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This chapter explores the ways in which a large-scale accounting system, known as Marijuana Enforcement Tracking Reporting and Compliance, contributes to the construction and organization of a new market for recreational cannabis in the US state of Colorado. Mobilizing the theoretical lenses provided by the literature on market devices, on the one hand, and infrastructure, on the other hand, the authors identify and unpack a changing relationship between accounting and state control through which accounting and markets unfold. The authors describe this movement in terms of a distinction between knowing devices and thinking infrastructures. In the former, the authors show that regulators and other authorities perform the market by making it legible for the purpose of intervention, taxation and control. In the latter, thinking infrastructures, an ecology of interacting devices is made and remade by a variety of intermediaries, disclosing the boundaries and possibilities of the market, and constituting both opportunities for innovation and domination through “protocol.”

Prior research documents that host communities struggle to influence tourism product design and destination management; however, emerging information and communication technologies (ICTs) are allowing host communities to bypass retail monopolies and create self-representation. This chapter examines how to make technological innovation endogenous to a regional growth model by identifying barriers constraining the adoption of innovation among rural microentrepreneurs in Pennsylvania. Insights about adoption of ICTs were gathered through participatory action engagement and semi-structured interviews with a network of rural tourism microentrepreneurs. Analysis revealed that microentrepreneurs perceive that tracking and monitoring customer inquiries is very time consuming, and they feel that using these platforms diverts them from achieving their desired lifestyles.

Martin Winterkorn had high aspirations for Volkswagen to become the world's leading automaker when he was promoted to CEO in 2007. Volkswagen lacked the technology needed to meet American emissions standards and fulfill their promise of a “clean” fuel efficient diesel engine. Instead, they chose to deceive the world, violating the law and the foundation the company's code of conduct was grounded in. This case provides an opportunity to explore corporate governance, ethical leadership, and the ethical and professional responsibilities that senior executives have to create and maintain an ethical culture. Examination of the details in the case uncover value conflicts. Examples of values included in IMA's Statement of Ethical Professional Practice are honesty, fairness, objectivity, and responsibility. IMA describes these as “overarching ethical principles.”

This case study deals with the financial accounting fraud at Sunbeam Corporation during the time “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap was the company’s CEO. This was a very pervasive fraud, involving improper revenue recognition, understatements of the reserves for sales returns and bad debts, abuse of the rules governing consignment sales, and other manipulations. While the amounts involved seem insignificant when compared to those of Enron and WorldCom, the study of Sunbeam is illuminating. Many of the problems at Sunbeam were caused by an abusive and egotistical CEO. In addition, Sunbeam’s external auditor during the period of the fraud was Arthur Andersen. Sunbeam can be viewed as being part of a continuum of audit failures extending from Waste Management to WorldCom. This case is designed in part to serve as an antidote to the coverage found in typical accounting by exposing students to a real situation in which people knowingly violated GAAP, and still received a clean audit opinion, and the company was eventually forced to declare bankruptcy.

This chapter first examines evidence concerning departures of the four flights out of Boston, D.C., and Newark, including identifications of the aircrafts involved, some evidence regarding the flight paths, and then the hijackings. Alleged video evidence at airports for the hijackers themselves is examined, but found to be unacceptable.

The fact of a conspiracy is uncontested by all. Three alternative conspiracy possibilities regarding the planes are examined: the ‘official’ one of suicide hijackers skillfully guiding planes with steeled determination into targets (independent of the hijackers’ identities); use of beaconing or electronic control, similar to ordinary commercial landings, into the targets; and use of ‘drone’ airplanes. The third alternative is not supportable at this time, but the other two are possible explanations, not necessarily equally likely.

The issue of insider trading before 9-11 is addressed. Publicly available data from OptionMetrics are provided and analyzed, indicating that many early reports were not using accurate data. Turning to an academic study in the Journal of Business which relies upon confidential, superior data, the findings are summarized that, indeed, there is evidence of insider trading before 9-11 on American Airlines and United Airlines. Larger concerns of insider trading are also summarized. Lastly, we give brief consideration to the profits certain capitalists make out of 9-11.