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Purpose: In reality, financial decisions are made under conditions of asymmetric information that results in either favorable or adverse selection. As far as financial decisions affect growth of the firm, the latter must also be affected by either favorable or adverse selection. Therefore, the core objective of this chapter is to examine the determinants of each financial decision and the effects on growth of the firm under conditions of information asymmetry.

Design/Methodology/Approach: This chapter uses data for the non-financial firms listed in S&P 500. The data cover quarterly periods from 1989 to 2014. The statistical tests include linearity, fixed, and random effects and normality. The generalized method of moments estimation method is employed in order to examine the relative significance and contribution of each financial decision on growth of the firm, respectively. Standard and proposed proxies of information asymmetry are discussed.

Findings: The results conclude that there is a variation in the impact of financial variables on growth of the firm at high and low levels of information asymmetry especially regarding investment and financing decisions. A similar picture emerges in the cases of firm size and industry effects. In addition, corporate dividen d policy has a similar effect on firm growth across all asymmetric levels. These findings prove that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the relationship between corporate financial decisions and growth of the firm. Finally, the results contribute to the vast literature on the estimation of information asymmetry by demonstrating that the classical and standard proxies for information asymmetry are not consistent in terms of the ability to differentiate between favorable or adverse selection (which corresponds to low and high level of information asymmetry).

Originality/Value: This chapter contributes to the related literature in two ways. First, this chapter offers updated empirical evidence on the way that financing, investment, and dividends decisions are made under conditions of favorable and adverse selection. Other related studies deal with each decision separately. Second, the study offers new proxies for measuring information asymmetry in order to reach robust estimates of the effects of financial decisions on growth of the firm under conditions of agency problems.

This chapter introduces dividend policy as both financial and business decisions. First, it presents the history of dividend payment, definition of dividend, and typical types of dividend. Dividends originate from liquidating payments of sailing vessels in the early 16th century and become popular with the development of corporations. In this book, a dividend is defined as a cash payment to shareholders. By payment time, there are three typical types of dividend including final dividend, interim dividend, and special dividend. Second, it presents definition, important dates, measures, and patterns of dividend policy. Dividend policy includes two decisions: the first is to pay or not to pay dividends, and the second is the dividend magnitude. Investors have to follow important dates of dividend payments in order to make their investment decisions. Important dates include declaration date, record date, ex-dividend date, and payment date. Dividend payout ratio and dividend yield are two common measures of dividend policy. Common patterns of dividend policy are no dividend policy, residual dividend policy, stable dividend policy, and irregular dividend policy. Finally, dividend policy is both financial and business-related decisions. Therefore, dividend decisions are affected by various levels of business environment such as internal, micro (industry), and macro-environment. Dividend theories are the behind mechanisms to explain the effect of each factor in the business environment on corporate dividend policy. Dividend policy, in turn, determines shareholders' wealth through its impact on stock price.

We investigate the implications of the misalignment between manager and shareholder interests and the effects of initial ownership stakes and reinvestment of unpaid dividends on managerial self-dealing.

We collect and analyze data from controlled laboratory experiments with an experimental setting which captures the role of ownership in managerial considerations.

We see the emergence of both investor-aligned outcomes and managerial self-dealing outcomes. We find that increasing managers’ initial endowment of shares makes it harder for managers to coordinate on an outcome and lowers return on investment. Moreover, allowing managers to reinvest unpaid dividends results in a transfer of wealth to management.

The results and the conclusions are drawn upon data from the particular setting we investigate. Generalizing them beyond the specific setting should be done with caution.

Higher managerial ownership stake means that managers have a greater incentive to reward shareholders, but we find that it may also imply a more difficult coordination problem between managers – sometimes to the detriment of shareholders.

This study is the first to consider the direct relationship between managers’ portfolios and voting decisions regarding dividends and investment levels.

This chapter analyzes how the internal environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, dividend policy is influenced by strategic and financial issues. Corporate strategies are developed by top managers to achieve firms' missions, visions, and long-term goals while business strategies are designed by middle managers to maintain firms' competitive advantages. These strategies affect corporate dividend decisions through corporate performance and business operations. In addition, many financial characteristics are important determinants of dividend policy. Financial characteristics are classified into three groups, namely performance-related issues (e.g., firm profitability, free cash flow, and stock liquidity), leverage-related issues (e.g., debt ratio, asset tangibility, business risk, and firm size), and investment-related issues (e.g., investment opportunities and firm maturity). Firms with high profitability, free cash flow tends to pay more dividends. Stock liquidity may have a positive effect on dividend payments through lowering costs of equity; however, it may also have a negative effect through weakening the signaling motive. Moreover, firms with high debt ratio, low asset tangibility, high business risk, and small size face higher costs of external financing. Therefore, they have low incentives to pay dividends. When firms have more investment opportunities, they are more likely to restrict dividends and save cash for their investment projects and vice versa. Second, internal stakeholders may influence corporate dividend policy since their benefits are closely related to dividend decisions. Shareholders, directors, the chief executive officer, and employees have different characteristics, positions, and hold various proportions of shares. Therefore, they create pressures on dividend decisions to protect their wealth.

This chapter presents both main arguments of dividend policy theories and their empirical evidence. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend decisions are not relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, there are several market frictions in the real world (e.g., information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, firm maturity, catering incentives and taxes). Therefore, academics use them to develop theories which help them explain corporate dividend decisions. Particularly, signaling theory considers dividend payments as a signal about firms' future prospects since outside investors face information disadvantage. “Bird-in-hand” theory argues that investors prefer dividends to capital gains since the former have lower risk than the latter. Agency theory is developed from the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. Corporate managers have high incentives to restrict dividend payments. Furthermore, transaction cost theory and pecking order theory posit that firms prefer internal to external funds. This drives firms to hold more cash and pay less dividends. Life cycle theory explains dividend policy by firm maturity. Mature firms have fewer investment opportunities, and thus, they tend to pay more dividends. Catering theory states that dividend decisions are based on investors' demand. Firms pay more dividends since investors prefer dividends and assign higher value to dividend payers. Tax clientele theory argues that firms that have corporate dividend policy rely on the comparative income tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Under the tax discriminations against dividends, firms tend to restrict their dividends in order to increase their stock prices.

This chapter provides an overview of the explanations and factors affecting dividend policy. This study employs a systematic literature review approach to review a large sample of studies related to the dividend puzzle. Although the analysis reveals mixed evidence involving the theories and determinants of dividend policy, some determinants appear in numerous studies. However, no consensus exists on an optimal dividend to resolve the dividend puzzle, and the authors propose a model to deal with the same. When examining dividend policy, researchers should consider the firm, market, behavior, and other determinants. When making significant dividend or stock decisions, managers and shareholders should also contemplate the factors, interactions, inadequacies, and consequences. Future researchers should strive to take a more comprehensive view when resolving the dividend puzzle. This study provides a current and complete picture of dividend policy's available theories and empirical determinants. Its significant contribution is identifying some of the more consistently essential determinants of dividend policy while proposing a holistic model to address the prevailing dividend dilemma.

The internal factors that influence the decision to change dividend growth rates include two competing models: the earnings and free cash flow models. As far as each of the components of each model is considered, the informative and efficient dividend payout decisions require that managers have to focus on the significant component(s) only. This study examines the cointegration, significance, and explanatory power of those components empirically. The expected outcomes serve two objectives. First, on an academic level, it is interesting to examine the extent to which payout practices meet the premises of the earnings and free cash flow models. The latter considers dividends and financing decisions as two faces of the same coin. Second, on a professional level, the outcomes help focus the management’s efforts on the activities that can be performed when considering a change in dividend growth rates.

This study uses data for the firms listed in two indexes: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA30) and NASDAQ100. The data cover quarterly periods from 30 June 1989 to 31 March 2011. The methodology includes (a) cointegration analysis in order to test for model specification and (b) classical regression in order to examine the explanatory power of the components of earnings and free cash flow models.

The results conclude that: (a) Dividends growth rates are cointegrated with the two models significantly; (b) Dividend growth rates are significantly and positively associated with growth in sales and cost of goods sold only. Accordingly, these are the two activities that firms’ management need to focus on when considering a decision to change dividend growth rates, (c) The components of the earnings and free cash flow models explain very little of the variations in dividends growth rates. The results are to be considered a call for further research on the external (market-level) determinants that explain the variations in dividends growth rates. Forthcoming research must separate the effects of firm-level and market-level in order to reach clear judgments on the determinants of dividends growth rates.

This study contributes to the related literature in terms of offering updated robust empirical evidence that the decision to change dividend growth rate is discretionary to a large extent. That is, dividend decisions do not match the propositions of the earnings and free cash flow models entirely. In addition, the results offer solid evidence that financing trends in the period 1989–2011 showed heavy dependence on debt financing compared to other related studies that showed heavy dependence on equity financing during the previous period 1974–1984.

The manner in which publicly traded companies’ management teams handle their firm’s free cash flows (FCF) has been an issue for many decades, because it is difficult to determine whether these management teams work for their own benefit or for that of their shareholders. Recent financial scandals have heightened mistrust of management. This mistrust, in turn, may have increased the pressure to reduce the portion of FCF left under management’s control. Boards of directors control dividend payout decisions, thus determining the portion of FCF available to corporate management. This paper examines whether the 2002 legal response to corporate financial reporting scandals, which came in the form of many new initiatives and requirements imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on all publicly traded firms, was relevant to dividend payouts. This question is investigated by noting that the impact of these new requirements differed among firms. Some firms had already introduced the use of independent directors and fully independent committees prior to SOX making them compulsory in 2002. This paper examines whether these “pre-adopters” experienced less change in their dividend payout policies than those firms that were forced to change the composition of their board and committees.

This investigation examines the effect on dividend payouts for listed firms attributable to the SOX and concurrent changes in stock exchange regulations that compelled increased use of independent directors and fully independent committees. To study the impact of SOX and the associated, required, changes in the composition of boards of directors for many firms, the difference-in-differences methodology is employed to overcome the endogeneity concerns that have consistently challenged prior governance studies. This was accomplished by examining the effects on dividend payouts associated with the exogenously forced addition of independent directors to the boards of publicly listed firms. The results reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between firms that were compelled by law to change their boards and increases in average changes in dividend payouts and percentage changes in dividends paid, when compared to firms that had pre-adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley corporate board composition requirements. A further exploratory analysis showed that the same significant positive relationship is detected for increases in average changes in total dollars distributed, where stock repurchase dollars are combined with dividend payouts. These findings imply that these board composition changes led to decisions that increased dividend payouts in percentage terms, as well as dividend payouts and total dollars distributed in aggregate dollar amount terms.

This chapter introduces dividend smoothing, presents theories to explain dividend smoothing behavior, and analyzes how different levels of business environment affect dividend smoothing. First, dividend smoothing describes a mechanism in which a firm is reluctant to reduce dividends and only increases dividends when its earnings increase permanently. In practice, dividend smoothing behavior is found in both developed and developing countries. Firms in developed countries are more likely to smooth dividends than those in developing countries. Second, although Miller and Modigliani (1961) posit that investors are indifferent between stable and unstable dividend payments in a perfect environment, market frictions in the real world make stable and unstable dividends have different effects on firm value. Three common frictions are information asymmetry, agency problem, and investors' demand for income smoothing. Due to information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, firms tend to smooth their dividends to signal outside investors about their quality. In addition, dividend smoothing may be the substitute for weak corporate governance and/or the outcome of free cash absorption behavior. Besides, dividends are more convenient for investors' consumption; therefore, firms are more likely to smooth dividends in order to satisfy investors' demand for smooth income. Finally, as a special dividend decision, dividend smoothing is also affected by an internal micro (industry) and macro-environment. Dividend smoothing theories are the behind mechanisms to explain these effects.

This model explains dividends as a component of a contract set up by an uninformed principal. I start from a well-documented empirical fact that there is a relation between dividends declared and executive compensation. I find that when hidden information is about the productivity of the agent then dividend – conditional on cash available – bears a negative relationship to managerial type. That is, for a given level of available cash, the lower type manager declares a higher dividend than that declared by a manager with higher productivity. The result is robust under different model extensions. I also discuss empirical implications of the model.