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This paper aims to elaborate upon the work of Aguinis and colleagues (this issue), who showed that there is almost no overlap between the chief executive officers (CEOs; of American publicly traded corporations) who are in the upper tail of the CEO pay distribution and the firms that are in the upper tail of the performance distribution.

This paper is an essay/commentary regarding the merits and implications of the paper by Aguinis and colleagues.

Drawing upon prior work, the author proposes that CEOs’ tenure-long pay patterns are established – essentially baked-in or hardwired – when CEOs first get hired. For various reasons, some CEOs receive ultra-grand pay packages at the outset of their tenures, and nothing – including mediocre performance – brings about subsequent diminishment of those sweet terms.

This paper sheds new light on the work by Aguinis and colleagues, in turn contributing new insights about the fairness (or lack thereof) of CEO pay determinations.

This paper integrates Aguinis and colleagues with prior works on CEO over- and underpayment.

El presente comentario se sustenta sobre el trabajo de Aguinis y colegas (este número) que muestra que apenas existe coincidencia entre los Consejeros Delegados (CEOs) de las empresas cotizadas americanas con mayor retribución y las empresas que mejores resultados obtienen.

Este artículo es un ensayo/comentario acerca de los méritos y las implicaciones del artículo de Aguinis y colegas.

Tomando como base un trabajo previo, el autor propone que los patrones de antigüedad-retribución se definen cuando el Consejero Delegado es contratado por primera vez. Por varias razones, algunos Consejeros Delegados reciben una gran retribución al inicio de su carrera en la empresa, y nada –ni siquiera unos resultados mediocres- reduce esa retribución.

El artículo arroja luz sobre el trabajo de Aguinis y colegas, y contribuye al debate acerca de la justicia (o ausencia de ésta) en la definición de los salarios de los Consejeros Delegados.

El artículo integra el trabajo de Aguinis y otros en la literatura previa sobre la sobre o infra-retribución de los Consejeros Delegados.

Este comentário sobre o trabalho de Aguinis e colaboradores (este número), que mostram que quase não há coincidência entre os CEOs (das empresas americanas de capital aberto) que estão na parte superior da distribuição de pagamento do CEO e as empresas que estão na parte superior da distribuição de desempenho.

Este artigo é um ensaio/comentário sobre os méritos e as implicações do artigo de Aguinis e colaboradores.

Tomando como base um trabalho prévio, o autor propõe que os padrões de antiguidade/retribuição se definam quando o CEO é contratado pela primeira vez. Por várias razões, alguns CEOs recebem uma retribuição grande ao início da sua carreira na empresa, y nada – nem uns resultados medíocres -reduzem essa retribuição.

O artigo lança nova luz sobre o trabalho de Aguinis e colaboradores, contribuindo com novos conhecimentos sobre a equidade (ou a falta) das determinações de pagamento dos CEOs.

O artigo integra o trabalho de Aguinis y colaboradores na literatura prévia sobre a infra-retribuição dos CEOs.

“In today's environment, a company that is a loose amalgamation of business units or a mere federation of regional subsidiaries is at a crippling disadvantage in its competitive marketplace.”

The purpose of this paper is to find out the most influential journals, articles, authors and the subject areas where Miles and Snow typology is used. The study identifies the opportunities for future research as well.

Review is based on 196 journal articles selected through a systematic and rigorous search process from the four databases: ProQuest, Business Source Complete, Willy and Science Direct. Total Citation, threshold citations, fractional citation and citation per year techniques are used for analyses.

Strategic Management Journal (SMJ), Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) and Journal of Marketing (JOM) are the most influential Journals. The most influential and prolific articles on the subject are from Hambrick (1983), Conant et al. (1990), Doty et al. (1993), Sabherwal et al. (2001), Desarbo et al. (2005) and Fiss (2011). Management, strategic management and marketing are the most studied subject areas.

Although there have been many reviews of the literature on this typology, the systematic review on Miles and Snow typology to find out the most influential journals, authors, articles and subject area has not been done before.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The purpose of the study is to set a research agenda so that future conceptual and empirical research can improve the understanding of why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled.

The paper compiles and adds to many of the explanations provided by this special issue’s nine commentaries regarding why CEO pay and CEO performance are decoupled. These explanations were grouped into two categories: economic (e.g. marginal productivity theory, agency theory and behavioral agency model) and social-institutional-psychological (e.g. CEO individual differences and characteristics and CEO-organization interactions). Moreover, new analyses based on additional data were conducted to examine measurement-related explanations for the observed pay-performance decoupling.

Results based on alternative measures of pay and performance confirmed, once again, the existence of pay-performance decoupling.

This paper will stimulate research pitting theoretical explanations against each other to understand their relative validity in different contexts.

The paper informs ongoing efforts to link CEO pay to performance.

The paper also revisits the decoupling of CEO pay and firm performance from a normative and value-based perspective (i.e. regarding whether pay and performance should be related).

The paper clarifies that the articles in this special issue largely concluded that CEO pay is decoupled from CEO performance.

Objetivo – El objetivo es proponer una ageda de investigación de forma que la futura investigación conceptual y empírica pueda mejorar la comprensión sobre por qué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO no están conectados.

Diseño/metodología/aproximación – El artículo compila y añade a la mayoría de las explicaciones proporcionados por los nueve comentarios publicados en este número especial acerca de porqué la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO están desconectados. Estas explicaciones se agrupan en dos categorías: económicas (e.g. teoría de la productividad marginal, teoría de agencia, modelo de agencia comportamental) y socio-institucional-psicológicas (e.g. diferencias y características individuales del CEO, interacción CEO-organización). Además, se llevan a cabo nuevos análisis sobre datos adicionales para examinar algunas explicaciones relativas a la medición para la falta de conexión entre retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Resultados – Los resultados basados en medidas alternativas de retribución y rendimiento confirman, una vez más, la existencia de una desconexión entre ambas magnitudes.

Limitaciones/implicaciones – Este artículo estimulará a investigación contraponiendo diferentes explicaciones teóricas para entender su validez relativa en diferentes contextos.

Implicaciones prácticas – El artículo informa sobre los esfuerzos actuals para relacionar la retribución del CEO y su rendimiento.

Implicaciones sociales – El artículo revisa la desconexión entre la retribución y el rendimiento del CEO desde una perspectiva normativa y de valor (i.e. sobre si la retribución y el rendimiento deben estar conectados).

Originalidad/valor – El artículo clarifica que los artículos en este número especial concluyen que la retribución del CEO está desconectada de su rendimiento.

O objetivo é estabelecer uma agenda de investigação para que futuros estudos conceptuais ou empíricos possam melhorar a compreensão do porquê de a compensação do CEO e o desempenho do CEO estarem dissociados.

Metodologia – O artigo compila e acrescenta às muitas explicações fornecidas pelos oito comentários deste número especial sobre as razões da dissociação da compensação e do desempenho do CEO. Estas explicações agrupam-se em duas categorias: económicas (eg., teoria da produtividade marginal, teoria da agência, modelo da agência comportamental) e Socio-institucional-psicológicas (eg., características e diferenças individuais do CEO, interações CEO-Organização). Além disso, conduziram-se novas análises baseadas em dados para examinar explicações baseadas em medições para a dissociação pagamento-desempenho.

Resultados – Resultados baseados em medidas alternativas de pagamento e desempenho confirmaram, uma vez mais, a existência da dissociação entre pagamento e performance.

Limitações/implicações – Este artigo estimula investigação que contraponha diferentes explicações teóricas, para perceber a sua validade relativa em diferentes contextos.

Implicações práticas – O artigo dá informação sobre esforços em curso para ligar a compensação do CEO ao desempenho.

Implicações sociais – O artigo revisita a dissociação do pagamento e desempenho da empresa Numa perspectiva normative e baseada em valores (ie, sobre se a compensação e a performance devem estar relacionadas).

Originalidade/valor – O paper clarifica que os artigos neste número especial basicamente concluiram que a compensação do CEO está dissociala do desempenho do CEO.

This paper examined the relationships between national culture and strategic behavior in the banking industry in Jordan and U.S. The study first developed a strategic posture and secondly a cultural profile for the top management of the research domain. The strategic posture suggested the readiness for strategic response from managers. The degree of readiness was correlated with the constructed cultural profile of the managers and financial performance of the banks. The study found significant relationships between certain national cultural strategic characteristics, (risk propensity, time orientation, and openness to change, uncertainty avoidance and managerial perception of control over the environment) strategic behavior and financial performance.

Analysis of organizational decline has become central to the study of economy and society. Further advances in this area may fail however, because two major literatures on the topic remain disintegrated and because both lack a sophisticated account of how social structure and interdependencies among organizations affect decline. This paper develops a perspective which tries to overcome these problems. The perspective explains decline through an understanding of how social ties and resource dependencies among firms affect market structure and the resulting behavior of firms within it. Evidence is furnished that supports the assumptions of the perspective and provides a basis for specifying propositions about the effect of network structure on organizational survival. I conclude by discussing the perspective's implications for organizational theory and economic sociology.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between potentials of top management teams’ (TMT) career development and corporate social responsibility (CSR) by examining listed manufacturing companies in China. More importantly, it tried to contribute to the understanding of the senior executive’s career development in the trend of upgrading the manufacturing industry.

The sample firms in this paper were selected from the China A-listed companies in the manufacturing industry. It collected CSR and TMT data from the Rankins CSR Ratings (RKS) Database and CSMAR database and applied the multiple regression to test the hypotheses. Moreover, it implemented the robustness test by using the standard regression method and the structural equation model.

The findings indicate that a firm’s CSR performance is significantly associated with TMT’s educational level and overseas background. The government background, academic background and financial background of high-level managers, instead, have a negative relationship with CSR performance. In addition, firm’s ownership moderates the relationship between TMT and CSR initiatives – the career development potential of TMT has different effects on promoting CSR in the context of different ownership. These relationships remain significant when the managers’ tenure, gender, age, wage and firm size are controlled.

The empirical research on the potentials of executive career development and CSR is limited to linear assumptions. Since there are fewer overseas holding companies in Chinese state-owned and private enterprises, it failed to reflect international differences.

First, CSR is related to the potentials of TMT career development and also the potentials of TMT career development are associated with the structure of the TMT. Second, to improve CSR, it is necessary to distinguish the different ownership of companies and then adjust the TMT structure correspondingly. Last, senior executives should choose their career direction according to their own distinct and inherent career development potentials.

This study explores the relationship between potentials of TMT career development and CSR. It not only expands the research in the field of CSR but also enriches the research on the career development of top executives.

As the global economy starts to perk up, interest in mergers and acquisitions is once again building. Now is the time to confront the paradox at the heart of M&A. Although study after study has shown that most deals destroy value for the acquirer’s shareholders, why do companies proceed with M&A deals? Why does hope triumph over experience? Because, if certain fundamental rules are followed, M&A can create substantial value for the acquirer’s shareholders. This article shows that every industry has acquisitive exemplars and describes how they extract value from acquisitions for their shareholders. Acquisitive exemplars view M&A as a means to a strategic end, rather than an end in itself. They adopt five decision biases: Set the balance between organic and M&A‐led growth in your corporate agenda, according to the maturity and dynamics of your industry. Challenge the level of acquisitiveness in your business unit’s agendas, and make sure they are aligned with the dynamics of the industry. If the growth strategy needs to be biased toward acquisition, challenge your business at the both corporate and business unit level on the nature of these acquisitions. Develop the key M&A capabilities needed for success in your industry or market segment. Develop a fully accountable process and appoint fully accountable people to integrate your M&A decisions with strategy formulation and performance monitoring.