wine economics.

Defines dumping as the sale of goods onto the market of an importing country at less than their normal value on the domestic market, and explains the economic rationale behind dumping. Reviews the origin of anti‐dumping laws, and the objectives of applying anti‐dumping duty legislation to non‐market economy countries, with reference to European Union (EU) anti‐dumping measures against China; the latter is still viewed as a non‐market economy. Indicates the impact of the EU anti‐dumping campaign on Chinese industries and legal strategies for challenging the EU anti‐dumping campaign. Concludes that the campaign is unfair and should now recognise the progress of economic reform in China, which since 2001 is a member of the World Trade Organization.

The purpose of this paper is to explore corporate social responsibility in context of the dumping of electronic waste (e‐waste), inferior products and second‐hand goods, and related activities of multinational corporations' (MNCs') subsidiaries in Ghana. It aims to suggest examples and recommendations to help curb the negative effects of dumping in Ghana.

Research into specific e‐waste and scavenging activities and its impact on indigenous people and the environment is analyzed. Furthermore, findings on relevant stakeholders who have interest in this menace are reviewed. There is also a general discussion of the effect of other import/export activities that are tantamount to dumping.

One can often observe ignorant scavengers around “recycling sites” demarcating their portions of the waste which includes discarded computers, televisions, micro‐waves, radio sets, and VCR amongst others. These wastes are often carried to strategic points where these people they extract some “valuable” components. It is known that MNCs find it expensive to re‐cycle these wastes in their home countries, thereby diversifying them to “new markets” often termed as “bridging the digital divide”. The hazards involved do not only affect the environment, but also the health of the indigenous people. Furthermore, there is the increase of inferior products as well as second‐hand goods in the country. Governments can set import restrictions, the pressure groups can help take appropriate actions to mitigate the effects. Educating the indigenous people in consciousness in the health hazards in e‐waste becomes necessary. Proper disposal and re‐cycling activities should be implemented by the government and collaborated by MNCs.

This paper can be seen as an initial attempt to integrate the effect of dumping and contributions from stakeholders to enforce MNCs and their subsidiaries to be socially responsible in the Ghanaian business environment.