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Examines the history of the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) 1969‐74 ‐ its origins, organization and policies ‐ and then evaluates its contribution as an agent of reform in the context of the perceived problems of the 1960s and 1970s. Considers whether there are any lessons to be learnt for the future given the possibility of a Labour Government, developments in Europe and the 1995 TUC policy document Your Voice at Work. Despite the drastic changes in industrial relations and in the economic, political and social environment, the answer is in the affirmative. In particular, the importance of a new third‐party agency having an independent governing body like the CIR and not a representative body like the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS); in its workflow not being controlled by government; and in its decisions on recognition being legally enforceable.

I. INTRODUCTION In this monograph we point out and analyse various dimensions of bargaining structure, which we define broadly as the institutional configuration within which bargaining takes place, and attempt to provide some guidelines for management action. We look at the development, theory, and present framework of bargaining structure in Britain and then examine it in terms of choices: multi‐employer versus single employer, company versus plant level bargaining, and the various public policy issues involved.

The recent wave of strikes, official and unofficial, in all kinds of economic and public activity, affecting all kinds of persons from children to pensioners, occasioning suffering, misery and harm to the community in general, has caused January 1979 to be called ‘Black January’. Yet ten years ago, in January 1969 a White Paper entitled ‘In Place of Strife’ [Cmnd 3888] was published. The White Paper set out a policy for Industrial Relations. It was the policy of a Labour Government and had been designed in the light of the report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations which had been published in June 1968 [Cmnd 3623]. The main recommendations of the Report [called the Donovan Report] were embodied in the proposals for an Industrial Relations Act which is Appendix I in the White Paper. That paper, following Donovan, boldly states in para 2:

The purpose of this paper is to show how a major public benefit entity in New Zealand uses formal accountability mechanisms and informal reporting to justify its existence. The paper is premised on the view that the accountability relationship for public benefit entities is broader and more complex than the traditional shareholder‐manager relationship in the private sector.

This longitudinal single case study of the Department of Conservation (DOC) spans the period from its establishment in 1987 to June 2006. It involves the detailed examination of the narrative disclosures contained in the annual reports, including the Statement of Service Performance, over the period of the study. A number of controversial items that appeared in the printed media between 1 April 1987 and 30 June 2006 were traced through the annual reports to establish whether DOC used impression management techniques in its annual reports to gain, maintain and repair its organisational legitimacy.

The analysis found that the annual report of a public benefit entity could play an important legitimising role. Using legitimacy theory, it is argued that assertive and defensive impression management techniques were used by DOC to gain, maintain and repair its organisational legitimacy in the light of extensive negative media publicity.

This is one of the first studies to examine the relationship between narrative disclosures in annual reports and legitimacy in the public sector. The paper provides a valuable contribution to researchers and practitioners as it extends the understanding of how public benefit entities can make use of the narrative portions of the annual report when pursuing organisational legitimacy.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

I should begin by saying that in addressing the Social Sciences Group of Aslib I feel not only a sense of pleasure but also that I am perpetrating the act of carrying coals to Newcastle. Having said that I should add that what I have to say consists of my own personal views. They reflect my research interests which lie in the fields of industrial economics—specifically monopoly and restrictive practices policy—and international economics—specifically the European Economic Community. Let me finally put you on your guard by pointing out that it is a notorious fact that no two economists think alike on any topic.

The 1990s literature portrays the corporate personnel/HR function as in decline due to the decentralisation and delayering of large organisations. As a result personnel’s presence on boards of directors and participation in the formation of corporate business and HR strategies cannot survive. This paper challenges this view arguing that strategies do not originate at main board of director level but at the CEO executive group level in most cases. Research has shown the personnel/HR function’s involvement at this level to be higher than on main boards. Other recent evidence has accorded personnel a higher strategic role in MNCs, especially regarding the staffing and development of an international cadre of managers. This evidence however supports the view that personnel’s corporate presence declined from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s before picking up, whereas the paper’s argument favours a steady growth thesis from the early 1970s. Additionally the dominant perspective contains an overly top down view of strategy formation whereas this paper argues for a counter‐balancing bottom up influence on strategy formation.

The Swedish Employers' Federation (SAF), which reached its 75th birthday in September 1977, today operates in a highly developed economy. In 1902 Sweden was relatively a poor country, where 55 per cent of the working population was employed in agriculture and forestry, and only 27 per cent in industry and mining. Today, six per cent of the working population is concerned with agriculture and forestry, whilst industry, mining and construction account for 36 per cent. And there are 30 per cent in public administration and other services and fifteen per cent in trade. The rise of this industrial economy in some seventy years has been achieved largely by private enterprise and initiative, inventive genius, the development of foreign trade, and a sound system of industrial relations. Some forty per cent of the industrial production is exported which is equivalent to twenty‐four per cent of the total production of goods and services measured in monetary terms. The recent devaluation of the Krona has been designed to boost exports in order to overcome the balance of payments deficit which has increased considerably in the past year. Sweden, like Britain, has been affected by the slow economic recovery of Europe and other areas in the world.

Based on a representative survey of German subsidiaries in the UK, their parent companies and a comparative analysis to the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, the article examines the impact of nationality of ownership on employee relations (ER) in German multinational companies (MNCs) operating in an Anglo‐Saxon setting. It also assesses whether in light of heightened international competition and the problems in the German ER model, there has been a weakening of the home country effect over time. The study finds little evidence of a home country effect in relation to ER structures but reveals a pronounced country‐of‐origin effect in the ER approach and style. There is also evidence that German MNCs have responded to the globalisation pressures of the 1990s by a heightened emphasis on the country‐of‐origin collective approach in their UK subsidiaries, whilst at the same time developing comprehensive direct human resource management employee involvement schemes to complement, rather than substitute collective ER.

Analyses union membership trends in the UK since 1979. Confirms the conventional wisdom that overall there has been a substantial membership leakage from UK trade unions for almost a decade and a half. Summarizes and discusses reasons for this. Goes on to show, however, that this overall trend masks a surprisingly steady and sustained growth of employee membership of “non‐affiliated” unions of professional workers and of staff associations, during the 1980s and early 1990s. Examines this stark contrast between falling membership among highly unionate traditional unions and lowly unionate, “non‐political” employee organizations. Explores the characteristics of the “new moderate unionism” in terms of its membership, size, sectoral, gender and industrial distributions and discusses the future prospects of this remarkably resilient group of employee organizations. Classifies them as “publicsector professional associations” and “privatesector staff associations”. Finally, evaluates the nature and ideologies of the “new moderate unionism” in the context of recent managerial employment strategies.